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boring? Contributors to On Boredom: Essays in art and writing, which include artists, 
art historians, psychoanalysts and a novelist, examine boredom in its manifold and 
uncertain reality. Each part of the book takes up a crucial moment in the history of 
boredom and presents it in a new light, taking the reader from the trials of the consulting 
room to the experience of hysteria in the nineteenth century. The book pays particular 
attention to boredom’s relationship with the sudden and rapid advances in technology 
that have occurred in recent decades, specifically technologies of communication, 
surveillance and automation.
On Boredom is idiosyncratic for its combination of image and text, and the artworks 
included in its pages – by Mathew Hale, Martin Creed and Susan Morris – help turn 
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Josh Cohen, Briony Fer, Anouchka Grose, Rye Dag Holmboe, Margaret Iversen,  
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Introduction: on boredom
Rye Dag Holmboe and Susan Morris
The Oxford English Dictionary defines boredom, tautologically, as ‘the 
state of being bored’, and provides us with two synonyms, perhaps by 
way of compensation: ‘tedium’ and ‘ennui’. The entry states that the first 
uses of the word ‘boredom’ in literature are found in Charles Dickens’s 
Bleak House (1852–3). The aptly named Lady Dedlock suffers from the 
‘chronic malady of boredom’ because she is stuck in a marriage of 
convenience. Meanwhile, another character called Volumnia is described 
as someone ‘who cannot long continue silent without imminent peril of 
seizure by the dragon Boredom, [and who] soon indicates the approach 
of that monster with a series of undisguisable yawns’. Boredom, for the 
Dickens of Bleak House at least, seems to be a female malady, one that 
is by turn chronic, monstrous and spasmodic, a deadly sickness. Lady 
Dedlock was ‘bored to death’, he writes.1
That the OED’s lexicographers could find no better way of 
describing boredom than by resorting to tautology shows just how 
difficult the condition is to define. The word names the experience of 
a kind of deadlock, one that can be so obdurate and self-referential that 
the best way of accounting for it may be in its own terms: boredom means 
being bored. Failing this, one might resort to the use of synonyms – 
‘tedium’, ‘ennui’, but also ‘monotony’, ‘dullness’, ‘dreariness’, ‘weariness’, 
‘inertia’, ‘apathy’ and so on – knowing that none of these words means the 
same thing. The attempt to define boredom precisely may be a hopeless 
task. Yet it is at least arguable that this resistance to definition, and 
indeed this hopelessness, resonate in some ways with the experience of 
boredom, and so provide a true enough description of it. We are bored 
when we lose interest. The world then feels unavailable or withdrawn, 
refuses to mean anything other than itself, and appears to prevent us 
from relating to it in a creative or meaningful way. Described in this 
manner, boredom starts to sound like depression, even melancholia, 
though the condition is probably more mundane than either.
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Much has changed since Dickens used the word, and it is often held 
that boredom, understood as a by-product of industrial capitalism, 
describes a structure of feeling that characterised Britain and Europe 
in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, not what is now 
variously called postmodernity, late capitalism or the contemporary. 
Flaubert was bored, Emma Bovary was bored, Manet’s Olympia was 
bored, Lady Dedlock was bored, Volumnia was bored, the bourgeoisie 
was bored, Heidegger, Kierkegaard and Schopenhauer were bored, 
Nietzsche even thought that, after the seventh day of creation, God 
was bored, but we today are not bored. We are distracted, unable to 
maintain our attention for any considerable length of time, and this, it is 
claimed, prevents us from developing genuine and profound interests 
and from experiencing life authentically. This attention deficit, itself one 
of the most prevalent diagnoses in mental health today, especially of 
children, may also make us vulnerable to manipulation and exploitation. 
Our perception of the world is so fragmented and overloaded by new 
technologies that we risk losing our critical faculties altogether, even, 
according to one critic, our capacity for sleep.2 Meanwhile, hundreds 
of books are published each year that show us how to focus our minds, 
how to respond with greater ease to the proliferation of information 
in what has been called ‘the age of distraction’.3 The implication is that 
the ‘age of boredom’,4 as Flaubert described it, has now passed. The 
principal culprits are thought to be the culture industries and, more 
recently, the internet, together with the digital technologies that allow 
us to access it. Under such conditions, it would seem that the time 
needed to be bored is no longer available. We may now even feel 
nostalgic for those times in our lives when we were bored: in childhood, 
say, when time seemed to slow down, sometimes painfully so. The 
danger in this form of retrospection, of course, is that boredom is 
idealised or romanticised. ‘Boredom is the dream bird that hatches 
the egg of experience,’ wrote Walter Benjamin. ‘A rustling in the leaves 
drives him away.’5 Boredom may at times be a dream bird, the ground 
of creativity, and so quite unlike Dickens’s dragon or monster. Yet it 
should not be forgotten that, if the rustle of leaves distracts us from what 
may be the deeper and more fundamental experience of boredom, and 
if distraction, once a remedy or palliative, has since become its own 
sickness, then boredom nonetheless remains an experience that we 
spend much of our lives trying to avoid, and for good reason. Being 
bored is a little like being dead – in a minor key. ‘Concert, assembly, 
opera, theatre, drive, nothing is new to my Lady under the worn-out 
heavens,’6 writes Dickens of Lady Dedlock.
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On Boredom addresses boredom in its manifold and uncertain 
reality, and asks what might be at stake in thinking about the affect today. 
One of the basic questions the writing and art included in this volume 
pose is whether there is a creative or critical potential to boredom or 
whether it is in fact as deadening an experience as it is often held to be. 
‘All boredom is counter revolutionary,’7 cried the Situationists in the 
1960s. Perhaps that is so. But perpetual revolution can itself become 
boring, permanent change can feel like sameness, and what is striking 
is how boredom, itself an ordinary, everyday experience, can become 
the site of some of our most extreme fantasies and projections: 
of revolution, counter-revolution, sickness, deadness, creativity, dream 
birds, dragons and monsters. Why might this be so? Is boredom really 
such a Pandora’s box? Or do these fantasies betray just how anxious 
we are at the possibility of confronting our own boredom, with the risk 
that we might encounter a meaningless kernel at the very heart of what 
we call life?
Answers to these questions – and there are of course many others – 
have come from a range of different perspectives. Material from artists, 
art historians, philosophers, literary theorists, psychoanalysts, writers 
and a novelist has been collected together to form a book that responds, 
both in its content and in its form, to the complexities and texture of the 
affect called boredom. The hope is that the combination of scholarship 
and artistic practice, of image and text, is adequate to an experience 
that is particularly difficult to put into words. The three visual artists 
whose work is included in the book, Martin Creed, Mathew Hale and 
Susan Morris, all engage in different ways with forms of attention 
and inattention. Creed’s work examines questions related to seriality, 
repetition and monotony, and his doodles or scribbles that punctuate 
this volume are the kind you might make when bored. The addition 
of repetitive lyrics adds to this effect. Hale’s contribution aspires to be a 
kind of autobiographical artwork, which mimics, parodically, interactive 
processes between humans and early computers. Meanwhile, Morris’s 
work, which also provides this book with its cover, conjures up a 
subject, her ‘self’, caught up in a technological web and subject to clichéd 
expressions, automatic gestures and repetitive behaviour. The work of 
each artist makes visible, in a compressed and visual form, some of the 
book’s key concerns, and we regard each contribution as a standalone 
work in its own right. On Boredom also includes an extract from Tom 
McCarthy’s Satin Island (2015), a novel that takes boredom as one of its 
subjects. Among the reasons why U, the novel’s protagonist, succumbs 
to the ‘mental disorder’ that leads to his manic attempts at composing a 
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‘Great Report’ or ‘anthropology of the Contemporary’, a task replicated in 
the writing of the novel itself, is to escape from the experience of 
boredom.8 The inclusion of this extract allows fiction to enter into 
productive dialogue with other forms of writing.
The other essays included in On Boredom take what may be in some 
respects a more familiar and academic approach. They address the 
problem of boredom in philosophy, psychoanalysis, art history and 
literature. Rye Dag Holmboe takes as his starting point the letters of 
Gustave Flaubert. His opening essay, ‘Where is the rule?’, tries to make 
sense of the plural and unruly nature of boredom as it is expressed in 
the novelist’s correspondence and argues for its survival in different 
forms of contemporary art. Anouchka Grose asks whether boredom is 
a precondition of a psychoanalyst’s work in the consulting room, the 
analyst’s ‘tragedy’; being professional might also mean being boring. 
Does one have to make oneself affectless and dull in order to open up 
space for the other person to speak?, she asks. Briony Fer examines visual 
representations of yawning, noting how photographic reproductions 
of yawning mouths also open up holes in the pages they are (barely) 
contained in. Yawns, Fer suggests, often escape representation, but when 
they are recorded in photographs or other media, they reveal the gaps 
and metonymic slippages that underlie representation itself.
Margaret Iversen and Josh Cohen both examine boredom as 
it relates to particular artists: Iversen’s essay considers the uses of 
emptiness and silence in the work of Thomas Demand, in particular his 
Dailies, begun in 2008, a series that deals with the ‘ubiquitous, banal, 
everyday practice of taking photographs with one’s smartphone’; 
Cohen examines Andy Warhol’s self-positioning as a permanently bored 
subject – his ‘blank indifference’, he suggests, may operate as a form 
of self-defence. Meanwhile, Susan Morris widens and moves beyond 
the discussion of her own work in order to consider the relation of 
boredom to digital technologies, arguing that, while ostensibly opening 
up ever more channels of communication between people, these 
technologies actually reduce the encounter with others or indeed with 
otherness as such. She argues for ways in which artists can create space 
in the fractures, blanks and discontinuities within a text: in writing’s 
undercurrent, or in what the poet Claudia Rankine terms the ‘underneath-
ness’ of language, where it is possible, as Rankine suggests, to stage 
silence.9 A philosophically grounded exploration of boredom is further 
developed in Michael Newman’s essay, which addresses the time of 
boredom. Newman considers examples of long-form artworks, such 
as John Cale’s 18-hour performance of Eric Satie’s Vexations (1893–4) 
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in 1963 and Andy Warhol’s film Empire (1964), which deliberately 
provoke boredom as a way of commenting on, or objecting to, the 
measurement and commodification of time. Could art have any role in 
the production of different temporal relations, associated, say, with 
a wasting of time? And if it is true that today ‘distraction covers the entire 
social and existential field’, why, asks Newman, is this not a period of 
‘great boredom’?
The focus of these essays falls on cultural traditions from Western 
Europe and North America. The aim was not to produce an exhaustive 
or comprehensive overview of the subject – a Great Report on boredom, 
say – but to extend some of the previous research on boredom in 
interesting and unexpected ways. The essays explore and expand upon 
a rich vein of European and American writing on the subject, which 
stands in need of re-evaluation. The focus is in this way restricted but 
broadened by an innovative and interdisciplinary approach. The reader 
will also note that psychoanalysis often figures in the pages that follow. 
This is partly because the writers, artists and academics invited to 
contribute to the volume share an interest in the discipline and were 
brought together for that reason. It is also because psychoanalysts have 
provided us with some of the most insightful and memorable theoretical 
accounts of boredom: Sándor Ferenczi, Otto Fenichel and, more recently, 
Adam Phillips, whose striking description of boredom as ‘that most 
absurd and paradoxical wish, the wish for a desire’ resonates with much 
of the material examined in this book, if often only tangentially. In 
‘On Being Bored’ (1994), Phillips describes ‘ordinary states of boredom’ 
as being ‘both waiting for something and looking for something’. In this 
sense, he adds, ‘boredom is akin to free-floating attention’, like that 
required of the psychoanalyst. He then gives the example of a ‘desolate 
child’ for whom ‘greed was a form of self-cure for a malign boredom that 
continually placed him on the threshold of an emptiness, a lack, that he 
couldn’t bear; an emptiness in which his own idiosyncratic, unconscious 
desire lurked’. For Phillips, however, the desire for nothing – the desire 
that one might have nothing to desire – could also be triggered by another 
kind of demand. ‘It is one of the most oppressive demands of adults 
that the child should be interested,’ he writes.10 Boredom might then 
be seen as a form of protest; boredom as a refusal of desire, or as a desire 
for nothing.
Such, then, are some of the ambivalences and complexities inherent 
to the experience of boredom. It is hoped that, rather than resolving 
these problems, the essays in art and writing encountered in On Boredom 
will help to deepen and extend them in creative and productive ways.
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A final note. Though this book was edited before the outbreak of 
Covid-19, we feel that the contributions to this volume find a renewed 
sense of urgency today. Perhaps at no other time in human history 
have such great numbers of people been forced to confront their own 
boredom, living in isolation from each other and needing to find ways 
of distracting themselves from a condition that can at times be stifling 
and claustrophobic. Yet these times have also shown, more hopefully, 
that boredom can be the source of creativity. The book’s cover image, 
by Susan Morris, speaks to this potential. It’s a still from a film made 
over a 24-hour period in May 2020, during what is now referred to as the 
‘first’ lockdown. Initially part of an ‘Instagram takeover’ commissioned 
by Kunsthaus Centre d’art Pasquart, Switzerland, the film is made up of 
24 one-minute video sequences shot on an iPhone.
Notes
 1 Dickens, Bleak House, chs 28, 58, 2.
 2 See Crary, 24/7.
 3 See, for example, Hassan, The Age of Distraction.
 4 Flaubert, letter to his mother, 14 November 1850, https://flaubert.univ-rouen.fr/
correspondance. Translation by Rye Dag Holmboe.
 5 Benjamin, Illuminations, 81.
 6 Dickens, Bleak House, ch. 12. 
 7 Debord, cited in Merrifield, Metromarxism, 107. 
 8 McCarthy, Satin Island.
 9 Flescher and Caspar, ‘Interview with Claudia Rankine’.
10 Phillips, On Kissing, Tickling, and Being Bored, 69.
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Where is the rule?
Rye Dag Holmboe
‘Isn’t “not to be bored” one of the principal goals of life?’1 This was one 
of the questions Gustave Flaubert asked himself while travelling around 
the Orient with Maxime Du Camp between 1848 and 1851. The journey 
filled the novelist with a degree of anxiety, torn as he was between 
Orientalist visions of splendour and a fear that reality would be a little 
more boring than his imaginings – and so much of Flaubert’s writing 
seems to exist within that gap.
His fears appear to have been well founded. After an initial thrill, 
Flaubert soon slipped into a kind of languid torpor. As Du Camp writes in 
his memoirs, ‘If it had been possible, Flaubert would have travelled on a 
divan, lying down, without moving, watching the landscapes, the ruins 
and the cities passing in front of his eyes like the canvas unrolling in a 
panorama-machine.’2 Flaubert here comes to resemble a kind of odalisque 
at the cinema, albeit of a primitive sort, and closer to Manet’s Olympia 
than he is to Ingres’s.
Indeed, the banality of the journey seemed to highlight, for 
Flaubert, something like the loss of the sacred. In one of the most 
amusing moments in his letters (to my mind his correspondence is 
often very funny; he’s a militant misanthropist), this one addressed to 
his uncle, Flaubert describes how in Alexandria, a certain Thompson, 
from Sunderland, had written his name and the name of his hometown 
in letters three feet tall down the side of Pompeii’s column. The words 
‘Thompson from Sunderland’ could be read at such a great distance that 
it was impossible to see the column without seeing the name Thompson 
and thinking of Thompson. ‘The cretin has incorporated himself into 
the monument and perpetuates himself with it,’ writes Flaubert. ‘He has 
crushed it with the splendour of his letters. All imbeciles are more or less 
Thompson from Sunderland.’3
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Ennui – I will keep the French to maintain the distinction for now – 
has become a byword for the experience of capitalist modernity, a 
word almost synonymous with the alienation and anomie putatively 
experienced by the much-derided bourgeoisie. Flaubert himself used, 
and perhaps coined, the expression ‘the age of ennui’4 to describe the 
tentacular quality of this affect. Most of his protagonists are, in one way 
or another, immersed in, or absorbed by, ennui. But in his letters, the 
meaning of the word ennui, variants of which are used more than 
100 times, is both elastic and capacious. Ennui, as he puts it in one letter, 
knows no measure. It is unruly, ‘démésuré’,5 a great leveller indifferent 
to its object – to time or to place – so that Flaubert carries it with him 
everywhere he goes: school, Rouen, Paris, the Nile. Ennui devours 
everything that it meets, and it is interesting that Flaubert links the 
experience to orality, which makes sense: we eat when we are bored, we 
fill a hole, but we can also be eaten up by boredom.
The first time Flaubert used the word ennui was in a letter written 
to his friend Ernest Chevalier. The letter is dated 26 December 1838, 
Boxing Day. Flaubert was 17. Chevalier was a schoolfriend of Flaubert’s 
whom the novelist would later deride for getting married and for 
becoming an archetypal bourgeois. In the 1838 letter, the adolescent 
Flaubert writes that his heart is inexplicably filled with ennui. Elsewhere 
he describes Rouen, the city where he lives, as a place drowning in shit 
where the good citizens ‘wank themselves silly on a Sunday from ennui’.6 
For Flaubert, it would seem, ennui, leisure and masturbation go hand in 
hand. The psychoanalyst Sándor Ferenczi had an expression for this 
tendency, which, in a paper of the same name published in 1919, he 
called the ‘Sunday neuroses’.7 Ferenczi argued that the experience of 
leisure on Sundays could become debilitating, almost intolerable and, 
with Flaubert’s letter in mind, in need of discharge.
In 1839, to the same friend, Flaubert complains how dull the 
world is and warns Chevalier that he, like everyone else, will only 
experience ennui during his lifetime, a grave after death and rot for 
eternity, or what he also describes as ‘merde au surplus’,8 a surplus of 
shit – Flaubert is also a great writer of scatology. In later letters, he often 
uses the reflexive verb s’ennuyer, to be bored or to bore oneself, which is 
synonymous for Flaubert with s’emmerder, to bore oneself shitless 
or, more literally, to bore oneself shitful, that is to say, to become 
constipated by boredom, as well as s’embêter, which sits somewhere 
between boring oneself and annoying oneself, but which also invokes 
that other word so dear to Flaubert, bête or bêtise. This term can be 
translated as ‘dumb’ or ‘stupid’, but it is noteworthy that in French it 
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carries zoological connotations: bête also means ‘beast’. In this context, 
it is worth observing that in his letters Flaubert identified with a whole 
set of animals. The list is remarkably long and includes a camel, a lion, a 
tiger, a sheep, a monkey, a donkey, a parrot, a dog, a whale, an oyster 
and, perhaps most famously, a bear, even a stuffed bear, like a specimen 
from a natural history museum. Hence Julian Barnes’s felicitous pun, 
from his book Flaubert’s Parrot (1994), ‘Flaubear’, or – less successfully – 
in French, ‘Goursstave’.9 And this experience of animality or bearishness 
– ourserie10 is Flaubert’s term, but it was also used by the Goncourt 
brothers to describe the experience of the French artist in the nineteenth 
century more generally – is inextricably tied to the artist’s experience 
of ennui, here tantamount to a kind of hibernation. Yet it is not only the 
animal world that ennui brings into being, if I can put it that way. 
Flaubert’s letters also link the experience to the vegetal and the fungal. 
In one letter, he describes himself as a ‘mushroom swollen by ennui’.11 
In another, he describes himself as a fossil, as though the experience of 
ennui was akin to a form of petrifaction, a sinking into what, today, in the 
age of the so-called Anthropocene, has come to be known as deep time.
Ennui, then, seems to be related to different becomings: becoming 
animal, becoming plant, becoming mushroom, becoming fossil, 
becoming bête. The caveat is that these becomings are debilitating. 
Flaubert describes the experience of ennui as tidal, an affect that can 
swallow him up like the sea, that he can become twisted or caught up 
in, that can dry out his pipes – a not very subtle metaphor – and that stops 
him from smoking, that can make him constipated, both anally and 
creatively. Ennui is also described as a contagious malady, a form of 
leprosy, a sickness of the nerves, an affect that suffocates, to the extent 
that in one letter he imagines himself as an Egyptian mummy embalmed 
by ennui and asks rhetorically whether he had in fact died before he 
was born. Yet if ennui cannot kill, Flaubert goes on to write, with 
characteristic irony – he is, after all, still alive, or just about, living but 
already dead – it can still turn him into a ‘thinking phantom’ or a ‘walking 
shadow’.12 Ennui, then, is experienced as a form of mortification. It affects 
the nervous system. This was made most explicit in a letter written in 
1861 in which Flaubert described himself as a bored hysteric. Boredom 
and hysteria have a particular history. Joseph Breuer, in his study on 
hysteria, writes that his patient Anna O.’s hysterical symptoms were 
creative ways of fending off boredom, so that hysteria might be seen as 
an imaginary solution, experienced in visions or somatic symptoms, to 
different forms of repression or, in Anna O.’s case, patriarchal oppression.13 
I wonder whether some of the fantasies staged in Flaubert’s letters might 
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be seen in such terms. One critic, Naomi Schor, has argued that Flaubert 
can be seen as a male lesbian because of his passivity – ‘Lesbos is my 
homeland,’ as the novelist once put it – which might also help to make 
sense of that vision of the novelist as a bored Olympia gazing at the ruins 
of the past projected onto a rolling panorama-machine.14 I also suspect 
that when Roland Barthes described ennui as his version of hysteria, he 
had Flaubert in mind.15
I hope that this does not sound like too much of a catalogue, or like 
a boring French lesson – though, given one of the works included in the 
artist Mathew Hale’s contribution to this book, There Was Silence in 
Heaven the Space of Half an Hour, perhaps that is in the spirit of things. 
But it felt important to give a sense of the volatility of ennui. The word is 
very unstable, like a Pandora’s box out of which emerge visions of the 
subject that are polymorphic and undo distinctions between species, 
genders, sexualities, the living and the dead, and the animate and the 
inanimate. A portrait of the artist as a mummified, mushroom-like bear 
who is also a hysterical male lesbian is a very confused, perhaps queer 
image, difficult to hold together or to come to terms with. It would 
be tricky, if not impossible, to extricate a particular facet of ennui and 
claim that it is representative of Flaubert’s prismatic subjectivity, at 
least as it is expressed in his letters. Perhaps this helps to make sense of 
his claim in one letter that there is no way to rationalise ennui and no 
obvious cause for it. In any case, what seems clear is that the term is so 
over-determined and ambivalent, or just plain weird, that it should 
be distinguished from the kind of existential angst that the term carries 
in the Romantic tradition and indeed in philosophy, particularly in 
Schopenhauer’s writings: Flaubert against the philosophers, perhaps.
Of course, all this might seem a far cry from the ordinary, everyday 
experience of boredom – though it is worth asking what kind of fantasies 
we are avoiding when we are bored – and ennui in the middle of the 
nineteenth century was in many ways different from the experience of 
boredom today. Michael Newman argues in his essay published in the 
present volume that the ‘great boredom’ has come to an end and that 
whatever form of boredom we now experience is in a minor key. But then 
affects are unruly things, resistant to strict periodisation, anachronistic 
– ennui, after all, gives Flaubert the impression that he may have died 
before he was born – and it could be argued that the affect has migrated 
and survives in certain forms of what we tend to call – for that very reason 
problematically – contemporary art.
As has been suggested, Flaubert’s experience of ennui is related 
to a very particular form of Orientalism, where symbolic forms are 
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deconstructed and brought down to earth; Flaubert’s vision of the Orient 
always errs on the side of Thompson, so to speak. His writings about 
Egypt register the sense that exhausted modes of representation, such as 
stereotype and cliché, prevent us from knowing the world immediately. 
The world is not encountered directly but is mediated by images 
inherited from popular literature, mass culture and religious rhetoric, 
the already seen and the already heard. That is why Flaubert is often 
seen to anticipate what is still sometimes referred to as postmodernism. 
The vision of the writer lying on a divan watching the sacred relics of 
the past in a kind of dumb torpor – ‘the Egyptian temples bore me 
profoundly’,16 he complains – is closer to Félicité’s communion with a 
stuffed parrot in the novella A Simple Heart (1877) than it is to religious 
experience per se. Félicité is something of a holy fool who in her dying 
moments misrecognises Loulou, her deceased stuffed parrot, for the Holy 
Ghost – and remember that Flaubert described himself as a stuffed bear.
In this context, one might also mention the experience of Saint 
Anthony in The Temptation of Saint Anthony (1874), who is tempted by a 
parade of grotesques and is attracted not by their spirituality or by the 
plenitude of their symbolic forms, but by their stupidity. When the bête 
Catoblépas, a black buffalo with the head of a pig that drags on the 
ground, addresses him, Saint Anthony is bored almost to death: ‘Its 
stupidity fascinates me,’ he says, to the extent that he later identifies with 
the monster and cries out: ‘I too am an animal!’17 Walter Benjamin has 
suggested that the identifications that take place in the Temptation are 
symptomatic of the empathy with exchange-value typical of capitalist 
modernity. To make sense of this claim, think of a status symbol, often 
an artwork, where people worship the price they have paid for a 
commodity more than its material properties.18 Yet it is on this same 
basis that Sven Lütticken has argued that works by contemporary artists 
such as Damien Hirst are a financial success, ultimate symbols precisely 
in so far as they reveal themselves to be conventional signs.19 The point 
is that demystification does not dislodge the fetish from the commodity 
because the buyer identifies with the commodity’s exchange-value, not 
its material qualities. This may explain why Hirst can freely say that 
whether the metal casings in his works enclose an animal or not is 
immaterial. He has also described himself as ‘a cunt who sells shit to 
fools’.20 Like the Flaubertian symbol, Hirst’s works are stereotypical and 
neo-archaic, both new and already old, and are thus a source of perpetual 
ennui. In his Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, Marx wrote 
of boredom as ‘the mystical feeling which drives the philosopher from 
abstract thinking to intuition … the longing for content’.21 This sense of 
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longing may also make sense of the pathos of the Flaubertian symbol, of 
which Hirst’s work is a later, and arguably more boring, iteration.
So where is the rule? This was the question asked on numerous 
occasions by Bouvard and Pécuchet, the eponymous protagonists of 
Flaubert’s novel, which, one letter tells us, might have borne the subtitle 
On the lack of method in the sciences.22 The book is about two mad Parisian 
bachelors who discover that they are both copy clerks and become 
friends. They share a distaste for urban life and for their work. When 
Bouvard inherits a small fortune, the two buy a farm where they retire 
and begin an encyclopedic quest for knowledge. They try chemistry, 
physiology, anatomy, geology, archaeology. On a visit to the natural 
history museum, the stuffed quadrupeds fill them with amazement, the 
butterflies with delight, the fossils make them dream, the conchological 
specimens bore them – and yes, you really could be at a Hirst exhibition 
– but in the end, all the reader is presented with is the repetition 
of clichés. Flaubert’s writing, his absolute way of seeing things, is 
indifferent to its object, to what Leo Bersani has described, in his essay 
‘Flaubert’s encyclopedism’, as ‘the superficial differences of content’.23 
‘What happens to horticulture or jam-making’, writes the critic, ‘is 
identical to what happens to theological doctrine and natural history.’24 
Cumulative descriptions exhaust the protagonists, the subject matter 
and the reader, whose capacity for metabolising information is broken 
down, leading to the experience of boredom. If the Temptation ends with 
Saint Anthony’s climax, Bouvard and Pécuchet ends with a parody of the 
very possibility of climax. But it would not be adequate to say that 
Bouvard and Pécuchet’s quest is motivated by failure. Their liveliness 
and restlessness, their craving for sensations and mental activity, are 
motivated and driven by an anxiety not to be bored. This for Flaubert is 
the ultimate goal of life, and theirs is a boredom closer to how we might 
mean it today, in the age of the internet and mass distraction.
When the two protagonists finally realise that their quest for total 
knowledge is bound to fail, they return to their roles as copyists, and, had 
the novel been finished, they would have gone on to compose a Dictionary 
of Received Ideas. In raising the craft of the copyist to the same level as 
that of the artist, their quest reminded me of figures such as Herman 
Melville’s Bartleby the scrivener, but also of conceptual art: Sol LeWitt, to 
be sure, but also a work by John Baldessari, which he made in 1971 and 
called I Will Not Make Any More Boring Art25 (Fig. 1.1).
I want to end with this work, if only to raise a question.
For Baldessari, the point of the work was to challenge ‘received 
wisdom, what you would get in school. And so a lot of my work was about 
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questioning this received wisdom.’26 Unable to travel to the exhibition in 
1971 to which he had been invited for lack of funds, he sent instead a set 
of instructions:
I have no idea what your gallery looks like of course, and I know 
that you do not have much money for shows so that conditions 
my ideas of course … I’ve got a punishment piece. It will require 
a surrogate or surrogates since I cannot be there to … impose 
punishment. But that’s ok, since the theory is that punishment 
should be instructive for others. And there is a precedent for it, 
Christ being punished for our sins, and many others. So some 
student scapegoats are necessary. If you can’t induce anybody to be 
sacrificial and take my sins upon their shoulders, then use whatever 
funds there are, fifty dollars, to pay someone as a mercenary.
The piece is this, from floor to ceiling should be written by 
one or more people, one sentence under another, the following 
statement: I will not make any more boring art.27
I think this statement suggests a connection between boredom and 
ennui, which may be related to a kind of sadomasochistic structure. 
Figure 1.1 John Baldessari, I Will Not Make Any More Boring Art, 1971. New York, Museum of 
Modern Art (MoMA). Lithograph, composition: 56.8 × 75.1 cm; sheet: 57 × 76.4 cm. © 2020. 
Digital image, The Museum of Modern Art, New York/Scala, Florence.
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What the terms share may have something to do with the repressed 
violence of their etymologies. Ennui is derived from the Latin in odio, 
to be in hate, while boredom is derived from the German bohren, to bore 
or to drill. The Oxford English Dictionary declares that its likeliest 
connection is to ‘making a hole’ by persistent pushing or drilling. 
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Prayer and other lyrics 
Martin Creed
PRAYER
I WISH I DIDN’T KNOW THINGS
I WISH I DIDN’T KNOW THINGS
I WISH I DIDN’T KNOW THINGS
I WISH I DIDN’T KNOW THINGS
IT DOES MY HEAD IN
IT DOES MY HEAD IN
I DON’T WANT TO KNOW









AND THIS IS NO EXCEPTION
THIS IS NO EXCEPTION
THIS IS NO EXCEPTION
THIS IS NO EXCEPTION
AND NEITHER IS THIS
AND NEITHER IS THIS
AND NEITHER IS THIS
AND NEITHER IS THIS
AND NEITHER IS THIS
AND NEITHER IS THIS
AND NEITHER IS THIS
AND NEITHER IS THIS
AND SO ARE WE
AND SO ARE WE
AND SO ARE WE
AND SO ARE WE
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WHAT THE FUCK AM I ?
WHAT THE FUCK AM I?
WHAT THE FUCK AM I SEEING?
WHAT THE FUCK AM I HEARING?
WHAT THE FUCK AM I SMELLING?
WHAT THE FUCK AM I SAYING?
WHAT THE FUCK AM I DOING?
WHAT THE FUCK AM I DOING?
WHAT THE FUCK AM I DOING?
I CAN’T BELIEVE MY EYES
WHAT THE FUCK AM I DOING?
I CAN’T BELIEVE MY EARS
WHAT THE FUCK AM I DOING?
I CAN’T BELIEVE MY NOSE
WHAT THE FUCK AM I DOING?
















WHAT THE FUCK AM I DOING? 
WHAT THE FUCK AM I DOING? 
WHAT THE FUCK AM I DOING? 
WHAT THE FUCK AM I DOING? 
WHAT THE FUCK AM I THINKING? 
WHAT THE FUCK AM I THINKING? 
I CAN’T BELIEVE MY HEAD 
I CAN’T BELIEVE MY HEAD 
WHAT THE FUCK AM I FEELING? 
WHAT THE FUCK AM I FEELING? 
I CAN’T BELIEVE MY HEART 
I CAN’T BELIEVE MY HEART 
WHERE THE FUCK AM I GOING? 
WHERE THE FUCK AM I GOING? 
I CAN’T BELIEVE MY FEET 
I CAN’T BELIEVE MY FEET 
WHAT THE FUCK AM I DOING? 
WHAT THE FUCK AM I DOING? 
WHAT THE FUCK AM I D-D-D-D-D-D-D-D-DOING?
WHERE THE FUCK AM I G-G-G-G-G-G-G-G-GOING?
WHAT THE FUCK AM I TH-TH-TH-TH-TH-TH-TH-TH-THINKING 











WHAT THE FUCK AM I?
WHAT THE FUCK AM I?




IT’S A BORDER CONTROL 
IT’S A BORDER CONTROL 
IT’S A BORDER CONTROL 
IT’S A BORDER CONTROL 
IT’S A BORDER CON
IT’S A BORDER CON
IT’S A BORDER CON
IT’S A BORDER 
IT’S A BORDER 
IT’S A BORE 
IT’S A BORE 
IT’S A BORE 
IT’S A BORE 
IT’S A BORE 
IT’S A BORE 




I GOT MYSELF INTO A MIND TRAP
AND NOW I’M LOOKING FOR A MIND TRAP MAP
I CAN’T GET OUT OF THIS MIND CRAP
I’M LOOKING FOR A MIND CRAP GAP
LEFT AND RIGHT AND UP
DOWN AND ROUND AND BACK
THROUGH AND ACROSS AND ALONG
BIT BY BIT BY BIT
I GOT MYSELF INTO A MIND TRAP
AND NOW I’M LOOKING FOR A MIND TRAP MAP
I CAN’T GET OUT OF THIS MIND CRAP
I’M LOOKING FOR A MIND CRAP GAP
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IT’S YOU
WHATEVER YOU FEEL 
WHATEVER YOU WANT 
WHATEVER YOU DO 
WHATEVER YOU DON’T 
WHATEVER YOU THINK 
WHENEVER YOU SINK 
WHEREVER YOU STAND 
WHEREVER’S YOUR LAND 
IT’S YOU AT THE FRONT 
AND IT’S YOU AT THE BACK 





IT’S YOU ON THE TOP
AND IT’S YOU UNDERNEATH
IT’S YOU IN THE MIDDLE
AND IT’S YOU ON THE SIDE
IT’S YOU, IT’S YOU, IT’S YOU
IT’S YOU THROUGH AND THROUGH
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PASS THEM ON
IF YOU’RE FEELING BAD
AND YOUR THOUGHTS ARE SAD















TO SOMEONE ELSE LIKE A FRIEND OR A RELATIVE









SHE’S NOT A WALKER
SHE’S NOT A WALKER
SHE’S NOT A WALKER
SHE’S NOT A WALKER
SHE’S A PRINCESS
AND SHE’S A TAXI GIRL









SHE’S NOT A STALKER
AND SHE’S NOT A TALKER





SHE’S A PARTY GIRL




I DON’T MIND IF I DO
PRINCESS TAXI GIRL
I DON’T MIND IF I DO
MIND 
25
(YOU PUT YOUR) HAND IN MY HAND







YOU PUT MY HEAD IN THE CLOUDS
YOU PUT THE CLOUDS IN MY HEAD
YOU PUT THOUGHTS IN MY HEAD
YOU PUT MY HEAD IN THE CLOUDS OF THE THOUGHTS
IN YOUR HEAD IN MY MIND
WITH THE THOUGHTS IN MY HEAD







YOU PUT YOUR FOOT IN MY MOUTH
YOU PUT YOUR TONGUE IN MY MOUTH
YOU PUT MY FEET ON THE GROUND
YOU TAKE THE RUG FROM MY FEET
YOU PUT YOUR HAIR ON MY FACE
YOU PUT MY HAIR OUT OF PLACE
I PUT MY LIFE IN YOUR HANDS
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Twenty years of boredom
Susan Morris
In 1997, at the time of making my computer-based work TEXT, I became 
interested in the way that then-new digital technology enabled you to take 
sequences of still or moving images, or audio recordings, and play them in 
a random order. Thus, in their ever-changing relation to one another, the 
components of any piece could build their own narratives, automatically, 
almost as if they were writing themselves. TEXT consists of a collection of 
quotations, bibliographies, indexes, contents pages and references on the 
subject of boredom, organised as a series of self-contained animations 
that run up the screen like end credits in cinema or TV – except that parts 
of the transcribed written material are sometimes cropped or out of frame. 
Adding the random function ensures that what is being communicated 
by the work remains unfixed: the piece loops endlessly, but the separate 
components of the whole never play in the same order.
The viewer is confronted with a strange kind of writing, a text in 
fragments. Impossible to grasp as a whole, the material is nevertheless 
not unreadable – some of it is even quite funny. This is especially the 
case with anything addressing the problem of boredom within the 
psychoanalytic setting, with The Bored and Boring Patient listed amongst 
the string of book titles and, from a book extract, a perplexed analysand 
recounting how he regularly watches his analyst fall asleep.1 Other 
animations contain fragments of songs where, for example, a lover 
laments the ‘long, lonely time’ of waiting, which viewers also get to 
experience as they are forced to spend the time it takes to read the lyrics 
slowly scrolling up the screen.
Time goes by so slowly
And time can do so much
Are you still mine?2
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Much of the material focuses on boredom in relation to the subjective 
encounter with technology. The Russian writer Maxim Gorky’s review in 
1896 of an early film by August and Louis Lumière is one such instance: 
in the silence, faced with the strange black-and-white scenes unreeling 
before him, Gorky feels himself confronted by a world whose ‘vividness 
and vitality have been drained away’. This is not reality, he declares, ‘but 
its shadow’.
… before you a life is
surging, a life
deprived of words
and shorn of the
living spectrum of
colours – the grey,
the soundless,
the bleak
and dismal life …3
In its emphasis on the ‘monotonous grey’ that covers everything, 
Gorky’s description evokes a world as if covered in ash; a dead world, 
devoid of meaning. But what did the film remove from the scene, if not 
the viewer himself? To be bored by something – a film, a book or, perhaps 
worst of all, a lecture – is to be confronted by a scene wherein it is clear 
that there is nothing here for me. When someone or something is boring 
you, it’s as if you don’t exist; exposed to a kind of ‘meaning vacuum’, 
you are rendered lifeless, snuffed out, like the canary at the bottom 
of the cage.4 Seán Desmond Healy, in Boredom, Self, and Culture (1984), 
from which I also extracted quotations for TEXT, characterises boredom 
as ‘the loss of a sense of personal meaning, whether in relation to a 
particular experience or encounter, or to an entire life situation. This loss 
might be occasioned by the withdrawal or absence of the meaningful, 
or by the imposition of the unmeaningful’ (as was the case for Gorky, 
perhaps). Sometimes the cause can be easily identified – it is this or that 
which is boring you. Often, however, the reason for a ‘chronic and 
painful’ boredom cannot be pinned down, and this realisation leads 
Healy to suggest that boredom takes two forms: there is a trivial, everyday 
kind of boredom, and a ‘hyperboredom’ that is ‘inexplicable, persisting’, 
akin to depression, and directly related to the ‘collapse of meaning’.5
The psychotherapist James E. Lantz suggests that boredom erupts 
‘whenever a subject has been unable to identify, find [or] recognise’ 
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meaning; when the subject is confronted with an emptiness both absurd 
and nauseating.6 Yet many writers have commented on the usefulness 
of boredom. For Walter Benjamin, famously, boredom was necessary to 
the creative work of making meaning, spun by the listener out of the 
multiple interpretations of a storyteller’s tale.7 Benjamin might in fact 
have described himself as following ‘an ethos of boredom’, taking care to 
deliberately summon it up in order to begin his writing.8 Benjamin’s 
boredom is neither trivial nor everyday – it is the ‘dream’ space through 
which the subject experiences and has deep connection with the world. 
Hyperboredom seems, in contrast, to shut the world out. In his review of 
Healy’s book, the historian Eugen Weber summarises it thus: ‘It is not we, 
hyperboreans, who are inadequate; it is the world around, the culture 
we live in.’9 And yet ‘hyperboreans’ suffer, by internalising the lack of 
meaning. The nothing here for me is reflected back onto the subject: there 
is nothing here in me.
Figure 3.1 TEXT, 1997. Randomly ordered series of digital animations, dimensions variable. 
Installation shot taken at ICA, London, during the launch of the CD On Boredom published by 
Cambridge Darkroom Gallery, December 1997. Courtesy the artist.
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Might these different types of boredom each be linked to a different 
relation to time? In Benjamin’s argument, the art of storytelling, which 
demands boredom’s ‘mental relaxation’, is distinguished from ‘a new 
form of communication’: information. Supplied primarily by newspapers 
– reproduced by the printing press – information is ‘shot through with 
explanation’. It replaces the tradition of the story, yet it has no lasting 
relevance; information simply evaporates when it is no longer new. 
Because it is resistant to interpretation, information also short-circuits 
or shuts down meaning. ‘A story is different,’ in Benjamin’s estimation. 
‘It does not expend itself. It preserves and concentrates its strength and 
is capable of releasing it even after a long time’, over time. Information is 
always local, immediate. Storytelling combines the yarns of the traveller 
with those of the artisan who stays at home; both leave an imprint on 
the tale. Untouched by an encounter with otherness, information is 
supplied to a reader who believes, as Hippolyte de Villemessant, the 
founder of Le Figaro, once stated, that ‘an attic fire in the Latin Quarter is 
more important than a revolution in Madrid’.10
Digital technology allowed me, in making TEXT, to experiment 
with narrative form against a background of ideas about storytelling 
aimed at disrupting closed systems of information. Artists might copy, 
sample or quote information out of a desire to create space that more 
Figure 3.2 TEXT, 1997. Randomly ordered series of digital animations, dimensions variable. 
Installation shot taken at Five Years Gallery during the exhibition What Is a Photograph?, 3 July–9 
August 1998. Courtesy the artist.
twEnty yEARS of boREDoM 31
accurately reflects the aberrant temporalities of human experience – 
shot through with fantasy. A great influence on many artists of my 
generation, for instance, was the film La Jetée (1962) by Chris Marker. 
Marker’s film remains radical not only because it consists almost entirely 
of stills, but also for the questions it poses concerning subjective time. 
As the artist and writer Victor Burgin argues, different registers of time 
run through the film concurrently. Firstly, and perhaps more obviously, 
there is ‘the time of the living organism, the irreversible time of the 
entropic body’.11 Kept by our biological clocks, this is the time of lifespans. 
In Marker’s film, evidence of this kind of time appears in the traces of 
graffiti that the characters in the story often come across when they 
meet.12 These handwritten marks – fragments of writing and drawing 
scrawled across walls and buildings – resonate with notations recorded 
in a diary, where the passing of chronological time is marked by the 
human individual who ages along with it. Embedded in this register of 
time, however, there is another, of a different tempo: the time of the 
human subject. This ‘constructs itself’ around the couple in the film, 
Burgin suggests, and is the time ‘of durée … an indeterminate period of 
lived existence that may expand or contract according to the attention 
that is brought to it’.13 This is subjective time, time that runs its own way 
and that operates, frequently, in memory and dreaming.
La Jetée, as the opening sequence of the film informs us, is ‘a story 
of a man marked by an image from childhood’ – an image that belongs to 
the register of subjective time. The (nameless) man travels backwards in 
Figure 3.3 Still from La Jetée, 1962, dir. Chris Marker.
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chronological time to meet with a woman (also nameless), whose image 
is fixed so firmly in his mind. The strangeness of this film is that it ends 
where it begins; or it doesn’t end, because although the reel runs for 
about 26 minutes, the film is looped internally. A boy will see himself die 
as an adult, and the adult will realise this at the moment of his death, 
but will also acknowledge that he is there still – alive – as a child in the 
same place. The two separate biological times coincide, in the time of 
the desiring subject.
Can subjective time be thought of in relation to psychoanalyst 
D.W. Winnicott’s concept of the transitional object? A 1953 article by 
Winnicott on the child’s first ‘not-me’ possession notes the use of 
transitional phenomena – such as toys, a blanket or even a special 
repertoire of songs – through which the infant develops a relation 
to external reality. Given that reality often contains things that are 
absent, ‘thinking, or fantasying’, as Winnicott suggests, ‘gets linked up’ 
with these objects.14 Yet there are also certain times, such as the time 
between sleep and awakening, or in daydreaming, when fantasy mingles 
with external reality. This time is anticipatory; it is a time of potential 
reunion. Initiated when the separation from the desired other first 
occurs, transitional time transforms the separation into a potential 
reunion. But if nobody comes, or if, upon returning, anticipation is 
repeatedly frustrated, then transitional time is transformed into what 
the psychoanalyst André Green describes as le temps mort – ‘dead time’ – 
the chronic equivalent of empty space. As Burgin writes: ‘In normal 
everyday experience this is the time of boredom, the waiting from which 
one expects nothing.’15
Transitional time is anticipatory. Endless waiting is dead time 
(boredom). In each kind of time, the thing upon which the subject waits 
is crucially bound up with his or her identity, but while transitional time 
looks to the future, endless waiting, as a kind of dead end, can curdle into 
severe depression. Here the subject ‘suffers a total inhibition of action 
and disinvestment from the world’, as if the world, or they themselves, 
were dead.16 Strangely, as Green explains, the subject experiences this 
as if they are at the mercy of a force other than themselves: ‘It is not 
me who is going away; I am not wanted here. I/they are expelling me.’17 
This description resonates with Sigmund Freud’s observation that in 
melancholia, with which hyperboredom may be compared, the ego 
appears to align itself with the lost object, the object that will never 
return. ‘In this way an object-loss [is] transformed into an ego-loss.’18 
Freud characterises the existential state of melancholia as a kind of 
annihilation or death of the self – or a death wish, ‘the overcoming of the 
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instinct which compels every living thing to cling to life’.19 Here the cry 
of every spurned lover, ‘You’re dead to me!’, is thrown back upon the 
self: ‘I am dead to me.’
For anyone who has had writer’s block, this feeling is familiar. How 
might one induce the kind of boredom that is conducive to making work? 
How might one avoid falling into that which baffles or suffocates thinking, 
that deadens the space of dreaming and strands us in a dead end where 
nothing comes? An answer might be suggested in Jean Cocteau’s film 
Orphée (1950), where the link between boredom and endless waiting is 
also explored. A princess, who represents Orpheus’s death, sacrifices 
herself to make the poet immortal. But she desires one last embrace, so 
she has to wait for him to come back to her in the underworld, and is 
tortured by the time it takes him to reach her. Now I understand what it is 
to wait! she cries. Is this what, for humans, is boredom?
For the first time I almost know what time is
On earth, waiting must be terrible
Do you get bored?20
Cocteau’s Orphée, as a modern-day retelling of the Greek myth, is set in 
Paris and saturated with residual trauma of the Second World War, when 
members of the French Resistance, anticipating the return of freedom, 
Figure 3.4 Still from Orphée, 1950, dir. Jean Cocteau. English subtitled version released in 2018, 
BFI, London.
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awaited communication from the Allies. The strange spoken messages 
in the film that Orpheus receives through his car radio reconstruct, or 
mimic, such kinds of coded signals. Orpheus, suffering from writer’s 
block and therefore desperate for inspiration (he has been waiting, 
despondently, for the return of his muse), interprets them as poetry. He 
writes them down. What does he recognise in these incomprehensible 
fragments? Why do they claim the status of poetry for him?
Interestingly, a debate about what constitutes writing occurs 
during the film’s interrogation scene. The judges cannot decide if 
Orpheus is a ‘writer’ at all, or they argue as to whether he is a writer or a 
poet. Orpheus suggests that writer and poet are almost the same thing. 
There is no almost here, snaps the interrogator, and What do you mean by 
poet? ‘Écrire sans être écrivain’, Orpheus replies – to write without 
writing.21 A poet doesn’t engage with writing, though he writes. Writing 
that isn’t (consciously) written – what is this? For the poet, the ‘text’ has 
to come from elsewhere, the radio receiver perhaps. Poetry, at least 
for Orpheus, has affinities with automatic writing – it emerges from a 
dream state. The interrogation panel, flummoxed by Orpheus’s replies, 
gives up on the question, but it lingers on in the film; the struggle to 
write, and to write poetry, is perhaps the film’s central theme. This is 
because in this post-war Paris version of the Orpheus myth, poetry equals 
death – or immortality. Perhaps they are one and the same. Poetry as 
‘not writing’, or as writing that is not writing; that is the end of writing: 
Figure 3.5 TEXT, 1997. Randomly ordered series of digital animations, dimensions variable. 
Installation shot taken at Five Years Gallery during the exhibition What Is a Photograph?, 3 July–9 
August 1998. Courtesy the artist.
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this signals the beginning of something else, something that breaks with 
the traumatised past. Here ‘information’ is repurposed and remade as 
a poetry equivalent to the shattered fragments of day-to-day life among 
the ruins. Language regains meaning, but only once it is coded, broken 
down, presented in pieces.
Gorky’s reaction to the Lumière film chimes with Roland Barthes’s 
observation that through photography the dead ‘return’.22 But they 
return, are made present, through other means too. Beginning around 
the end of the nineteenth century, modern industrial technologies 
of transport, production and communication, through which things 
could become doubled or set adrift, seemed to bring the dead closer. 
Voices could be severed from their speakers, for example; objects and 
machinery could move by themselves. During the First World War, this 
feeling intensified as people started seeing longed-for loved ones in the 
street, even though they knew they were dead – ‘just catching a glimpse 
of someone on a bus or through a shop window, thinking it’s their 
husband or their brother or their son’.23 Suddenly the glass in the 
buildings or on vehicles would double as a sensitive plate or recording 
instrument with the face of the absent loved one projected across the 
street, like a cinematic fragment; like a photograph. The city therefore 
itself becomes a medium, housing the dead, with the literature that 
reflects it classified, perhaps, as the work of mourning. The dead can be 
made present in the fractures, blanks and discontinuities within a 
text – in writing’s undercurrent, or in what the poet Claudia Rankine 
terms the ‘underneath-ness’ of language, where it is possible, she 
suggests, to stage ‘silence’.24
When we see our beloved ‘everywhere’, we are waiting to be with 
them again. So it is for the man in La Jetée, who sees the image of the 
person with whom he wishes to be reunited. So it is for all of us who wait 
for the ones we love. As the narrator of André Breton’s Nadja (1928) 
asks at the very beginning of the book, ‘Who am I [if not] whom I 
“haunt”[?]’ This idea, he continues, ‘makes me, still alive, play a ghostly 
part’.25 Breton’s novel, the story of a doomed love affair, is constructed, 
like a collage, from fragments of real (or more often missed) encounters, 
the majority of which take place in the street or in bars and cafes. It’s a 
text that didn’t have a planned outcome, but that wrote itself as it moved 
along a route dictated by desire, accumulating material lifted directly 
from the exterior world. The camera has always done this – absorbed the 
world, unmediated, into itself – and since the invention of photography, 
literature has frequently tried to adopt the camera’s point of view.26 
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Indeed, as new technologies continue to give rise to different literary 
forms, contemporary storytelling reflects our encounters with the 
internet. Now content is gleaned from websites and social media, with 
the narrative arc (or more often, the anti-narrative outcome) directed by 
reactions to and between sources. Conducted in a dreamlike state, the 
route taken as a user travels through, or ‘surfs’, the rhizomatic space of 
the web is intuitive, spontaneous, anticipatory, with the resulting ‘text’ 
structured in ways that replicate this journey.
Such is the argument put forward by the poet and critic Kenneth 
Goldsmith in his book Wasting Time on the Internet (2016). Goldsmith 
suggests that Breton’s strategy of using inquisitive, open-ended 
‘wandering’ to construct a narrative is analogous to the experience of 
the contemporary internet user, whom Goldsmith proposes as the 
twenty-first-century equivalent to the flâneur. Absorbed by and into 
the environment, people surfing the web drift – just as the Situationists, 
with their strategy of dérive, once gave themselves up ‘to the tugs and 
flows of the urban street, letting the crowds take them where they will’.27 
In this space where contemporary forms of writing and art-making are 
emerging, Goldsmith argues, we might think of ‘our web sojourns as epic 
tales effortlessly and unconsciously written, etched into our browser 
Figure 3.6 Anonymous Situationist slogan, 1968.
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histories as a sort of new memoir’.28 Goldsmith refers to early precedents 
including Samuel Pepys’s diary and James Boswell’s Life of Samuel 
Johnson – built up out of the ‘accumulation of bits and pieces of the 
quotidian ephemera: letters, observations, patches of dialogue, and 
descriptions of daily life’ – in order to compare them to online blogs.29 
Interestingly, to advertise his course at the University of Pennsylvania 
(after which his book is titled), Goldsmith chose a Situationist slogan 
that marked the walls of Paris during the May 1968 protests: ‘live 
without dead time’.
If you are able to travel unobserved along ungoverned routes, you 
remain open to the chance encounter, to otherness. But it’s no good if 
these journeys take you nowhere; if you only end up back where you 
started; if you don’t get started at all. Recent changes in the internet in 
fact threaten to kill off the digital dériviste. In 2009, for example, Google 
started using a new algorithm for its search engine with the aim of 
providing a ‘personalised search for everyone’.30 As author and activist 
Eli Pariser explains in The Filter Bubble (2011), Google tracks ‘signals’ 
obtained from individual users in order to present them with customised 
pages corresponding to who they are assumed to be, and what kind of 
things they like. Thus the world that forms before your eyes is simply 
a reflection of your own past forays into the web; new routes are 
closed down or non-existent. In an uncanny echo of newspaperman 
Villemessant’s comment cited above, Pariser’s book opens with a 
quotation from Mark Zuckerberg, Facebook’s co-founder: ‘A squirrel 
dying in front of your house may be more relevant to your interests 
right now than people dying in Africa.’31 States Pariser: ‘Now you get the 
result that Google’s algorithm suggests is best for you in particular – and 
someone else may see something entirely different.’32
‘The user’, in other words, ‘is the content’.33 In this surely regressive 
situation there are no ‘not-me’ phenomena, no longed-for other. There 
is only the mirror image of yourself as a narcissistic, closed circuit that 
has little contact with difference, with anything that falls outside of 
what has already been ‘liked’. For film-maker Adam Curtis, the version of 
cyberspace that is currently evolving is very much like the one imagined 
in William Gibson’s novel Neuromancer (1984), where ‘behind the 
superficial freedoms of the web’ are a few giant corporations with opaque 
systems that control and limit what we see and shape what we think, 
what we buy, how we vote.34
While the full impact of this technology as an ‘influencing machine’ 
is not yet understood, there is nothing new about the malleability of the 
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subject.35 Advertisements and public relations companies have always 
exploited the subject’s tendency towards projection into a future where 
a new and better self awaits. This idea – that there is another ‘you’ 
somewhere else – is rehearsed in the anticipatory time of daydreaming. 
Under these conditions, where the authentic self is actually located 
shifts to the question of when, thus reiterating the ideas outlined above 
about subjectivity’s peculiar relation to time. Outside of any fixed time 
and place: subjectivity is anachronic. I like the definition of this word 
as a description of the chronologically ‘misplaced’.36 Subjective time is 
disordered; it disregards chronological time. Gazing at a photograph – 
perhaps one in an advert – you experience, as Barthes suggested, a 
peculiar conjunction of tenses (dizzying, impossible) all operating ‘under 
the instance of “reality”’ – a reality that nevertheless is out of time, above 
or beyond time; or where time, on a loop, eternally recurs.37
According to a graph supplied by the Collins English Dictionary, 
use of the word anachronic might seem to have risen during the period 
of the two world wars – precisely when the dead began to appear in 
such numbers among the living, within an environment formed by 
technology’s proliferation of discontinuity and otherness.38 The shadow 
or blur in early photography, the echo on the telephone line, the uncanny 
self-sufficiency of automated systems of production and transportation: 
these things that are in excess of technology’s primary operation 
expose us to something outside of ourselves. Overall, however, and 
alongside further technological mutations, anachronic appears to have 
actually declined in usage, as if the ever-increasing industrialisation, 
mechanisation and quantification of labour and life coincide with – or 
indeed produce – the urge to categorise, classify and fix everything within 
an allocated time slot. Things are discouraged from drifting out 
of place. In this scenario, ever more ‘subject to administrative norms’, as 
Benjamin observed, ‘people must learn to wait’.39
Has digital technology increased this waiting time? Analogue 
technology, including the machinery of industrial production, brings into 
everyday experience the encounter with the dead. There is something 
about celluloid footage of a train, for example – or even about the train 
itself – that haunts the subject. The effect of digital technology (and 
its algorithms) is to turn this dead thing back upon ourselves. The 
anticipatory time of fantasy and daydreaming slips into endless waiting. 
Into this space of dead time no one comes. The object dies. This is the 
time of hyperboredom, the encounter with the dead, when that dead 
thing is yourself.40
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Benjamin wrote his essay ‘The storyteller’ in 1936, but he had 
started working on a very different kind of writing much earlier. The 
Arcades Project – unfinished at his death – presents scraps of information 
in such a way that they replicate the open-ended fabric of storytelling. 
Described as a way of ‘writing about a civilization using its rubbish 
as materials’, the book also introduces something of the flâneur’s 
approach to reading, intricately linked with boredom.41 Consisting 
of multiple entries on various themes – like a collection of index cards 
gathered in researching a particular topic that never coalesces into a 
whole – the book might be started at any point, for its thesis is constantly 
regenerating itself. Benjamin’s overall ‘topic’ is, in fact, the Parisian 
shopping precincts, or arcades, that brought together (as the text does) 
apparently incompatible objects and ideas all under the same roof. 
‘Existence in these spaces flows like the events in dreams. Flânerie is the 
rhythmics of this slumber.’42 Indeed, while there remains some debate 
about his intended final outcome, there is no doubt that Benjamin was 
experimenting with form, juxtaposing seemingly unrelated textual 
fragments to create a disunited whole: ‘This work has to develop to the 
highest degree the art of citing without quotation marks. Its theory is 
intimately related to that of montage.’43
The Arcades Project opens itself up to multiple interpretations 
and so presents an interesting model for representing a scattered, 
chronologically disordered subject position. Almost contemporaneous 
with it, but less well known, was a project initiated by Maxim Gorky 
some 50 years after his encounter with the Lumière film. Aimed at 
capturing a snapshot of the world by condensing samples of it taken 
from a single day, Den’ mira (A Day of the World) compiles, in book form, 
news reports including photographs and cartoons from around the 
globe on 27 September 1935.44 When the project was reperformed 
in 1960 for publication as A Day of the World: The events of Tuesday, 
September 27, 1960, one contributor, the East German writer Christa 
Wolf, somehow found herself unable to stop; she went on to make 
annual notations of her everyday life on or around every 27 September 
until her death in 2011.45
Contemporary writers and artists seem increasingly drawn to 
practices that are either diaristic or that utilise found material as a method 
of producing work discontinuous in style but externally structured (often, 
for example, by the clock or calendar) – think of Claudia Rankine’s recent 
poems from the American Lyric series, Kenneth Goldsmith’s books Day 
(2003) and Capital (2015; directly modelled on Benjamin’s Arcades 
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Project) and Uwe Johnson’s Anniversaries: From a Year in the Life of Gesine 
Cresspahl (1970–83; translated from the German – four volumes – into 
English in 2018).46 Collaged and fragmentary, with content frequently 
extracted from the exterior world, this writing may come out of a desire 
to record and fix time, but to do so through the collecting together of 
ephemera – material often cast aside or thrown away. Encyclopedic in 
scale, while simultaneously undermining the encyclopedia’s quest for 
accuracy, these kinds of texts present an alternative to the deadening 
meaninglessness of endlessly recycled newsfeeds and status updates – 
which they nevertheless often incorporate.47
My recent large-scale work de Umbris Idæarum (on the Shadow 
Cast by our Thoughts) takes the form of a diary. It is like Johnson’s 
Anniversaries because it records an entire year – 2011 – but it is not a 
work of fiction. A mixture of writing, such as my own ‘personal’ 
observations alongside text extracted from books, newspapers, 
transcriptions of radio shows and conversations overheard on the 
bus, with photographs and other scanned paraphernalia, the work was 
built using the software application Evernote, into which I could save 
information at any point in the day using a Wifi-enabled device (typically 
Figure 3.7 Images from de Umbris Idæarum (on the Shadow Cast by our Thoughts), 12 softback 
books, each 21.5 × 13 cm, with shelf. Printed paper and wood, 25 × 95 cm, 2019. 
Courtesy the artist and Bartha Contemporary.
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my own phone, iPad or laptop). Gathered over time, like Breton’s Nadja, 
the diary presents a chronological flow of ‘updates’ in a seemingly endless 
narrative that continually returns to the present – for instance, entries 
repeatedly start with the statement ‘I am awake’ (usually in the morning, 
though not always). I am also often waiting (at bus stops, or for friends to 
arrive) or apologising for keeping my friends waiting (when, racing 
against time, I’m running late).
The collected material is organised as a series of 12 books, one per 
month, with each book’s interior spreads structured by the timing 
of individual diary entries – a column of numbers that run down the 
centre of the pages, parallel to the book’s spine. Time counts down over 
the course of the year, with what is randomly ordered being the self, 
the many variable, anachronic instances of me. My moods, like the 
weather, are both changing and recurring. The people around me – 
friends, colleagues, family members as well as strangers – exhibit the 
same yet unpredictable behaviours – who they are is as impossible to 
pin down as I am. Assertions and decisions are undone as quickly as 
they are made; like any diarist, I am unreliable, inconsistent.48 During the 
recording process I became interested in publicly displayed messages on 
walls and noticeboards, such as graffiti or posters for lost pets or items for 
Figure 3.8 Images from de Umbris Idæarum (on the Shadow Cast by our Thoughts), 12 softback 
books, each 21.5 × 13 cm, with shelf. Printed paper and wood, 25 × 95 cm, 2019. 
Courtesy the artist and Bartha Contemporary.
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sale, and there are many photographs of these kinds of things reproduced 
in the diary – evidence of the time of the living organism, which operates 
alongside subjective time.
There is in fact a third kind of timekeeping recorded in the diary – 
that of the wildlife in my immediate environment, seemingly synchronised 
to something other than subjective or chronological time. Observations 
are made of the coming and going of city birds, the activities of local 
foxes, as well as of changes to trees and flowers and even the impact of 
the seasons on the food I eat. Detailed in the receipts from restaurants 
and cafes, supermarkets and corner shops, are names of the individuals I 
was ‘served by’, seasonal special offers, advertising slogans and company 
logos. Finally there are the many songs, often on repeat, that come into 
my head either randomly or triggered by the external world. I am myself 
like a radio, a receiver, a transmitter; and the randomly collected 
ephemera has evolved into something affiliated with the dream space 
of TEXT, from back in 1997.
The overall effect is to show the subject of the diary as fluid, cloud- 
like, unresolved and migratory, constantly rewriting itself in relation 
to – or against – chronological time. The ‘text’ of the diary – littered as it is 
Figure 3.9 Images from de Umbris Idæarum (on the Shadow Cast by our Thoughts), 12 softback 
books, each 21.5 × 13 cm, with shelf. Printed paper and wood, 25 × 95 cm, 2019. 
Courtesy the artist and Bartha Contemporary.
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with receipts, flyers, news articles, etc. – is marked by dates of issue and 
time-stamped proofs of purchase. In contrast to this time ‘of the body’, my 
self drifts, rewriting itself in each new entry. In this way the diary attempts 
to stage the unconscious, that is, the self as other. Mirroring the day’s 
events as well as the culture I am embedded in, ‘I’ become scattered across 
clock time, adopting different subject positions in time.
André Green describes the activity of the average neurotic as 
working ‘against the ineluctable march of time [where] something is 
repeated, without the subject knowing it, or in spite of himself, which is 
fundamentally resistant to any possibility of being transcended’. Often 
the elements in the subject’s discourse ‘that are indispensable for its 
intelligibility are lacking’.49 Writing – what it can contain as well as what 
it leaves out, what is inadmissible to it – is still very much at the centre of 
my work. I regard the diary as a kind of ‘involuntary’ novel, but I’m also 
interested in the way that writing can incorporate blanks, or yawning 
gaps. This may stage a new form of automaticity, where the montage of 
texts and images, rather than evidencing traces of an automatic gesture, 
is the engine of it. By this I mean that the collected citations, quotations, 
reports and so forth, alongside my own (possibly boring) personal 
musings, generate something that operates like unconscious thought. 
What is made present may be excluded from the actual contents, may in 
fact only make itself felt (as ghostly presence, or as absence-as-presence) 
through lapses and silences in the assembled materials. Thus the diary is 
an attempt ‘to write without writing’; to draw out the singular, evasive 
and discontinuous, the temporally aberrant nature of subjectivity. This is 
to move beyond the nullifying effects of much current technology – 
governed by algorithms – and towards a future as yet unwritten.
Note: The context for this piece is the symposium ‘20 Years of Boredom’, 
hosted by the Department of History of Art at UCL in 2017, where I gave 
a short paper on which the above essay is based. Twenty years earlier, 
I had curated an exhibition on CD, On Boredom, which brought together 
a group of artists who had started working with newly accessible 
desktop computers and image-manipulation software, including early 
versions of Photoshop and Premier, and with the worldwide web, which 
had first made its appearance in 1994.50 Often frustrated by the limits 
of the processing power, we were nevertheless optimistic about the 
creative potential of these ‘new tools’. The CD, with a fold-out publication 
including essays by David Bate and Andrew Brown, was launched at 
the ICA, London, in December 1997, and published by Cambridge 
Darkroom Gallery.
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My thanks to the then-director, Ronnie Simpson, for enthusiastically 
embracing boredom all those years ago. This essay is also indebted to 
Victor Burgin’s brilliant essay ‘Marker marked’, which brings together 
so elegantly the themes of biological time, subjective time and André 
Green’s ‘dead time’.
Notes
 1 Stern (ed.), Psychotherapy and the Bored Patient, 31.
 2 Stern (ed.), Psychotherapy and the Bored Patient, 129. The song is ‘Unchained Melody’ (1955), 
lyrics by Hy Zaret.
 3 Gorky cited in Leyda, Kino, 407–9. Gorky writes of ‘grey rays of the sun across the grey sky, 
grey eyes in grey faces and [that] the leaves of the trees are ashen grey’.
 4 Lantz, ‘The bored client’, 111.
 5 Healy, Boredom, Self, and Culture, 10 and 99. Emphasis mine.
 6 Lantz, ‘The bored client’, 111.
 7 Benjamin, ‘The storyteller’, in Illuminations, 91.
 8 Sturgeon, ‘The storyteller by Walter Benjamin: review’.
 9 Weber, review of Healy, Boredom, Self, and Culture.
10 Benjamin, Illuminations, 88–91.
11 Burgin, The Camera, 146.
12 They encounter it again – this record making/evidencing of time passing – when they come 
across the giant sequoia tree trunk.
13 Burgin, The Camera, 146.
14 Winnicott, ‘Transitional objects and transitional phenomena’.
15 Burgin, The Camera, 149.
16 Burgin, The Camera, 149.
17 Green, Diachrony in Psychoanalysis, 120. 
18 Freud, On Metapsychology, 258.
19 Freud, On Metapsychology, 254.
20 These translations are lightly paraphrased from the English subtitles in the version of Orphée 
released in 2018 and distributed by the British Film Institute (BFI), London. 
21 A literal translation would be ‘To write without being a writer.’ Subtitles in the version released 
by the BFI in 2008 have the phrase as ‘One who writes, without being a writer,’ while the 2018 
BFI version has: ‘No writer, yet he writes.’ 
22 Barthes, Camera Lucida, 9. Barthes writes of ‘that rather terrible thing which is there in every 
photograph’. 
23 In research conducted for his 2016 public art project We’re Here because We’re Here, British 
artist Jeremy Deller came across many such recorded accounts. For the comment about 
‘seeing a glimpse of someone’, see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uXnr3w74TJs.
24 See Flescher and Caspar, ‘Interview with Claudia Rankine’. Rankine has spoken of ‘the 
potential openness of the page’, which she uses ‘to suggest silence, for example’. 
25 Breton, Nadja, 11. The ‘proverb’ Breton refers to in this opening statement is ‘Dis-moi qui tu 
hantes et je te dirai qui tu es’ (‘Tell me who you haunt and I’ll tell you who you are’).
26 See Banfield, Unspeakable Sentences; Banfield, ‘L’imparfait de l’objectif’. Drawing on Banfield, 
I discuss this idea at length in ‘On the blank’, especially pp. 27, 55. 
27 Goldsmith, Wasting Time on the Internet, 56.
28 Goldsmith, Wasting Time on the Internet, 24. In an interview with Claudia Rankine, Kayo 
Chingonyi suggests that Rankine’s recent prose poems similarly reflect the way our lives are 
mediated through many different spheres and media: ‘Instagram and Tumblr poets are now 
part of popular culture, and the boundaries that divide poetry from other creative modes are 
being called into question.’
29 Goldsmith, Wasting Time on the Internet, 79.
30 Quoted in Pariser, The Filter Bubble, 1.
twEnty yEARS of boREDoM 45
31 Pariser, The Filter Bubble, 1.
32 Pariser, The Filter Bubble, 2.
33 Pariser, The Filter Bubble, 47.
34 See Hypernormalisation, dir. Adam Curtis (2016). https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/
p04b183c.
35 See also Tillmans, What is Different? 
36 https://www.thefreedictionary.com/anachronous.
37 Barthes, Camera Lucida, 97.
38 https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/anachronic.
39 Benjamin, The Arcades Project, 119.
40 André Green thinks of this ‘disappointed expectation’ as a kind of ‘negative trauma … The 
hallucinatory wish-fulfilment has had no effect: nothing comes. Beyond a certain time, the 
possibilities of postponing the hoped-for-satisfaction are exceeded. The object dies.’ Green, 
Diachrony in Psychoanalysis, 120.
41 Coetzee, ‘The marvels of Walter Benjamin’.
42 Benjamin, The Arcades Project, 881.
43 Benjamin, The Arcades Project, 458.
44 Gorky recruited the journalist Mikhail Koltsov as editor and the resulting book was published 
in 1937, a year after Gorky’s death. See Bird, ‘Revolutionary synchrony’.
45 Published in English as Wolf, One Day a Year, 1960–2000 and One Day a Year, 2001–2011.
46 See Sehgal, ‘A masterpiece that requires your full attention’.
47 The diary, for example, could be considered as ‘a new mode of writing for a new mode of 
living’. See Levensen, ‘Stephen’s diary’, 185. 
48 Because ‘I was someone else then’. See Levensen, ‘Stephen’s diary’, 191.
49 Green, Diachrony in Psychoanalysis, 115–17.
50 Invented by Tim Berners-Lee in 1989, the internet didn’t become widely accessible until 
1994. In 1997, a few months before we published On Boredom, Larry Page and Sergey Brin 
registered the domain name for Google. 
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There was silence in heaven  
about the space of half an hour
Mathew Hale
I just love this image on the cover of my old Poltergeist video. Coming 
from outside my project it confirmed the ‘magical’ aspects of human/
computer interaction, and the physical skin of the virtual, back in slow, 
glass, computer-1997.
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There Was Silence in Heaven About the Space of Half an Hour instructs 
the participant to print out a form and then press it against the screen 
of their computer monitor, facing towards the screen, and hold it there 
for five seconds. Here is a photo of me doing that in 1997. The warmth 
coming off the cathode ray tube and its curving surface are memorable.
The computer begins ‘translating’ the German words. Each letter is 
written on screen by a modular font, designed by me, which mimics 
handwritten script, allowing each letter to appear gradually, as it does 
when handwritten. Adults who have transcribed these 25 translated 
words often find that their handwriting has become a ‘childish’ version 
of itself.
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Transcribing is a very dull activity. At the time I made the piece I was also 
working as a typist for psychoanalyst Marion Milner. This was usually not 
dull at all, quite the opposite, but it could be. Marion was in her nineties 
and her script was hard to decipher. Much of my time was spent walking 
to and fro between the room where I typed and Marion’s work room, 
reading back the text I had typed to check it was as she had intended.
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Here is an example of a form completed by someone who performed the 
process demanded by There Was Silence in Heaven About the Space of Half 
an Hour. You can see how their writing has become childish because each 
word appears letter by letter, one at a time. The 25 example words, 
translated, are extraordinarily suggestive, and put me in mind of the 
Apocalypse – and Dalí/Buñuel. Here they are: Post, Picture, Christ, Dam, 
Egg, Woman, Gold, House, Hunt, Head, Leaves, Man, Night, Place, 
Horse, Torment, Ring, Sand, Stone, Table, Clock, People, World, Time, 
Everything.
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Sometimes Marion’s manuscript pages got truly baroque as she worked 
over them during the week between my visits. She continued writing in 
bed at night. The book which resulted, Bothered by Alligators, was her last 
creative project, and was published in 2012. She was born in 1900.
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Here is a copy of Milner’s The Suppressed Madness of Sane Men, exactly as 
she last left it. I photographed her house before her possessions were 
moved, the day after her death. Part of the reason that I did was to help 
keep track of the different parts of her unfinished manuscript. Mainly I 
did it because her life and house were so rich when they were suddenly 
gone, and her work and friendship felt so significant to me. There is 
another slide I took showing On Not Being Able to Paint lying in a shaft of 
sunlight.
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On Not Being Able to Paint is a book whose entire subject might be said to 
be the process by which one ceases to be a little bored by what one makes. 
The process by which one passes through aspiring to copy and match 
received models of painting, in Milner’s case, and then begin to be driven 
by desire and its mysterious imperatives, many of them unconscious.
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A few years before her death Marion had seen my new hardback copy of 
On Kissing, Tickling, and Being Bored by Adam Phillips, in my shoulder 
bag. She immediately asked if she could borrow it. I said yes, because she 
knew the writer and I recognised that she should read it immediately. 
She told me she thought it was very good. I used to look for it vaguely 
over the next couple of years until one day I suddenly spotted it at the 
bottom of a pile. I took it to her saying I had found it and had she finished 
with it? She returned it to me and when I left her house I got on the tube 
to go directly to see my psychotherapist, Nina Farhi, who had been 
recommended to me by Marion. I was immediately absorbed in reading 
the book which was extra fascinating because Marion had made a lot of 
notes in the margins.
Suddenly I realised that I had arrived at Golders Green and, rushing 
out of the carriage before the doors closed, I left the book behind me. 
I was devastated. I had only just got it back and in an improved form too, 
embellished with Marion’s marginalia. When I got to my session I was 
disproportionately upset and as I told Nina what had happened, lying on 
my back, I made a slip of the tongue, giving the title as On Kissing, Tickling, 
and Not Being Bored. ‘Did you hear what you just said?’, she asked.
I had moved the ‘Not’ from the title of my favorite book of Marion’s, 
On Not Being Able to Paint, and transferred it to Adam Phillips’s volume of 
essays. Losing the book had been worth it, perhaps. I was left with not 
being bored and being able to paint.
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Since before I knew her personally, but after having read On Not Being 
Able to Paint at art school, I have made ‘free drawings’, as advocated and 
practised by Marion Milner. The term refers to a process: beginning a 
drawing without knowing what it will be and allowing it to elaborate 
itself. This is a drawing that I made in the same year that I left the book 
on the train. It also perhaps has to do with There Was Silence in Heaven 
About the Space of Half an Hour, also made in 1997. There is a kind of 
sadistic enjoyment to the task of writing and maybe being punished for 
writing badly. Handwriting always remains the product of schooling. 
That echo never entirely fades. I can feel the sexuality coming through it. 
That is a good sign for me when I’m inside the process of drawing. What 
does it mean to bring adults to write in a childish hand?
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I came across this unusual image of a naked boy holding his ‘mother’s’ 
breasts from behind her. It immediately reminded me of the sensation of 
pressing the form against the old computer screen.
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Last year I exhibited a collage I had made of a phantasy interaction 
between Marilyn Monroe and Queen Elizabeth II. Here we see a detail. 
The queen asks for help with reading and Marilyn coaches her – via the 
metaphor of her chest on a computer screen. ‘Please read thi/ese,’ it says.
… Which allows us to loop back around to the cover image of 
Poltergeist.
I guess, like On Not Being Able to Paint, this pathway, above, 
describes a process of becoming no longer bored by one’s work. That did 
happen to me, especially so in the years after I mistakenly enunciated the 
words, ‘On Kissing, Tickling, and Not Being Bored’.
(The End)
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Work No. 422, 2005, © Martin Creed. All Rights Reserved, DACS 2020.
Courtesy the artist and Hauser & Wirth.
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Extract from Satin Island (2015)
tom McCarthy
On buffering
7.3 The meeting with the Minister took place. It’s odd to spend time in 
the company of somebody with power – I mean real, executive power: to 
hang out with a powerful person. You would imagine they exude this 
power at every turn, with each one of their gestures; that their very 
bodies sweat the stuff, wafting its odour at you through expensive 
clothes. But in fact, the thing most noticeable about this Minister was her 
lack of powerful aura. She seemed very normal. She wasn’t physically 
striking in any way: neither particularly tall nor particularly short; 
neither fat nor thin; neither attractive nor ugly. Her accent bore no traces 
of excessive privilege, nor of its masking. She must have been about my 
age, early forties. She was wearing sober, business-like clothes, with 
the exception of her shoes, which had small faux-fur tiger-skin stripes 
on them. We were sitting around a table: Peyman, Tapio, myself, this 
Minister and two of her staff. The way we were positioned allowed me 
to see these shoes, and what she was doing with them. As first one, then 
another person presented, responded, queried, clarified, proposed, 
counter-proposed and so forth, she rubbed one of her feet against the 
other, so that her right shoe’s toe, its outer edge, moved up and down 
against the side-arch of its neighbour. She performed this activity 
non-stop throughout the meeting, even when she herself was talking. 
I thought at first that she was scratching herself, that she had a bite or 
irritation on her left foot that was itching. Twenty or so minutes into the 
meeting, though, I had to abandon this hypothesis: while even low-level 
scratching has a kind of franticness about it, an angry, stop-start rhythm, 
her movement was so regular and methodical that it seemed almost 
automatic. With each upwards motion of the toe against the arch, the 
ON BOREDOM62
tiger-skin, its fur, would be drawn upwards, ruffled until its hairs all 
separated, each one bristling to attention; with each downward or return 
stroke these hairs would all lie back flat again, losing their individuality 
amidst the smooth, sleek flow of feline stripes.
7.4 After the best part of an hour, I realised what this Minister was up to: 
she was attempting, with her right foot, to undo her left shoe’s buckle 
(which, unusually, fastened on the inward- rather than the outward-
facing side). This, I realised as I watched her, was a quite ambitious 
undertaking. Buckles are finicky; once you remove hands from the 
equation, mastery of them becomes well-nigh impossible. Yet this is 
what her right foot, with a persistence and determination that I found 
increasingly admirable, was trying to do. The buckle had some give in it; 
the strap had been made pliant by (I presumed) repeated previous 
attempts to carry out this operation. At the same time, the strap still 
possessed enough stiffness to ensure that a push applied to its free end 
caused a whole stretch to be forced up towards – and ultimately through 
– the metal frame, rather than just crumpling. This didn’t, as I mentioned, 
happen all at once: it took an hour of tiny upward nudges, and of tiny 
corresponding downward smoothings of the shoe’s surrounding surface, 
for the strap to travel all the way up through the frame’s lower side; then, 
continuing its upward movement even though there was no further up 
for it to go, it snaked back over on itself in such a way that up turned into 
down with no perceptible change of direction – and, in performing 
this manoeuvre, cleared the central bar with all the grace of a pole-
vaulter, the prong falling away beneath its belly as it did so. Free of all 
encumbrances, the strap then slipped with rapid ease through the frame’s 
upper side; and presto! the operation was completed.
7.5 As if this weren’t impressive enough, the Minister then proceeded, 
using the outside edge of her right shoe’s toe once more, to re-do the 
sequence in reverse. It took the best part of another hour; but she 
managed it as well. As soon as she’d returned the buckle to its starting 
position, its original state, she called the meeting to a close. I found the 
whole experience of observing this small episode, this drama that (due to 
the shape of the table, its supporting legs, the layout of our chairs and 
similar factors) I alone could see, deeply satisfying. How do you think it 
went? Peyman asked me after we had left. Oh, I answered: excellently.
7.6 Back in the office, as our work on the Koob-Sassen Project kicked in 
and the general traffic levels edged up, we started experiencing problems 
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with our bandwidth. There was too much information, I guess, shuttling 
through the servers, down the cables, through the air. My computer, like 
those of all my colleagues, was afflicted by frequent bouts of buffering. 
I’d hear Daniel swearing in the next room – Fucking buffering! – and 
others shouting the same thing upstairs, their voices funnelled to me 
by the ventilation system. The buffering didn’t bother me, though; I’d 
spend long stretches staring at the little spinning circle on my screen, 
losing myself in it. Behind it, I pictured hordes of bits and bytes and 
megabytes, all beavering away to get the requisite data to me; behind 
them, I pictured a giant uber-server, housed somewhere in Finland or 
Nevada or Uzbekistan: stacks of memory banks, satellite dishes sprouting 
all around them, pumping out information non-stop, more of it than 
any single person would need in their lifetime, pumping it all my way 
in an endless, unconditional and grace-conferring act of generosity. 
Datum est: it is given. It was this gift, I told myself, this bottomless and 
inexhaustible torrent of giving, that made the circle spin: the data itself, 
its pure, unfiltered content as it rushed into my system, which, in turn, 
whirred into streamlined action as it started to reorganise it into legible 
form. The thought was almost sublimely reassuring.
7.7 But on this thought’s outer reaches lay a much less reassuring counter-
thought: what if it were just a circle, spinning on my screen, and nothing 
else? What if the supply chain, its great bounty, had dried up, or been cut 
off, or never been connected in the first place? Each time that I allowed 
this possibility to take hold of my mind, the sense of bliss gave over to a 
kind of dread. If it was a video file that I was trying to watch, then at the 
bottom of the screen there’d be that line, that bar that slowly fills itself 
in twice: once in bold red and, at the same time, running ahead of that, in 
fainter grey; the fainter section, of course, has to remain in advance 
of the bold section, and of the cursor showing which part of the video 
you’re actually watching at a given moment; if the cursor and red section 
catch up, then buffering sets in again. Staring at this bar, losing myself 
in it just as with the circle, I was granted a small revelation: it dawned 
on me that what I was actually watching was nothing less than the 
skeleton, laid bare, of time or memory itself. Not our computers’ time and 
memory, but our own. This was its structure. We require experience to 
stay ahead, if only by a nose, of our consciousness of experience – if for 
no other reason than that the latter needs to make sense of the former, 
to (as Peyman would say) narrate it both to others and ourselves, and, for 
this purpose, has to be fed with a constant, unsorted supply of fresh 
sensations and events. But when the narrating cursor catches right up 
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with the rendering one, when occurrences and situations don’t replenish 
themselves quickly enough for the awareness they sustain, when, no 
matter how fast they regenerate, they’re instantly devoured by a mouth 
too voracious to let anything gather or accrue unconsumed before it, 
then we find ourselves jammed, stuck in limbo: we can enjoy neither 
experience nor consciousness of it. Everything becomes buffering, and 
buffering becomes everything. The revelation pleased me. I decided 
I would start a dossier on buffering.
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Creative boredom and  
Thomas Demand
Margaret iversen
It is well known that Walter Benjamin distinguished between two 
kinds of experience for which he used the German words Erfahrung 
and Erlebnis, which can be respectively translated as genuine, long 
or authentic experience and isolated or immediate experience. He 
associated these different kinds of experience with the shift from 
pre-modern to modern industrial conditions of life and labour. It is less 
well known that Benjamin also conceived of two kinds of boredom, 
between which he didn’t clearly distinguish and for which he only had 
the one German word, Langeweile, literally, long while or long time. Each 
type of boredom has its corresponding form of experience, but only 
pre-modern boredom is conducive to the formation of genuine 
experience. Benjamin’s account of the atrophy of genuine experience 
and memory, owing to modern industrial and urban conditions, has 
been revived in the current context of debates concerning the effects of 
information and communication technologies. Contemporary artists, 
including Thomas Demand, have addressed this crisis with work aimed 
at encouraging something equivalent to the boredom associated with 
experiential receptivity described by Benjamin in ‘The storyteller’. 
Demand’s series of photographs based on iPhone snaps, the Dailies, 
requires a particular approach that takes into account the artist’s 
description of them as ‘haiku moments’.1 Roland Barthes’s reflections 
on the haiku, which anticipate his account of photography in Camera 
Lucida, help to draw out this suggestion.
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The two boredoms
Benjamin’s notion of pre-modern boredom, which he elaborates in 
‘The storyteller” (1936) and elsewhere, is bound up with the rhythms 
of pre-industrial forms of labour, such as weaving and spinning.2 These 
activities encourage a relaxed, receptive, self-forgetful, almost absent 
state of mind. It is in this dreamlike atmosphere that storytelling 
thrives. Storytelling is fundamentally about assimilating, sharing and 
transmitting experience. Experience in the deepest sense, Erfahrung, 
depends upon these processes which enable the retention of new 
experiences, the assimilation of them to past ones, and the formation of 
personal or collective narratives. Stories help to weave together a largely 
unconscious repository of shared understanding. This is partly because 
the story remains open, ambiguous and enigmatic. As Benjamin put it, 
the story is free from explanation and, consequently, ‘it preserves and 
concentrates its energy and is capable of releasing it after a long time’. 
But the conditions that induce boredom and foster storytelling no longer 
exist. As Benjamin put it, ‘boredom is the dream bird that hatches the 
egg of experience’. This dream bird’s ‘nesting places – the activities that 
are intimately associated with boredom – are already extinct in the cities 
and are declining in the country as well’. When we lack the open-ended 
time of boredom, ‘the gift of listening is lost and the community of 
listeners disappears’.3
In his helpful essay ‘The atrophy of experience: Walter Benjamin 
and boredom’, Carlo Salzani argues that the conditions that caused the 
atrophy of experience and destroyed ‘boredom as mental relaxation … 
at the same time also produced a new form of boredom’.4 The second 
type of boredom, which we mainly encounter in Benjamin’s essays on 
Baudelaire, is a kind of enervated restlessness caused by the constant 
stimulation and shocks of modern life and labour. Baudelaire’s ‘spleen’, 
which he called ‘a soul-deadening spiritual condition’, is related to this 
boredom.5 In one of his poems, he figured this mood of depression as a 
city plunged in fog which, Benjamin noted, is ‘the preferred canvas for 
embroideries of boredom’.6 To characterise the psychological impact of 
industrial technologies and urban existence, Benjamin relied on Freud’s 
‘Beyond the pleasure principle’ (1920). He summarised Freud’s thesis as 
follows: ‘The greater the shock factor in particular impressions, the more 
vigilant consciousness has to be in screening stimuli; the more effectively 
it does so, the less these impressions enter long experience (Erfahrung) 
and the more they correspond to the concept of isolated experience 
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(Erlebnis).’7 Freud thought that shocks are parried or cushioned by a 
part of the brain that has become hard or inorganic and so resistant to 
the effects of stimulus. Following Baudelaire, Benjamin compared the 
function of this defensive, vigilant consciousness to a fencer parrying 
blows. The mental shocks caused by jostling in city crowds, repetitive 
factory labour, clock time and the blitz of media info-imagery eventually 
leave one incapable of properly assimilating new impressions. This 
breaks up one’s sense of time into a series of discrete events and leads 
to the characteristic boredom of modernity. The account of modern 
boredom outlined by Benjamin was also influenced by Georg Simmel, 
who argued in ‘The metropolis and mental life’ (1903) that modern city-
dwellers develop a blasé attitude in response to the levelling effect of 
money, which ‘hollows out the core of things’. For Simmel, ‘the essence 
of the blasé attitude is an indifference toward the distinction between 
things’. Things ‘appear to the blasé person in a homogeneous, flat and 
grey colour with no one of them worthy of being preferred over another’.8 
For Benjamin, the modern city-dweller’s dual defence of hyper-alertness 
and unresponsiveness prevent just the sort of relaxed, semi-unconscious, 
self-forgetful receptivity associated with pre-modern boredom. As a 
result, their experience is shallow and disconnected.
Thomas Demand
For Benjamin, the loss of a receptive state of boredom and the consequent 
atrophy of genuine experience are closely associated with a crisis of 
memory; what is merely lived through leaves no trace. In ‘On some 
motifs in Baudelaire’ (1939), he observed that technologies such as 
photography, which make it easy to retain and retrieve an event, have a 
deleterious effect on our capacity for long experience and substantive 
memory. Since our prosthetic devices remember for us, our power of 
remembrance is weakened. In addition, the instantaneous snapping 
of the modern camera shutter gives ‘the moment a posthumous shock’, 
insulating it from lived experience.9 There is a certain irony, then, in 
Thomas Demand’s use of photography as the medium for work aimed 
at countering the deepening contemporary crisis of experience and 
memory. He is well aware of the tension: in a conversation with the 
novelist Daniel Kehlmann, he linked his fears of an impending crisis of 
memory to digital technologies. In the age of Facebook, he noted, the 
distinction one formerly drew between collective and personal memory 
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is collapsing. In theory, one could publicly document and post one’s 
entire life online. One could construct ‘a lifelong photo album in the 
Cloud’. He continues:
But that also means you are storing your own deepest memories 
offsite. These days this most private aspect of human life is being 
commercialized … We know we’ve got all these photos readily 
accessible, so we forget them. And what happens in the long term 
with the human mind if it now structures knowledge according 
to how it can be accessed and retrieved? After all, you for one, are 
still more interested in the contents of Proust’s work than in 
knowing where the book is on the shelf.10
In his response, Kehlmann proposes an analogy between the current 
situation of knowledge and the use of satellite navigation. Satnav allows 
you to find your way around a city without knowing its geography. So 
also in the case of knowledge: you can find information so effortlessly 
that ‘very quickly you lose any deeper understanding of connections 
and contexts’.11
Yet concern over a crisis of memory long predates digitalisation. 
It is surely no accident that, in precisely this context, Demand mentions 
Proust, a novelist deeply concerned with the problem of memory. In 
‘The image of Proust’ (1929), Benjamin argued that Proust’s notion 
of involuntary memory more closely resembles forgetting, for it is in 
dreams and idle thoughts that we weave meaningful patterns with the 
disparate threads that constitute experience. These largely unconscious 
memories are only retrievable accidentally. Conversely, the information 
about the past retrieved by voluntary memory ‘retains no trace of that 
past’.12 The sort of memory that relies on deliberate recall is hollow, 
simulacral or, as Samuel Beckett remarked in his book on Proust, 
‘it presents the past in monochrome’.13 Benjamin suggested that ‘A la 
recherche du temps perdu may be regarded as an attempt to produce 
experience … in a synthetic way under today’s social conditions.’14 
But the conditions required for what might be called creative boredom 
no longer exist and cannot be resurrected. In these circumstances, we 
must ask: is it possible to create, in the midst of our distracted state 
of boredom, the conditions conducive to genuine, long experience? 
Can the technical, mediatic image be made memorable? These are the 
questions addressed by Demand’s unusual photographic practice of 
photographing full-size paper and cardboard models of scenarios often 
based on media images.
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In a conversation with the theorist, film-maker and storyteller 
Alexander Kluge, Demand acknowledged our condition of near-total 
immersion in the mediatic: ‘I gain a large part of my experience exclusively 
through this media-based narrative on the world and not, as one would 
have done one or two generations ago on “primary experience”.’15 
Or, again: ‘I’m at the end of an entire chain of worlds of images that 
present themselves to me. All experience, all I essentially am, is largely 
the upshot of things passed on to me.’16 In the same conversation, 
Demand revealed that many of the images he uses have a particular 
personal charge. Room (1994), for example, shows a destroyed office 
which, we learn, is based on a photograph documenting the aftermath 
of the unsuccessful attempt on Hitler’s life by Wehrmacht officers in 
1944. The photograph hung in Demand’s school room. For those who 
grew up in post-war Germany, this scene has more than merely historical 
interest: Demand says that it ‘had been seared in my mind’.17 These words 
recall Benjamin’s comment in the ‘Little history of photography’ (1931) 
about early photography being marked by ‘the tiny spark of contingency, 
of the here and now, with which reality has (so to speak) seared the 
subject’.18 The implication seems to be that, for Demand, certain trauma-
laden media images have the power to puncture the psyche’s protective 
shield and so form the basis of memorable, long experience. Benjamin 
suggested that this is what Baudelaire accomplished with his poetry: 
he exposed himself to the shocks of modern life, but to this immediate 
experience (Erlebnis) he ‘has given the weight of long experience 
(Erfahrung)’.19 An example of this effect, cited by Benjamin, is Baudelaire’s 
poem ‘A une passante’ (‘To a passer-by’). Jostled in a city street, the 
narrator passes a tall veiled woman in deep mourning who is borne 
along and swept away by the crowd. It is a case of love at last sight – a 
sudden and fleeting encounter. The image is striking, isolated, but for the 
narrator-poet and reader alike, unforgettable.20
Demand aims to transform our exposure to mass media imagery 
into something like authentic experience, retroactively; he is an artist as 
storyteller for modern times. If, for Benjamin, the storyteller always 
impresses something personal on otherwise remote events, then, for 
Demand, this bears on his use of personally affecting source imagery: 
‘Things must be slowed down,’ he says, ‘and for me that involves making 
something with my hands.’21 In this respect, he is comparable to the 
storyteller as craftsman whose task it is to ‘fashion the raw material of 
experience’.22 As raw material, Demand often chooses ‘blurred’ mass 
media images of events that form part of our personal biographies, but 
which also circulate in the public sphere. By laboriously constructing a 
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model and photographing it with a large-format, analogue film camera, 
he detaches these images from mass media information and makes 
them enigmatic, prolonging our attention. This is comparable to what 
the storyteller does. In a story, things are reported with accuracy, but as 
Benjamin notes, ‘the psychological connections among the events are 
not forced on the reader’. The story is bare; it ‘has a chaste compactness 
which precludes psychological analysis’.23 In other words, Demand’s 
photographs of models of mass media imagery acquire an internal 
opacity that encourages a receptive, unconscious reverie analogous to 
pre-modern boredom.
The Dailies
As we have seen, Demand appropriates hyper-mediated but personally 
affecting photographic images and transforms them into objects of long 
experience. In an interview, he made this clear, noting that his art 
involved ‘pulling true facts into fiction’.24 This account relates well to 
Demand’s Histories, but is it equally appropriate in the case of the series 
he initiated in 2008 called the Dailies? This series engages with the 
ubiquitous, banal, everyday practice of taking photographs with one’s 
smartphone. The device makes possible the habit of snapping, sharing 
and saving fairly inconsequential images which then serve as a little 
archive of personal memories. The activity typifies the distracted state 
of boredom – a state, as Jonathan Crary put it, of ‘constantly engaged, 
interfacing, interacting, communicating, responding or processing 
within some telematic milieu’.25 Yet in an interview, Demand remarked 
that the Dailies ‘are like these little haiku moments: you see something 
that has a very mundane and trivial beauty, and then you walk on’.26 
Haiku moments may be mundane, but they nonetheless have the capacity 
to puncture the general ‘telematic milieu’. For this series, Demand selects 
images from his own ephemeral iPhone snaps, makes life-size paper and 
card models of them, photographs the models using his large-format 
Sinar camera, and then has prints made using the dye transfer technique. 
This printing technique is very complex, time-consuming and nearly 
obsolete, but capable of producing extraordinarily rich and subtle 
colours.27 The Dailies are rectangular in format, in both portrait and 
landscape orientations, and of variable dimensions, amounting to an 
area under one square metre. In other words, given the current context, 
they are quite modest in size, as are the things photographed. Also, unlike 
Demand’s large-scale Histories, which are laminated behind plexiglass 
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and unframed, the Dailies are framed and glazed. It is as though, after a 
period working within the contemporary equivalent of the genre of 
history painting, Demand turned his attention to the more intimate, ‘low’ 
genre of still life. Like the Histories, the Dailies respond to the atrophy of 
experience, but they do so in a different way.
In his article, ‘Dailiness according to Demand’, Hal Foster picks up 
on the artist’s suggestive reference to the haiku moment and poses 
the pertinent question, ‘can everyday things still prompt epiphanic 
insights in an administered world?’28 Can a photograph pierce the 
muffled anxiety and restless boredom of contemporary life? I would 
like to pursue these questions further with the help of Roland Barthes’s 
fascinating discussion of the haiku in his late seminars published 
posthumously as The Preparation of the Novel (2003). Preparation 
contains a section devoted to the boredom and crippling lethargy suffered 
by many writers. Yet Barthes also declared that ‘art is indeed this power 
that relieves boredom: it cuts off (short circuits) boredom’.29
The haiku is a traditional Japanese poetic form that consists of 
three lines, each with a prescribed number of syllables, 5–7–5. Barthes 
remarks that a haiku is best appreciated seen on the printed page as 
‘a little block of writing, like an ideogrammatical square’. The haiku’s 
appeal to vision is owing not just to the arrangement of the printed 
words, but also to the white spaces created by them, which impart an 
‘aerated’ lightness. Barthes also discusses the form’s popular appeal. 
In Japan, haiku induce in readers the desire to write their own; it is a 
popular pastime.30 The brevity, small format, popular appeal and lack of 
any strict division between author and reader all suggest the plausibility 
of the analogy with smartphone photography, but the analogy, as we 
shall see, goes deeper.
The Dailies resist the dominant trend in art photography for large, 
theatrically staged and/or digitally manipulated work. Faced with this 
dominance, many artists are exploring the possibilities of an altogether 
different ideal of photography. Moyra Davey, for example, writing in 
2008 (the year of the first Dailies), forcefully stated her objection: 
‘The problem, to state it baldly, is one of stilt coupled with bloat. Absent 
from these oversized tableaux is the inherently surrealist, contingent, 
“found” quality of the vernacular photograph.’ She concludes that what 
is missing in contemporary art photography is accident.31 She is not alone 
in this surmise. In fact, even Andreas Gursky, a master of the digitally 
manipulated ‘oversized tableau’, has recently been experimenting with 
taking source photos from moving cars and high-speed trains, in order 
to produce accidental effects, unexpected distortions and loss of focus. 
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Similarly, Demand’s interest in phone photography can be seen in the 
context of a certain dissatisfaction with the immaculate, totally 
controlled and imposing nature of contemporary photography. Michael 
Fried famously argued that this kind of photography, including 
Demand’s, demonstrates its thoroughgoing authorial intentionality 
and so its realisation of photography’s ambition to be a fine art, like 
painting.32 Yet while Demand’s model-building, lighting and photography 
are undertaken in studio conditions, the images themselves, based 
on appropriated media sources, often epitomise the accident – either 
historical catastrophe or natural disaster. Consider, for instance, the 
ironically titled Control Room (2011), showing the aftermath of the 
Fukushima nuclear disaster.33 The Dailies represent another kind of 
accident – the contingency that marks everyday life.
The situation of contemporary photographic art bears comparison 
with the literary scene to which Barthes was responding in his appeal to 
the haiku. In his seminars of 1979–80, he set out his aim of writing a 
novel that would be fragmentary, intimate, domestic.34 He had been 
musing on this project for some time: for instance, in Roland Barthes by 
Roland Barthes (1975), he wrote under the heading ‘Projected Books’: 
‘Incidents (mini-texts, one-liners, haiku, notations, puns, everything that 
falls, like a leaf), etc.’35 He elaborated this idea in an essay on the writer 
Pierre Loti: ‘The incident – already much weaker than the accident (but 
perhaps more disturbing) – is simply what falls gently, like a leaf, on life’s 
carpet; it is that faint, fugitive crease given to the fabric of days; it is 
what can be just barely noted: a kind of notation degree zero.’36 Foster 
points out that the root of both accident and incident is cadere, to fall, and 
that ‘gravity is foregrounded’ in many of the Dailies, which ‘pressures 
the intentionality that otherwise suffuses the work’. He relates this to the 
aleatory strategies of the historical avant-garde, such as Jean Arp’s 
Squares Arranged According to the Laws of Chance (1917).37 While the 
Dailies do make compositional allusions to the early avant-garde, they 
actually have more in common with Barthes’s conception of things 
that fall on life’s carpet. The marked point of view, often from above, is 
intended to make them look like records of a momentary glance.
In one of the seminars in The Preparation of the Novel, ‘Daily practice 
of notation’, Barthes discusses his habit of carrying around a notebook in 
order to jot down incidents that attract his attention; he hoped that these 
brief notes, prose haiku, would form the basis of a new kind of novel. 
Particularly relevant in this context is his observation that the haiku 
verges on the banal, while at the same time giving subtlety and nuance to 
the everyday. The task of poetry, epitomised by haiku, is to rescue a sense 
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of nuance in a culture bent on standardisation. As Antoine Compagnon 
put it, for Barthes, ‘the haiku emblematizes, individuates, nuances the 
world, instead of abstracting and conceptualizing it’.38 Further, according 
to Barthes, haiku touches on a ‘language void’ in the subject – a void, 
not owing to despair, but rather to jubilation, to the sense that life is 
worth living. It is the loss of language that comes when one is ‘alive to 
the world’. It ‘retains a trace, a scent of this resistance to meaning’. It is a 
scrap, a sliver of vision – absolutely contingent, subtle, painful, real. It 
evokes ‘what, in a unique instant, once befell the subject: a voice, a sound 
(contingency defines the perishable, the mortal)’.39 Haiku is an activity of 
writing between life and death. It sparks the satori, or mental jolt, that 
Barthes would later associate with the photographic ‘punctum’. Like 
photography, its impression of presence is in the past, and so edged with 
absence. Barthes also notes that neither medium says ‘I’, although both 
imply a subject who has noted the scene – and thought it worth noting.
The Dailies suggest that even the mundane, daily practice of 
smartphone photography is capable of a haiku-like vividness. The 
difficult task Demand set himself was to show the mundaneness and the 
vividness at once. Some of the Dailies emphasise the mundane side of 
the haiku. This is especially true of the images apparently chosen to relate 
to the site of their first exhibition. The photographs were displayed in an 
unusual building, designed for the Commercial Travellers’ Association in 
Sydney, whose hotel bedrooms are arranged, like flower petals, around a 
central core. Daily #10 (2008), which shows a footstool with a bold 
flower pattern, alludes to this arrangement. Other photographs evoke 
the legendary boredom and alienation of the travelling salesman: these 
include the corner of an anonymous bathroom, a ‘do not disturb’ sign 
hanging from a door knob, and ‘artfully’ arranged processed cheese slices 
with tongs. Other images have the essential haiku-like quality of being 
both recognisable and surprising, which is also the classic definition 
of wit. Daily #15 (2011), for instance, shows a chain link fence into 
which someone (or a couple) has wedged two empty paper coffee cups, 
one nestling inside the other. Daily #14 (2011) visually thematises the 
haiku’s characteristic resistance to meaning; it shows foliage seen 
obscurely through a window of frosted glass, rendered, I suppose, with 
tracing paper. Particularly haiku-like is Daily #20 (2012), probably 
because it is one of the few images that indicate a time of day, morning, 
and a trace of the previous night’s activity – a plastic glass of half-finished 
beer on a sloping window ledge. The more one studies the image, the 
more its complexity grows. Light, shade and reflections play on the 
various (paper) surfaces; the beer acts as an impromptu spirit level; 
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the window mirrors the glass, tilting the beer in the opposite direction. 
(But how does one make a paper model of a reflected glass? With another 
paper glass?)
Although it is not a Daily, the most haiku-like work by Demand is, 
for me, Rain (2008), the animated film loop of rain drops bouncing off a 
shiny ground accompanied by the lovely rushing sound of a downpour. 
Barthes cites what could have been its source-haiku:
No sound
Other than the summer rain
In the evening
(Issa)
Barthes might have been thinking of this haiku, or one like it, when he 
observed that ‘Haiku frequently bring short filmed sequences to 
mind.’40 The film is actually a stop-motion animation: amazingly, the 
raindrops are formed of candy wrappers and the soundtrack is of eggs 
frying in a pan.41 Relevant in this context is Benjamin’s observation that 
one of the symptoms of modern urban existence is ‘the diminishing 
magical power of rain’.42 Although Rain is the very height of artifice, 
it nonetheless restores a moment of wonder to what has become the 
utterly dreary natural phenomenon of a rainy day. To reply to Foster’s 
question, then, everyday things can still prompt epiphanic insights in an 
administered world.
The Preparation of the Novel makes it clear that Barthes’s conception 
of photography, as expounded in Camera Lucida, is closely connected to 
his appreciation of the haiku. A whole seminar is devoted to the haiku’s 
similarity to photography. ‘By entering one art though another’, he came 
to realise that they share a ‘that-has been-temporality’, that is, a certificate 
or impression of past presence. Barthes also points to the key importance 
of the two arts’ lack of generality: if a haiku mentions rain, ‘we perceive 
the particular mode of being of that rain’. The particularity of the haiku 
might seem to be in tension with Demand’s model-making process. Yet 
Barthes also points to the major difference between photography and 
the art of haiku: a photograph is bound to say everything; it produces 
an excess of meaning. Haiku, on the other hand, are more ‘abstract’.43 
Demand’s model-making means that his images lack photography’s 
‘inevitable details’; they have the bare, compact quality of a haiku.
In a sensitive reading of Benjamin’s ‘The storyteller’, Peter Brooks 
glosses what it might mean to transform information into a memorable 
story. Interestingly, he stresses what is left out:
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What may need to be scrutinized in narrative is less its ‘message’, 
less its ostensible affirmations, and much more its interstices, its 
gaps, its moments of passage, the moment when something falls 
silent to indicate a transference, the moment when one begins to 
hear other possible voices in response.44
This insight bears on Demand’s unusual process which, we can now see, 
is not just a matter of demonstrating the constructedness of photographic 
meaning or the ‘sheer authorial intention’ of photographic art. Rather, it 
is a way of creating blanks, interstices, gaps, silences that resist meaning 
and so of producing creative boredom and genuine experience in a 
synthetic way under today’s social conditions.
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Professionally boring:  
the psychoanalyst’s tragedy
Anouchka grose
There are a number of generic responses when you say you’re a 
psychoanalyst. One is to back away from you very fast; another is to tell 
you everything. Then again, it’s common to say something along the lines 
of: ‘That must be so interesting!’ Or what probably amounts to much 
the same thing: ‘Oh my God, that must be so boring. How on earth do you 
stand it?’ Not only do you have to sit around all day listening to people 
ramble on about their first world problems, but you have to do it all 
with a measured, professional demeanour while wearing drab clothes. 
According to a certain set of (Anglo-Saxon) standards, a psychoanalyst is 
meant to be almost theatrically boring. They are supposed to have given 
up all their symptomatic weirdnesses; to have transcended the internal 
volatility that makes human beings fascinating.
Quite often, the people who come to see you also worry that they 
might be boring you, and money often gets brought in as the solution 
to the problem; as long as you pay your analyst you can bore them as 
fiercely as you like. Occasionally you get someone who’s perhaps more 
worried than most; someone for whom ‘boringness’ is a key presenting 
symptom. I once worked with a woman who feared being dull. She felt 
she couldn’t keep people around – they’d fade away from her as if there 
was nothing in her that could hold them. The factual details of her life 
were odd and interesting, but in a kind of low-key way. If you met her at 
a party and made small talk you’d be quite likely to stumble across these 
few slightly unusual details. Still, she desperately didn’t want people 
to latch onto them, as it would feel too exposing. For her, there was 
so much pain attached to these biographical facts that it would be 
unbearable to talk about them with a stranger in a social setting. But to a 
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friendly, well-meaning stranger they might appear innocuous enough to 
ask further questions about. (Without giving too much away, it was 
something along the lines of her father having a slightly unusual job.) So 
she didn’t let people know any of the ‘interesting’ things about her, but 
was then upset at how lonely she was, and how difficult it seemed to 
make and keep friends. In short, she was a perfect, neurotic impossibility 
machine. In the end it wasn’t clear whether she feared being boring or 
interesting, but both were bad. The first left you isolated, and the second 
invaded – a seemingly insoluble topological problem.
This seems to be something quite different from the traditional 
‘bore’ who leaves no space in his discourse for the other: somebody who 
talks at people rather than conversing with them. In analysis people often 
worry about being mistaken for one of these types and are keen to point 
out that they would never be so rude as to talk about themselves at such 
great length in any other situation.
It seems that some psychoanalysts themselves also bring a 
special array of concerns to this question of boring or interesting. On 
the side of their analysands, it’s easy – all people are interesting, and if 
they seem boring then that’s interesting in itself. How and why are they 
bringing this boringness about? What’s the unconscious purpose of it? 
But, at least in the Anglo-Saxon tradition, the boringness or interestingness 
of the analyst is a subject that can sometimes become a little fraught. In 
her book Jacques Lacan and Co., Elizabeth Roudinesco presents the 
psychoanalytic world of the 1960s as a culture of charismatic narcissists 
on the Lacanian side, versus castrated artisans on the International 
Psychoanalytical Association side. From a certain perspective it can seem 
that in order to be a ‘proper’, ‘legitimate’ psychoanalyst you have to be a 
bit boring.
It’s always funny to see how small theoretical differences between 
the various analytic orientations play out in clinical practice. One of 
the thornier questions is the handling of the transference. In the 
French psychoanalytic tradition you have the idea of a transference to 
knowledge, as in knowledge of the unconscious, and definitely not great 
learnedness. As Lacan said in his twenty-second seminar, psychoanalysis 
can make you less ignorant, but it can’t stop you being a pillock. In the 
course of your analysis you set to work to find out what your analyst 
appears to you to know about your unconscious. You want to know as 
much about it as they do. So your transference is to what they appear 
to you to know, and not so much to them. But in the Anglo-Saxon 
tradition there’s more of an idea of a transference to the person of 
the analyst, coupled with the idea that transference interpretations 
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will form a very important part of the work. The analyst will consistently 
name the affects associated with the transference: ‘You think I’m angry 
with you. You’re sad because there’s a break coming. You’re trying to 
frustrate me by being late.’ (Apologies for the caricature but, going by the 
evidence, it’s not that much of a caricature.) In order to stay relatively 
‘clean’ in this mess of difficult feelings the analyst has to be careful about 
how they appear to their patient. They have to be – or certainly to seem 
to be – well analysed themselves, otherwise they’d surely be equally 
responsible for all the dreadful feelings flying around. And that brings 
out another huge set of theoretical differences. What does it mean to 
be ‘well analysed’? What are the aims of psychoanalysis? Are you 
supposed to be able to control your drives better? To have a healthy, 
flexible ego? To be realistic about the kinds of satisfactions you can expect 
from life? Or to have seen beyond all your ideals and identifications 
(in which case ‘looking like a psychoanalyst’ would be the proof that you 
hadn’t quite got there yet)?
How to Survive as a Psychotherapist (1993) is the name of a widely 
read book by Nina Coltart, a British independent psychoanalyst and 
one-time vice president of the British Psychoanalytical Society (i.e. a 
premier league castrated artisan). As the title suggests, the book deals 
with the daily ‘realities’ of working as a psychoanalyst. It attempts to take 
the word ‘survival’ seriously, focusing on the idea that psychoanalysis or 
psychotherapy is a very challenging form of work for reasons that are 
ludicrously varied. Your survival as an analyst might depend on things as 
disparate as your capacity to bear the suicide of one of your analysands, 
your ability to be equally frank about sex and money, and your aptitude 
for sitting in the same chair for eight to ten hours a day and not saying 
much. In this context, Coltart also singles out your ability to dress 
appropriately for the job; failure to do so will apparently cause your 
patients no end of embarrassment and will no doubt therefore have 
an impact on your survival in the field. For Coltart, ‘appropriately’ 
equals ‘conservatively’, which again brings out the question of what a 
psychoanalyst is. Are they supposed to function as a model of perfect 
psychic equanimity and social normalcy, or can they be something more 
like a refreshingly abnormal co-conversationalist? And what impact 
might these basic suppositions have on the way they dress?
The book came out in 1993, the year before Coltart retired, and 
there is a small section in it about choosing the right chair. ‘I cannot 
emphasize enough how essential a good chair is,’ she writes,1 which 
could seem banal, until you hear (not in the book, but perhaps in one of 
her obituaries) that she retired due to severe back pain caused by sitting 
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still for too long, combined with heavy smoking; one of her vertebrae 
collapsed. In 1997, at the age of 70, she underwent voluntary euthanasia 
after the painkillers she was taking gave her a perforated stomach ulcer. 
So when she says, ‘Get a good chair,’ one can assume it really comes from 
the heart. (It’s a great shame she missed out on the famous Herman 
Miller ‘Aeron’ chair – designed in 1994 – beloved by bankers who take 
coke and do 24-hour shifts, and widely available second-hand on eBay 
since the financial crash in 2008.)
Coltart describes the work of being a therapist as ‘eccentrically 
low-key’, which some might say is a euphemism for ‘boring’.2 More than 
once she mentions Wilfred Bion’s rather Zen idea of approaching sessions 
‘without memory or desire’, and she herself was a Buddhist who saw 
great parallels between psychoanalysis and Buddhism. Both practices, 
according to certain traditions, aim to tame excitement or agitation in 
order to reduce suffering. Apparently she meditated daily, which perhaps 
goes to show how far her passion for sitting still and shutting up went. 
You could almost call it an unhealthy obsession. Only a weekend job in 
Trafalgar Square, moonlighting as a ‘living sculpture’, would be needed 
to complete the picture of ossification.
What are you supposed to do with your body when you’re apparently 
just sitting there, listening and thinking, giving yourself over to an 
account of the thoughts and drives of someone else? Are you equally 
full of impulses and desires yourself, in which case how can you do your 
job well? Wouldn’t you die of boredom, or explode with frustration – or 
even just make loads of unconscious slips? Or do you have to be somehow 
drained of all excitement, in which case, equally, how can you hope to 
understand what your analysands are on about? (Or, perhaps more 
sinisterly, are you the first type, disguised as the second? Do you fear 
the intrusions of your drives and so present an uncanny mask of false 
serenity? This is basically the state of all comedy therapists, from Frazier 
to Tina Fey’s character in Unbreakable Kimmy Schmidt, as well as more 
frightening shrinks such as Hannibal Lecter.)
In Coltart’s book, alongside chapters about assessment and the 
differences between psychotherapy and psychoanalysis, there is a 
chapter called ‘Apparent trivia’ that deals with all sorts of stuff that 
psychoanalysts are supposedly reluctant to speak about because it 
seems too stupid. While most of the other chapters deal with ‘ideas’ – 
such as how to cope with paradoxes, or negative transferences – the 
trivia chapter has a heavy focus on materiality, of the consulting room 
and also of the body. Apparently it’s highly unlikely that your training 
will have flagged this stuff up for you. In fact, your training may even 
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have led you to believe that psychoanalysis is all to do with the psyche 
and therefore happens in some kind of bodiless space, or at least a space 
where bodies are held in suspension temporarily so as to make way for 
purity of thought. The funny thing is that Coltart’s book is going to tell 
you it’s not like that so you can pre-empt things in order to make them 
appear more like that again. So you must have a watertight dustbin to 
catch the occasional vomit, in order that your consulting room remain 
odourless and unsullied for the next session. The walls of your room 
should be white, and any artworks (particularly facing the couch) should 
be as unevocative and austere as possible. There do need to be artworks, 
however, as bare walls look unhomely.
Still, there’s one element of the ‘apparent trivia’ that does tend to 
be a frequent topic for discussion, at least according to Coltart, and that 
is the psychoanalyst’s clothing. The appearance and meaning of our 
clothes is an especially pressing matter because we live in even closer 
contact with them than all the other things in our personal space. 
Therefore, if you get them ‘wrong’ it’s quite literally ‘on you’. The main 
thing about clothes, as with everything else in the psychoanalyst’s 
physical space, is that they should be thought about, chosen well and 
then forgotten. In order for this to happen, the clothes supposedly need 
to be both comfortable and conservative. Coltart says, rather ominously, 
‘A therapist who is obviously self-conscious, in either an anxious or a 
narcissistic way, about her clothes, would be quite off-putting to a patient, 
who might not feel able to broach the subject for a long time.’3
You can maybe see that there’s a lot packed into that statement. For 
a start there’s the fact that it’s gendered, unlike almost every other such 
statement in the book (which is otherwise full of ‘one’, ‘he/she’ and ‘I’). 
There’s also the idea that psychoanalysis necessarily involves thorough 
and explicit exploration of the transference (inside which you must 
sustain a position of faultless opacity). What if your patient didn’t like 
your clothes? OMG, how would they deal with that? And what if it was 
your fault that they didn’t like the way you dressed because you had 
picked the ‘wrong’ clothes? How would they gradually pluck up the nerve 
to tell you about your very visible clinical mistake? And that’s presuming 
they kept coming long enough to get round to it. Of course they would 
immediately be able to see that you aren’t very well analysed if something 
of your own desires or phantasies has crept into your wardrobe. In other 
words, the chapter is a masterclass in how to appear boring.
It’s easy to laugh at the programmatic nature of it all – the robot 
therapist idea – but of course it can be very anxiety provoking when 
something too un-boring, or revealing, slips into the work from the 
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analyst’s side. I recently had a strange experience of it that really shook 
me up. A man came for an initial session with the idea that he’d like 
to start an analysis. He was a very intelligent person, clearly capable of 
self-questioning, so it seemed that it would be possible to get to work. 
He also worked in the same field as my partner, which can sometimes feel 
a bit uncomfortable; are you going to run into each other outside the 
consulting room? Does he know people we know?
The man left, and immediately afterwards I saw that my daughter’s 
boyfriend had let the dog out during his session, and that he had 
deposited a kind of joke shop-style turd right in the middle of the 
doorway, which this person must have had to step over on his way out. 
I felt immediately implicated by this terrible object – it was like the worst 
wardrobe malfunction; like something of mine had slipped out. I felt like 
I had to do or say something about it, but what? And also how? And 
when? It certainly didn’t seem like an appropriate subject for an email. 
What would you put as a heading? There was nothing to be said that 
wasn’t all about me, my shame, my embarrassment, my ‘badly analysed’ 
relation to the anal object. So I vowed to say nothing and waited for 
the next session. If there was anything useful to be said it would have to 
come from him.
The man arrived a few days later and spoke a great deal about all 
sorts of things, but definitely not about the turd in the hall. There was no 
sign whatsoever that he had even seen it. After talking for quite some 
time he mentioned dreams, saying he never remembered them. I pushed 
a little and he said he could remember a tiny fragment of one from the 
night before. He’d dreamt he saw his old doctor coming towards him in 
the street and was embarrassed because it was a doctor who maybe knew 
a bit too much about him. His actual words were something like, ‘My old 
doctor appeared unexpectedly in my field of vision. He was kind of a 
grumpy old man.’ He wondered whether to acknowledge this doctor or 
just to look away. As the doctor drew nearer the man became more and 
more anxious, but the doctor suddenly looked straight at him and gave 
him a smile and a wink. The man felt incredibly relieved – this potentially 
awkward encounter suddenly seemed friendly and funny.
So it appears to be an extremely elegant bit of dream work. The 
man sees an unexpected thing in his field of vision. And this ‘thing’ seems 
somehow to interpellate him, or to know too much about him. He didn’t 
explicitly make the link with the unspeakable hallway object, and I chose 
not to make it for him, as it was only his second session and it might have 
been somewhat pushy. So we ended the session there and will have to 
wait to see how ‘the thing’ will come back. But for now perhaps it can 
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show that weird shit can come out in analysis, not only on the side of the 
analysand, and it needn’t be a complete disaster. And it would be boring, 
not to mention futile, to try to pretend otherwise.
Notes
* Sections of this essay were previously published under the title ‘Shrinking clothes’ in Fashion 
Theory 24.1 (2018): 85–91, DOI: 10.1080/1362704X.2018.1465279. The author is grateful to 
Valerie Steele for her help.
1 Coltart, How to Survive, 28.
2 Coltart, How to Survive, 25.
3 Coltart, How to Survive, 30.
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Among Andy Warhol’s most disturbing images is one we’ll never see. In 
1949 the fledgling commercial artist, newly arrived in Manhattan, 
painted a series of large canvases that were later lost or destroyed. One, 
based on a harrowing photograph known as Bloody Saturday, originally 
published in Life magazine, showed a lone baby sitting among the ashen 
wreckage of Shanghai’s South Station during the Japanese bombing 
campaign of 1937.
Figure 8.1 H.S. ‘Newsreel’ Wong, Bloody Saturday, 1937. Photograph, original dimensions 
unknown.
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The baby is propped upright at the edge of the platform, his skin 
blackened, clothing shredded, mouth fixed in a cry of despair as he stares 
into the ruined vista ahead. According to Warhol’s biographer Victor 
Bockris, ‘the painting was horrific yet surprisingly decorative’, executed 
in what would come to be his trademark ‘blotted-line technique and 
pastel colours’.1
The painting foreshadows the celebrated Death and Disaster series 
(1962–4), but with a striking difference: where in the later images of 
electric chairs and road accidents, human beings are either ominously 
absent or grainy corpses indifferently merged into the mechanical 
wreckage, the Shanghai baby brings us into the traumatic presence of 
raw and incomprehensible pain.
A young man I treated in analysis over many years had come to 
London fleeing a childhood marked by the unbound cruelty of a civil war. 
One day he arrived having had a potentially fatal cycling accident the 
previous afternoon. He was shaken less by the speeding white van that 
muscled him off his bike than by the succession of cars that drove past 
him as he lay on the pavement. ‘I felt like a screaming, naked baby in the 
middle of the road,’ he told me. Consigned without choice or consent to 
total dependence on the care or neglect, love or hate of adults, we are 
born, to use Freud’s term, into a condition of helplessness.
Perhaps, Bockris hints, Warhol disowned the painting once it 
revealed itself to him as an unwitting self-portrait, an exposure of 
the darkest and most vulnerable corner of his own self. His commercial 
work at the time mined post-war consumer culture’s deep seam of 
sentimentality, conjuring an idyll of lush pastel flowers, cherubs and 
butterflies, an enchanted inner childhood. Perhaps the Shanghai baby, 
rendered in those ‘surprisingly decorative’ colours, was the cherub’s 
unconscious obverse, an unacknowledged black trauma haunting the 
idealised, pastel surface.
Coloured by illness and grief, Warhol’s childhood afforded him 
little relief or distance from the terrors of infantile helplessness. At the 
age of two, he suffered ocular swelling, treated by his mother with boric 
acid baths; at four, curvature of an arm bone he’d broken without 
realising it; at six, scarlet fever; and at eight (the most notorious of 
these biennial afflictions), recurrent bouts of chorea, or St Vitus’s 
dance. Chorea is a disorder of the central nervous system that causes 
its sufferer to lose control of his limbs, which periodically flail in an 
unpredictable frenzy. The sensation of dispossession would stoke the 
child’s fear that he was going mad. Andy’s shaking fits led to the malign 
attention of bullies, leaving him in terror of going to school, confused by 
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basic tasks of coordination and provoked all too quickly to tears. His 
childhood had become a story of the traumatic breaching of his bodily 
and emotional borders.
Prescribed a month’s bed rest and constant care, Andy was moved 
by his mother, Julia, into the dining room adjoining the kitchen, enabling 
her to attend him round the clock and perhaps beginning the fraught 
relationship that saw her live with him (though kept increasingly out of 
sight) through the various homes of his adult life. In bed, the convalescing 
patient enjoyed a limitless supply of paper dolls, comic books and 
magazines procured by his mother, from which he cut the elements of 
the collages he’d then assemble. Describing the scene in his Philosophy, 
Warhol evokes – knowingly? – the ambience of a factory in miniature: 
‘I would spend all my summer listening to the radio and lying in bed 
with my Charlie McCarthy doll and my un-cut-out paper dolls all over 
the spread and under the pillow.’2 The convalescent bed shared an 
essential paradox with Warhol’s later Factory, the legendary studio space 
in which his manic production mingled with sexual, narcotic and 
emotional excess and where too the radio would be kept on through the 
working day: both the child’s bed and the adult Factory were places 
of compulsive productivity and of inertial retreat, of perpetual motion 
and its cancellation.
Figure 8.2 Andy Warhol, Electric Chair 74, 1971. Screenprint in colours, no. 215 from an edition 
of 250, Zurich, Bruno Bischofberger. Christie’s Images © 2020 London/Scala, Florence.
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Cut out from newspapers, the serial images of electric chairs, car crashes, 
suicides and race riots in Warhol’s Death and Disaster series have a 
disinterested quality, as if taken by an anonymous camera. Saturating 
them in industrial yellow, green, red and orange, Warhol submerged the 
traumatic images in a wash of indifference.
These paintings have always aroused in me a queasy shame, as 
though catching me in the posture of the gawking rubbernecker. When 
you drive past the scene of a motorway accident, the speed of the cars 
ahead, and then of your own car, dips to a catatonic slow motion. For 
those few seconds, the concertinaed fenders, shattered glass, even the 
blood trails, are drained of human significance, as your eye becomes a 
coldly mechanical recording instrument. I experience the same split in 
perception before the Death and Disaster paintings. The car crash scene is 
both an eruption of violence, destruction and pain, and an indifferent 
arrangement of interchangeable objects. I feel at once inhuman and all 
too human, too far away from and too close to the surfeit of horror.
Warhol’s ‘hardcore detachment from anything concerning 
[death]’3 doesn’t preclude compulsive fascination with it. In the grip of 
hypochondriac anxieties, imagining his skin and internal organs under 
permanent siege, the critic Brian Dillon suggests, he took refuge in 
the fantasy of a neutral body, in which all agitation was cancelled 
out: ‘Fearing illness and medicine in equal measure, he imagined that 
physical well-being consisted in remaining inviolate from both and 
thought that a healthy body was a body that was unified, self-same, 
wholly itself and itself alone.’4
Isn’t it this fantasy of equilibrium that colours the screaming 
Shanghai baby in dreamy pastels, and that coats the later scenes in 
shades of commercial affirmation? The vacant electric chair signifies 
both the violent shock it will administer and the permanent silence 
of death that will follow. The artificial colour washes out these twin 
terrors of excess and nullity. While commentators have ascribed 
political meaning to the series, during a radio conversation with Claes 
Oldenburg and Roy Lichtenstein Warhol insisted they were ‘an expression 
of indifference’.5
The flattening function of colour gives a more sinister inflection 
to the whimsicality of Warhol’s comments on painting, more than a 
decade later, in his book The Philosophy of Andy Warhol: ‘You see, I think 
every painting should be the same size and the same color so they’re 
all interchangeable and nobody thinks they have a better painting or 
a worse painting.’6 Put differently, the ideal of painting would be to 
nullify both its own content and the viewer’s response – saying nothing, 
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soliciting nothing, a moment of pure non-communication between 
artist and audience.
Neutrality, indifference, emptiness – these were Warhol’s resources 
in the struggle against the onrush of disturbances to his internal balance. 
He sought, in both life and work, a state of serene pastel stillness, only to 
find it menaced on one side by the threat of pain and shock, on the other 
by the void of silence and death. His erotic life oscillated between long 
periods of asexual detachment and abrupt bursts of passionate, often 
hopeless desire, just as his successive relationships with his Factory 
‘superstars’ repeated a trajectory of adhesive mutual entanglement 
ending in cold indifference and rejection.
Warhol evidently found intolerable the double bind of love – the 
promise of gratification, the risk of indifference; hence his compulsive 
oscillation between renouncing erotic desire and giving himself up to it. 
The cultivated emptiness of his persona, among his greatest creations, 
was a solution to this bind. Visiting Hollywood in 1963, he dreamed (as 
he writes in POPism, his memoir of the 1960s) of his life assuming 
Hollywood’s unalloyed vacancy: ‘Vacant, vacuous Hollywood was all I 
wanted to mold my life into. Plastic. White-on-white.’7
To attain a white-on-white life is to permanently neutralise the 
agitations of feeling, to cleanse the face of life of the colours that 
distinguish it. According to Warhol’s friend and biographer David 
Bourdon, his favourite film of 1964 was The Creation of the Humanoids, 
Figure 8.3 Andy Warhol, 5 Deaths, 1963. Silkscreen ink and acrylic on canvas, 111.8 × 83.8 cm. 
Christie’s Images © 2020 London/Scala, Florence.
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in which a post-apocalyptic labour shortage is resolved by the invention 
of humanoid robots. The film’s ‘happy ending’ ‘comes when the heroine 
and the hero discover themselves to be machines’.8 The disappearance of 
the human into the machine was the happy ending Warhol sought for 
himself. Numbness and indifference, the end of desire, were increasingly 
Warhol’s primary creative resources.
Warhol’s persona was an attempt to realise ‘the desire for non-desire’ 
as his very essence. Indifference insinuated itself into his gaze, his voice, 
his comportment: into the texture of his everyday being. Paradoxically, 
his persona also fed off the creative, emotional, narcotic and sexual 
excesses flaring around him. A community of artists, drag queens, 
hangers-on and superstars inhabited the Factory during the 1960s and a 
febrile cauldron of loves, hatreds, rivalries and yearnings bubbled 
perpetually around the impassive humanoid at its centre.
Is it irony or destiny that a body obsessively imagined by its bearer as a 
site of danger and vulnerability should end up being shot by a stalker, 
whose intent above all was to attack the victim’s bodily and psychic 
boundaries? The bullets Valerie Solanas fired into Warhol’s chest on 
3 June 1968 would destroy his last vestige of trust – in other human 
beings and in the integrity of his own body, which could now be restored 
only precariously and with the aid of an external device. ‘Profoundly 
disembodied already,’ remarks Warhol’s biographer Wayne Koestenbaum, 
‘he became, after the assassination attempt, more radically severed from 
his body, now a canvas of wounds and scars – the apparatus of his torn 
and flayed flesh held in place, for the rest of his life, by tightly bound 
abdominal belts, corsets that Brigid Berlin dyed for him in optimistic 
pastels, like the colours of his silkscreens.’9
Being shot confirmed for the author of the Philosophy that all 
experience, even and especially at its most traumatic edge, is essentially 
‘television’: ‘you don’t feel anything’.10 It is the same philosophy that 
imagines an aesthetic utopia in which all paintings are the same size and 
colour, that enjoins us to play all relationships ‘on one level’ of genial 
indifference: ‘very light, cool, off-hand, very American’.11 In a Warholian 
utopia, the excitations and agitations of desire, pain, frustration and 
even pleasure would be cancelled out in the name of nirvanic bliss.
The increasingly obsessive cultivation during the early Factory 
years of his trademark flat, affectless mode of speech and movement 
was the manifest expression of this inertial ideal. But here a striking 
paradox comes into view: Warhol’s investment of his whole self in doing, 
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feeling and being nothing was also an expression of his prodigious 
productivity.
The chapter on ‘Work’ in the Philosophy turns on the erosion of any 
distinction between work and life: ‘just being alive is so much work 
at something you don’t always want to do. Being born is like being 
kidnapped. And then sold into slavery. People are working every 
minute. The machinery is always going. Even when you sleep.’12 We 
are ransomed to work for as long as we’re alive, slave labourers on a 
zero-hours contract, subject to the flows, sometimes even, sometimes 
violently unstable, of energetic input and output circulating through us. 
The machinery is always going.
Perhaps, then, Andy got to the Factory early and worked so 
unrelentingly because even if he were to stop doing and making, he 
would still be stuck with the work of simply being. And so his work and 
life were dedicated to the strange ideal of lifelessness. ‘The negative 
message that emerged from the Warhol Factory was really a memento 
mori,’ remarked the critic Calvin Tomkins.13 In his films the camera whirrs 
away, keeping a vigilant eye on its objects for hours on end in the service 
of attaining a state of absolute stillness and silence.
In July 1963, during the Death and Disaster period, Warhol bought 
the Bolex 8 mm camera and made his first film, proposing to his lover 
John Giorno that he make him a movie star by filming him sleeping. 
Sleep is a five-hour film which shows the naked, sleeping Giorno, the 
camera lingering hypnotically on smaller and larger fragments of his 
body from different angles and perspectives: head, torso, buttocks, the 
full body seen from the foot of the bed or sideways or above. It is very 
difficult, as Koestenbaum suggests, to watch Sleep without thinking of 
the corpse of Andrej Warhola from which Andy had taken flight 21 years 
previously. ‘At last,’ he writes, ‘Andy performs his filial vigil; Sleep is a 
wake.’14 The motionless paternal body the young Andy couldn’t bring 
himself to look at was transmogrified into the lover’s body he couldn’t 
take his eyes off.
Staring at a sleeper is minimally yet decisively different from 
staring at a corpse. Motionless for long stretches, withdrawn into itself, 
the sleeping body is absent from the world, divested of the interests 
and desires of waking life. The evocation of death at certain points is 
irresistible; filmed on his back from the foot of the bed, Giorno’s head 
and torso assume a leaden immobility that recalls an open coffin, or 
Frankenstein’s monster awaiting his fatal animation. But of course 
Giorno isn’t dead. His face twitches, he turns on his side, his trunk hosts 
the rise and fall of his breath. He evokes deathliness only because we’re 
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seeing him in the most elemental state of life, bordering both the final 
and irreversible stillness to which we all succumb and the anticipation of 
his imminent awakening into life and desire.
Warhol’s camera eye in Sleep is very far away from the anonymous 
gaze of the Death and Disaster series or the stony neutrality of the 
stationary camera placed years later in front of the Empire State Building. 
The camera switches angles, zooms in and out, taking up an intrusively 
curious relation to its oblivious object. There are interminable shots that 
home in on Giorno’s body to the point where it becomes inhuman, an 
abstract composition of texture and shadow. But when the camera pulls 
back to reveal the curved line stretching across the base of the screen as 
the crack of his sculpted buttocks, the apparent formal objectivity of the 
previous shot takes on the creepiness of the stalker’s obsession.
Sleep ties erotic desire, like aesthetic creativity, to the sleepy 
state in which we’re suspended between life and non-life. ‘Spying on 
motionlessness’, comments Koestenbaum, ‘is a rather specialized erotic 
discipline.’15 Warhol works through the night, sacrificing his own sleep to 
capture his lover’s. All his labour and creativity are invested in the state 
of total disinvestment. In contrast to his predecessors in the surrealist 
movement, it is sleep rather than dreams that interests him – not the 
working part of the nocturnal psyche (‘Dreams’, writes Freud, ‘only show 
us the dreamer in so far as he is not sleeping’16), but its non-working, 
inertial counterpart. His abundant reserves of creative and sexual energy 
are all put in the service of sleep and its various cognate states in waking 
life: apathy, emptiness, indifference.
Notes
 1 Bockris, Life and Death, 88.
 2 Warhol, Philosophy, 21.
 3 Bockris, Life and Death, 46.
 4 Dillon, Tormented Hope, 265.
 5 Bockris, Life and Death, 170.
 6 Warhol, Philosophy, 149.
 7 Warhol with Hackett, POPism, 51–2.
 8 Bockris, Life and Death, 217.
 9 Koestenbaum, Andy Warhol, 47–8.
10 Warhol, Philosophy, 91.
11 Warhol, Philosophy, 111.
12 Warhol, Philosophy, 96.
13 Cited in Bockris, Life and Death, 264.
14 Koestenbaum, Andy Warhol, 30.
15 Koestenbaum, Andy Warhol, 30.
16 Sigmund Freud, ‘A metapsychological supplement’, 223.
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It was bigger than everything
Bigger than its own bigness
Vasko Popa, ‘Yawn of yawns’1
A yawn is one of a multitude of small gestures that tend to escape visual 
representation, or at least lurk only in its shadows. Pictures of yawns 
are scarce because like throat clearing or hiccupping or sighing they are 
insignificant and so actively get in the way of expression – they are the 
useless bits of us that have to be edited out in order for representation to 
be meaningful to us. If, as I am, you happen to be drawn to the bits that 
generally slip through the net of attention, then the visual phenomenon 
of yawning becomes worth thinking about. I’m talking, of course, as if I 
know what yawning is, which is not to say that I know what it means. 
It appears that the question of why we yawn is still one of science’s great 
mysteries, which would seem to confirm the general lack of interest in it. 
The most recent theory – and in actual fact one of the most ancient – is 
that rather than being a sign of sleepiness yawning allows us to take in 
more oxygen in order to wake us up.
As involuntary bodily actions yawns are a natural reflex yet they 
are laden with social meaning and mired in tiny rituals. They are most 
often taken to show – or betray – boredom or tiredness. Obviously we 
can try to control our fits of yawning, more or less successfully; and we 
can do what we are taught to do: cover our mouth with our hand. And 
yet they momentarily overwhelm us beyond our control – involuntary 
spasms manifested in varying degrees of contortion to the muscles of 
the face, pulled tight yet almost recklessly free. Yawns can be subtle, 
tortuously stifled like Emma Bovary’s where ‘every smile concealed a 
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yawn of boredom’ (‘chaque sourire cachait un baillement d’ennui’2), or 
exaggerated, in a grimace: mouth gaping, arms stretching, back arching. 
Or they can start as one and end as the other. They can be single or serial, 
all but silent or alarmingly loud, on the verge of a howl.
The most striking image of a woman yawning is the series of 
photographs taken by Albert Londe, the head medical photographer 
of the St Salpêtrière Hospital in Paris in about 1890 (Fig. 9.1). He worked 
closely with the psychiatrist Jean-Martin Charcot documenting both 
male and female hysterics. The unidentified woman patient, according 
to Charcot, was 29 years old and was suffering from ‘bâillements 
hystériques’, paroxysms of yawning that occurred about 8 times a 
minute or 480 times an hour. She was observed during the session of 
23 October 1888, and Londe’s photographs were published alongside 
numerous others in the magisterial Nouvelle Iconographie de la 
Salpêtrière (1890).3 You have to rotate the volume to see the three 
stages in sequence running across the page: the chin first protruding 
as the mouth begins to open, widening as the jaw drops lower, then 
finally a gaping hole stretched to its limits. In the vast taxonomy set 
out in the Nouvelle Iconographie, hysterical yawning is only one set of 
symptoms to be documented by Londe, alongside others such as a male 
subject laughing.
The taxonomic drive aims to keep the categories separate; in an 
image world, on the other hand, those categories may be more or less 
indistinguishable. The incremental building and release of tension in the 
yawn could also be a cry of despair, or nudged a little perhaps, even an 
eruption of incipient laughter. The facial spasms involved in yawning, 
screaming and laughing – in representation at least – are almost self-
mimicking. The fact that yawning is known to be contagious (though 
nobody has established why) exacerbates this mimetic aspect as a 
compulsive form of serial repetition – a serial attitude that is of course 
laid out in the three photographs of ‘bâillements hystériques’.
The metonymic slippages involved can be readily seen in the 
photograph J.A. Boiffard took to accompany Bataille’s entry on ‘La 
Bouche’ in his Critical Dictionary in the dissident surrealist magazine 
Documents (1930). Now the caption is taken from Bataille: ‘terror and 
awful suffering turn the mouth into the organ of tearing screams’ 
(‘la terreur et la souffrance atroce font de la bouche l’organe des cris 
dechirantes’).4 The blurred image of the gaping mouth fills the frame to 
reveal the droplets of spittle on the tongue – a scattering of luminous 
points that seem to settle on the surface of the photograph. It’s as if the 
hysterical yawn of Londe has mutated into a spasm of terror, as if the one 
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Figure 9.2 J.A. Boiffard, La Bouche, accompanying Georges Bataille’s article in his Critical Dictionary, from 
Documents 2.5 (1930), p. 298.
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were the flipside of the other. Neither is passive but instead aggressive: 
as Bataille makes clear, ‘the mouth is the beginning of the animal part 
and what is most frightening for other animals’ (‘la bouche est le 
commencement, ou si l’on veut, la proue des animaux’).5 And the most 
animal-ish part of us.
Leafing through Documents, the gaping hole that is Boiffard’s 
photograph becomes a template for all the many masks and faces that 
proliferate through its pages in articles on ‘Têtes et crânes’ and ‘Masques-
Janus du Cross-River (Cameroun)’.6 It is filled with faces and masks of 
faces in various states and stages of extreme distortion. The very last issue 
had an article on Franz Xaver Messerschmidt, the eighteenth-century 
sculptor and friend of Franz Anton Mesmer who made numerous bronze 
portrait busts as part of an inventory of contorted facial expressions 
and grimaces, including crying and yawning.7 In this company, Picasso’s 
famous series of paintings of Olga seems more ambiguous – especially 
the almost cartoonishly graphic profile of a wide-open mouth caught 
between despair and chronic boredom.8 There is no denying the libidinal 
projection onto the body of the female hysteric that underpins Documents’ 
anatomy of the modern, and yet one also feels the radical counter-force 
of what second-wave feminist theorists such as Jacqueline Rose termed 
‘hysterical protest’.9
As the original prototype, the image of the human face provides a 
schema that is endlessly malleable and capable of expressing the full 
range of human emotion. The repetition of the gaping mouth shows 
both the very conventional nature of this model of expression and its 
ambiguities. The metonymic slippages are, as we have seen, dramatised 
through the serial nature of photography but they are by no means 
confined to it. Another register where the malleability of a graphic line 
amply demonstrates this kind of polymorphism is surely in cartoon 
animation. As Sergei Eisenstein observed in his commentary on Disney, 
animation is all about what he called the ‘protoplasmic’ – the stretching 
and morphing of one thing into another that the animated line 
demonstrates so vividly. The language of mutating cellular processes 
might also be useful in describing the way the line worked in Picasso’s 
portraits of 1930 (Eisenstein would refer to Picasso’s ‘plasmatic 
reminiscences’10) or for that matter the Russian film-maker’s own prolific 
drawings. Like Picasso, Eisenstein favoured the closed contour, all the 
better to curve back and forth in and out in a continuous and unbroken 
movement. He traced this back to the first doodles of the child, drawing 
circles in the shape of a ‘primal ellipse’ that could then potentially 
transform into any number of other possible figures.
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Technically, the protoplasmic effects of animation were achieved 
through extremely intricate and laborious methods, with each sequence 
of movement broken down into numerous individual drawings. Even 
the simple opening and closing of the mouth is a complex series of 
graphic operations. The yawning hippo in Disney’s Fantasia (1940) is 
an example of the extreme ‘protoplasmic’ stretching out of a closed 
contour in a way that ‘plasmatises’ the whole screen. In this instance – 
and many others like it – the languorous yawn is a comically expansive 
and somewhat paradoxical trope commenting on the process of 
animation itself – that is, the very process of coming into being or 
enlivening of form. In a not wholly dissimilar way, Eisenstein’s dissonant 
montage in the famous scene of the sculptural monument coming to life 
in Battleship Potemkin (1925) involved rapidly intercutting the sleeping 
and roaring lions with the exploding buildings, making the sculptures 
themselves appear to awake in alarm.
The fact that yawning is a behaviour shared by humans and 
animals becomes more rather than less significant in the context of all 
this fluidity between species. Yes, it cast the female hysteric as a wild 
animal and, as such, as an object to be contained and controlled by the 
psychiatric regime that was St Salpêtrière. The same reflex action is to be 
found in non-humans. Albert Renger-Patzsch’s photograph taken of a 
baboon at Dresden Zoo in 1927 is part of a series that all focus on the 
face of the animal, in dignified repose and then yawning so extravagantly 
that the mouth stretches out of all proportion to the frame. Teeth and 
tongue frame the gaping hole at the centre of the image – as if this organ 
is the body’s aperture, a yawning chasm that mimics not only its animal 
subject but also the open shutter of the camera lens, just as in Londe’s 
photographs, where the paroxysm of the mouth had acted out the 
reflex action of the camera. The repetition of the shutter corresponds 
to the body’s most revealing and disconcerting gape – not the eyes, now, 
but the yawn.
The phrase ‘yawns of boredom’ comes from a novel by the 
nineteenth-century Brazilian writer Machado de Assis that has been 
published in English as Epitaph of a Small Winner. It brings me to my 
final point. An avid reader of Flaubert, Machado de Assis wrote the 
novel as a fictitious memoir from beyond the grave. His narrator, then, 
is already dead, recounting his life, but at the same time interjecting 
his commentary upon what it is to write it. In one of his many short 
chapters, he digresses in this way, showing himself to be as much in thrall 
to the wild ways of Tristram Shandy as to the ennui of Emma Bovary. 
The bored narrator interrupts his own narrative with a chapter titled 
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‘Parenthesis’, listing a series of maxims or epigraphs for the reader to 
ponder (such as ‘We kill time; time buries us’).11 Machado de Assis 
had begun his career as a typesetter and never lost his love of dashes, 
asterisks and the blanks on the page – so each maxim appears as a little 
stab at wisdom or a little spasm. And as an observer of his own life, the 
parenthetical ‘digression’ becomes a way both to distract the reader 
from its dull proceedings and to focus attention instead on the job of 
writing about it – like Laurence Sterne in Tristram Shandy, Machado 
makes us feel as if the book is still in the process of being written as we 
are reading it. This adds a temporal aspect to yawns of boredom – to 
the business of stretching out and contracting of a narrative.
Yawning may be contagious, but arguably in visual representation 
it offers us not an allegory of empathy but rather – in its place – a series 
of gaping holes. When a yawn comes from the eternal background of 
insignificant actions to the foreground of an image – as it occasionally 
does – then we see, as we gawp at its gaping, something fundamental 
about the image as an exaggerated, distorted version of itself.
Notes
 1 Popa, ‘Yawn of yawns’, in Complete Poems, 71.
 2 Flaubert, Madame Bovary, 400.
Figure 9.3 Three people sitting yawning around a table. Etching. Wellcome Collection. 
Attribution 4.0. International (CC BY 4.0).
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 3 See also de la Tourette et al., ‘Contribution à l’étude des bâillements hystériques’.
 4 ‘La Bouche’, in Documents 5 (1930), reprinted in Hollier (ed.), Documents, vol. 2, 299.
 5 ‘La Bouche’, in Documents 5 (1930), reprinted in Hollier (ed.), Documents, vol. 2, 299.
 6 ‘Masques-Janus du Cross-River (Cameroun)’ by Dr Eckart von Sydow in Documents 6 (1930), 
321–8; and ‘Têtes et crânes’ by Dr Ralph von Koenigswald in Documents 6 (1930), 353.
 7 See the article by Jean Bourdeillette, Documents 8 (1930), which contains the following 
images: L’Homme pleurant, Le Souci profondément caché and L’Homme très vieux, all from the 
Belvedere, Vienna. Messerscchmidt’s Man Yawning of c. 1770 (Museum of Fine Arts, Budapest) 
is not shown, but is discussed in the excellent recent study by Guédron, L’Art de la Grimace.
 8 Reproduced in the special issue devoted to Picasso, Documents 3 (1930).
 9 See Rose, Sexuality in the Field of Vision. 
10 Eisenstein, Eisenstein on Disney, 12.
11 Machado de Assis, Epitaph of a Small Winner, 207. 
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The long and the short of it:  
boredom after the end of  
the great boredom
Michael newman
One of the first long-form works to deliberately evoke the experience 
of boredom, Erik Satie’s Vexations, composed around 1893–4, was 
presented 70 years later in the episode of the US broadcaster CBS 
television’s I’ve Got a Secret of 16 September 1963.1 The beauty of this 
conjunction is that the game show is a good example of precisely the 
kind of distraction that in general the long-form work deliberately 
provoking boredom is trying to resist. The episode also brings together 
perhaps the earliest such work from the 1890s with a period, the 1960s, 
that marks a peak in the exploration of the temporality of boredom 
by artists, musicians and film-makers. This particular performance of 
Vexations, in which John Cale was one of the team of pianists and where 
Karl Schenzer was the only member of the audience to sit through it 
to the end, was organised by John Cage and is supposed to be the first 
time Vexations was played in its entirety. Members of the audience did 
indeed clock in and clock out, receiving a refund of a nickel for each 
20 minutes attended. This draws attention to factory conditions of 
labour and the economising of time that the excess involved in the 
extremely long performance – the sheer waste of time – is supposed to 
militate against. On the top of the manuscript of Satie’s Vexations are 
written words that might be considered instructions: ‘To play this motif 
840 times in a row, it will be well to prepare in advance, and in the 
greatest silence, by serious immobility.’2
A year after Cage organised the performance of Vexations, 
which in the end lasted over 18 hours, Andy Warhol showed his film 
Empire (1964), a film of the Empire State Building shot from a static 
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Figure 10.1 I’ve Got a Secret, featuring John Cale, 16 September 1963. Screenshot captured at 
0:40. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0mqO-xsRyTM.
Figure 10.2 I’ve Got a Secret, featuring Karl Schenzer, 16 September 1963. Screenshot captured 
at 0:54. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0mqO-xsRyTM.
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camera and played at a slowed-down rate of 16 frames per second, lasting 
for eight hours and five minutes.3 My hypothesis is that in the twenty-first 
century great boredom is a thing of the past, as great art was a thing of 
the past to Hegel in the nineteenth century.4
However, a difference in the relation to history of ‘great art’ and 
boredom is that boredom has an oblique relation to the dialectic. The 
whole point of boredom is that it cannot be integrated into a spiral of 
negation and production. Nonetheless it also occupies, parasites even, 
the Hegelian dialectic in that the ‘absolute knowing’ in which the 
Phenomenology of Spirit culminates would after all be a rather boring 
state to occupy.5 The Bildungsroman of Geist,6 with its actually quite 
surprising twists and turns (despite the fact that it has always already 
happened), culminates in a boring plateau or a plateau of boredom, as 
boring as heaven would be if there were such a place. The ‘end of history’ 
would needless to say be boring, but boredom is not the end of history. 
In Hegelian terms this is the moment at the end when the dialectic is no 
longer productive, no longer needs to be productive. If we knew what we 
desire to know we would be bored, clearly. As the writer knows, the 
problem is not to attain a state of knowledge but to try to restore your 
ignorance in order to have a motive to keep going.
So, if boredom is both inside and outside the dialectic, which 
boredom is it exactly that is a thing of the past? For, no doubt, there is 
more than one kind of boredom.
Figure 10.3 Score of Vexations, Eric Satie.
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Arguably, the period of great boredom runs from the 1890s to the 
1970s. Peaks would be the 1890s, the 1920s to 1930s, and the 1960s. All 
seem to coincide with mediatised jumps in the amount of distraction: 
newspapers and fashion in the 1890s, radio and cinema in the 1920s and 
1930s, and TV and advertising in the 1960s. The paradox is that we are 
faced in the third decade of the twenty-first century with a mega-jump in 
the amount of distraction brought on by the confluence of the internet, 
smartphones and social media, but virtually no recourse to long-form 
‘boring’ works of art, theatre, cinema or music. Why is this not a period of 
‘great boredom’? Is it because distraction covers the entire social and 
existential field? Could we say that once distraction is totalised, boredom 
is entirely forgotten7 – that if these have been ‘20 years of boredom’, as 
per the title of the conference on which this book is based (quoting 
Leonard Cohen)8 it is not 20 years of being bored, but rather 20 years 
of the forgetting of boredom? By this I mean that distraction is no 
longer counterposed with boredom. We are no longer even aware that 
distraction is an escape from some kind of fundamental confrontation. 
Distraction rules by completely concealing boredom. It is no coincidence 
that distraction is now a fundamental way of conducting politics: it 
becomes a way of concealing the ‘political’, rendering us oblivious to it.9 
Pessimistically, we could say ‘that’s it’, that’s the short of it. Or else we 
could go a bit mystical and say that ‘where the danger lies, there lies the 
saving power’.10 Will there be a flip out of boredom into another kind 
of relation with time and with the world? Could art, after all, have any 
role in this? How might art preserve itself from being absorbed into the 
culture of distraction?11 Or could the turn happen through art being 
totally absorbed into distraction?
The point is, of course, that boredom, if it has any radical sense at 
all, must involve an outside, a non-relation that is not just an absence of 
relation. Just as the idea that ‘great art is a thing of the past’ was turned 
to their advantage by the thinkers who broke with Hegel – that art could 
stand for that which falls away from the dialectic, that which remains 
unassimilable, and so on, at least if thought about in ‘anti-aesthetic’ terms 
– so might be the case with boredom. But at the same time, that boredom 
today might be ‘a thing of the past’ raises the question of the loss of 
the outside in the context of the economisation of everything and the 
totalisation of distraction.
The word for ‘boredom’ in German is Langeweile, which is a 
compound of the words for ‘long’ and ‘while’, the latter related 
etymologically to ‘rest’ or ‘pause’.12 Heidegger, in his lectures on boredom 
of 1929–30, makes much of this stretching of time. We could contrast this 
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with the shortening or acceleration of time today. Heidegger adduces 
three forms of boredom: being bored of (doing) something – the example 
he gives is waiting for a train; being bored alongside something, for 
example at a social event, where we don’t even know we are bored until 
afterwards, when we realise we have been wasting our time; and the 
state in which everything is boring. Heidegger’s claim is ontological 
because it concerns the being of beings as a whole: boredom gives access 
to the ontological difference between being and beings, by rendering all 
beings as nothing, as withdrawn from possibility. To attribute boredom 
to boring things, or to consider it an inner psychological trait of the 
subject, is for Heidegger to avoid the fundamental relation of Dasein to 
the world and to beings as a whole, which profound boredom discloses.13 
Unlike the more dramatic ‘being towards death’ of Heidegger’s 
earlier Being and Time, boredom thus serves as a mediation between 
inauthenticity and authenticity, as a means to transit from one to the 
other, but with the implication, which is perhaps foreign to Heidegger’s 
intention, that the authentic and the inauthentic can never be definitively 
separated, and that authenticity might become boring. In effect, 
Heidegger is making a distinction between ‘little’ ordinary boredoms 
and a ‘great’ boredom that involves the ontological disclosure of the 
burden or task of Dasein. As he leaves the discussion of boredom, he 
suggests that the ‘problematic of metaphysics’ may not ‘for the whole 
of world history’ be ‘developed on the basis of the temporality of Dasein’, 
and that there might be ‘a different kind of necessary grounding 
for metaphysics’.14 On the one hand, he is implying the necessity to 
understand the Stimmungen, the attunements, including boredom, 
which is a fundamental one, a Grundstimmung in relation to a history 
of being as a history of the forgetting of the ontological difference of 
beings and being, just as the ‘great’ boredom is suppressed by the little 
boredoms and their distractions. But on the other hand Heidegger also 
makes the ominous demand, as if to answer to what being fully open 
to the ‘great’ boredom requires of his audience in the lecture hall, that 
‘We must first call for someone capable of instilling terror into our Dasein 
again.’15 Three years later, shortly after he had been elected Rector of the 
University of Freiburg, Heidegger joined the Nazi Party. Today, of course, 
fascism as an escape from white male boredom, now mediated through 
internet memes and streams, is once again a live topic.
What then is the relation, where boredom is concerned, between 
ontology and history? Why does boredom, as an ontological Stimmung 
or attunement, emerge under particular historical conditions? How is 
Langeweile related to the acceleration of time in modernity? What exactly 
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is forgotten or suppressed in and by that acceleration? In order to 
approach these questions, I now turn to the relation between boredom 
and technology.
I wonder whether one could say that the ‘great’ boredom is an 
analogue affect – that it has a relation to the record of time conceived as 
a continuum that is inscribed. Boredom would thus be a relation to time 
as continuum – it just goes on and on – combined with the withdrawal 
of investment in, or engagement with, objects and projects. Boredom, 
then, is non-relation with relation conceived in terms of continuity. 
Nonetheless, this kind of boredom is finite. The long work of art may 
therefore be an analogue phenomenon, because there has to be a limit 
for it to be perceived as long. This could be the material limit of the 
vehicle, such as the physical celluloid, or the scroll. Or the limit of 
exhaustion of the human body. We could contrast this with a digital 
video recording simply allowed to run on endlessly, as might be the case, 
for example, with surveillance videos. In that case the video is neither 
long nor short, since it has no determinate length. There would be no 
possibility to see it through to the end, however bored one might be. The 
works of art of the ‘great boredom’ offered the opportunity to undergo 
something difficult, and there would come a point when they would 
have been ‘lived through’. The paradox was to offer the audience an 
achievement that was one of passivity. This would reveal something 
about an essential passivity, perhaps even a ‘passivity more passive than 
the passivity of activity’, as the philosopher Levinas put it.16 This passivity 
would not be a defective form of activity, with the latter given priority. It 
would have implications for the relation to oneself, to the world and to 
the other. Is it not this passivity that is occluded in the transition from the 
‘great boredom’ to totalised distraction?
An example might be Christian Marclay’s The Clock (2010). It is 
24 hours long, and at one level functions literally as a clock. As with 
the relation of Jasper Johns’s Flag (1954–5) to an American flag, which 
poses the question of whether it is a painting of a flag or a flag, The Clock 
is both a film of clocks and a clock. The time shown on the clocks in the 
sequences from films is coordinated with the time at which these are 
shown in the screening of The Clock. Despite its duration, The Clock is not 
a work of the ‘great boredom’, but rather discloses the temporality of 
distraction. This may have to do with the short segments, each arousing 
a kind of narrative spasm which only leads into the next, so that each 
segment of time gets nowhere, and the next begins again in medias res. 
In structuralist terms, the paradigmatic substitutions are determined 
but limited by the size of the archive and the syntax is paratactic, one 
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moment beside the other. The attempt on the part of the viewer to create 
a sequence is endlessly frustrated. In a sense this is pure distraction, but 
at the same time repeating the frustration from which distraction is 
meant to distract. We could contrast this with Douglas Gordon’s 24 Hour 
Psycho (1993), which we might see rather as a late work of the ‘great 
boredom’, remediating film through video to bring together two modes 
of the 1950s to 1960s, the psychological horror thriller and long-duration 
art. It does seem to press against the limits of endurance in a way made 
possible by contemporary technological changes.17
I have suggested that boredom, in its withdrawal of attachment or 
cathexis, is potentially a mode of access to the non-relational. Hence its 
role in the production of the new. Where the technologies of boredom 
are concerned, a question might arise as to what the non-relational is, or 
whether the non-relational is even possible with respect to the digital, 
given that the digital is all-encompassing, or omni-relational. Would 
digital non-relationality simply be a ‘sleep mode’? The digital enables 
the seeping of distraction into every aspect of life. It contributes to 
the collapse of the distinctions of inner/outer and private/public. On 
public transport people are absorbed into the private worlds of their 
smartphones, which connect them to everything everywhere – or seem 
to. In the current media ecology, we risk losing all the spaces in which 
boredom might be experienced. The artist’s studio was such a space that 
was culturally privileged and mythologised.
Figure 10.4 Douglas Gordon, 24 Hour Psycho, 1993. Screenshot captured at 21:27.
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Early on in Alberto Moravia’s novel Boredom (1960) there is a 
scene in which the protagonist, who is an artist, destroys the painting 
in his studio by cutting it into pieces. He later asserts the blank canvas as 
his work.18 Boredom becomes, as Adam Phillips puts it, ‘the moment in 
which nothing is inviting’.19 In the novel, the artist’s dissatisfaction, the 
failure of his desire, is connected to his cold mother or rather with a 
Figure 10.5 Warhol’s Empire and Marclay’s Clock. Screenshot captured at 13:46.
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non-coincidence of mutual expectations. Christopher Bollas, cited by 
Phillips, suggests that boredom is waiting for transformation, linked 
to the mother experienced not as an object but as a process of 
transformation, leading in adult life to the object being ‘sought for its 
function as signifier of the process of the transformation of being’.20 
Moravia’s novel also implicitly raises the question of the gendering of 
boredom and its relation to sexual obsession, and indeed harassment, 
as an act pursued, not out of desire, but rather out of the reaction to the 
failure of desire and the substitution of power.
In Moravia’s novel, the studio is one of the sites – perhaps the most 
important – where boredom is played out. So far, we have at least three 
modalities of boredom: the boredom that is the topic of psychoanalysis; 
the boredom that is a factor of the shocks and distractions of modernity; 
and the boredom where withdrawal is connected to potential. The artist’s 
studio may function as something of an intersection of the three.
If the studio is a privileged site for a necessary boredom, a place 
where potential is gathered, what then of so-called ‘post-studio’ practice? 
I think we can locate an ambivalence, perhaps a contradiction, here. 
On the one hand, post-studio art can be seen as a resistance to the 
fetishisation of both the object and the artist as isolated genius, and 
an attempt to give art a socio-political role; on the other hand, of course, 
it is confluent with the post-object experience economy of platform 
capitalism, and therefore on the side of the totalisation of distraction, 
even if the ‘distraction’ in this case might be a worthwhile political 
project.21 In post-studio practice, art becomes a ‘project’ instead of an 
object.22 It could be that the very structure of the ‘project’ is as much a 
part of the problem as a critical response to it, in so far as it implies 
both an orientation to the future made possible by a relation to finitude 
and death that enables the grasping of possibilities,23 and a temporal 
continuum where the future is supposed to be under the control of 
the present.
While art has become an important part of the distraction 
economy – biennales, blockbuster shows, publicity, lifestyle and so on – 
art is also offered as the escape from, or even cure for, our malaise. 
In the ‘critical’ period of boredom, in the 1920s and 1930s, that malaise 
would have derived from a combination of acceleration in technological 
and economic urban life with the sense of the eternal recurrence of 
the new in fashion and commodities. Everything rapidly changes but 
social relations remain the same, with inequality increasing as it does 
today. Boredom would have been a defence against this acceleration, 
and perhaps a way of accessing another temporality. Up to the 1960s, 
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art and the studio provided the locus for resistance, or escape, depending 
on how you look at it; perhaps even the promise of a transfigured 
relation to being. But somehow the art of the ‘great boredom’ seems to 
have disappeared.
Can we envisage a return of the ‘great boredom’, or are we 
involved in a new kind of relation? If a new kind of relation, then the 
non-relation that was once experienced as boredom will necessarily 
be different. Perhaps, if still to be found, it will no longer be experienced 
as boredom, but rather as some other affect. What may have changed 
is not the boredom as such, but the relation to it: to be more specific, 
the relation with non-relation, with both its possibility, and what it 
gives on to.
The necessity of wasting time has not changed. Indeed, it is even 
more urgent because of the total colonisation of time. Pretty much all 
our time has been rendered productive, although mostly not for us. This 
has been achieved through the monetisation of attention, made possible 
by the digital and the internet, social media and the development 
of smartphones, which lure attention during down moments, the times 
when in the past we might have been bored. Apparently, at one point, 
Candy Crush largely replaced the reading of novels on public transport.24 
Now, no doubt, some other game transports commuters elsewhere. This 
‘wasted time’ has been rendered productive for the global corporate 
economy, so we have to look somewhere else to find a waste that cannot 
be economised, if such a thing is even possible, according to the paradox 
of the potlatch identified by Bataille, that of turning waste itself into 
an acquisition.25
It is here that we might turn to the relation between boredom and 
bliss posited by Roland Barthes. We see this when, in the middle of an 
interminable meeting during the notorious trip to China by French 
intellectuals that led to the Maoist turn of the Parisian left, he is attracted 
by tea leaves unfolding in a cup.26 This is not a great boredom, but a 
mundane boredom, and the bliss, which he describes as an excess of the 
signifier, is a small bliss, and not a great fusion: a tiny moment of ecstatic 
waste in the midst of an instrumentalised administered world.
The non-relation of boredom is a kind of out-of-work-ness, a 
désoeuvrement.27 This might be understood as a withdrawal (as in, say, 
Herman Melville’s story ‘Bartleby the Scrivener’ [1853], with the 
scrivener’s ‘I would prefer not to’ being neither negation nor affirmation 
but neutral), or even as something affirmative. For Barthes this is in a 
small way; for Georges Bataille it is in an ecstatic sense. We need to 
understand this ecstasis not as leisure – the time to recuperate in order to 
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work better – but rather as outside of the work–leisure duality (which is 
also where we might want to situate boredom).28
Waste in Bataille’s sense is potlatch and expenditure without 
return.29 We tend to think of the period in which this thought was 
articulated in terms of things. But the relationship to time was already 
there through money. And the idea of a wasted time, time as a kind of 
waste or wasteland, is obviously in Samuel Beckett, in the idea of waiting, 
repetition or tedium.30 This wasteland seems to have been entirely 
gentrified today, converted into value. Wasting time has been made 
productive, just, as I said, not for us. More and more of the day has 
become wasted time where our attention is harvested. It is another form 
of expropriation. The problem we face is how to claim back our wasted 
time without instrumentalising it, without turning it into labour. A task 
for education, perhaps, not providing ‘job skills’ and preparing for 
lucrative employment but teaching the art of wasting time.
The advent of the modern ‘great boredom’ is marked in the arts by 
a distinction between two different kinds of long form, and of the 
temporalities implied by them. Around the time of Satie’s Vexations, the 
poet Stéphane Mallarmé was developing his ideas for the epochal book 
performance Le Livre, based on obsessive calculations and measurement, 
and both could be seen as a response to – indeed critique of – Wagnerism, 
manifested in excessively long operas and the mythic opera cycle The 
Ring. Note that already in Satie the ‘ring’ is replaced by what is in effect a 
‘loop’: the long-form narrative work with its tendency towards ecstatic 
fusion is replaced by repetition, bourgeois religiosity with almost factory-
style labour. One way of seeing the repetition of the short piece of music 
is as its looping, except that it does have an end after 840 repetitions, 
number being as much of an interest to Satie as it was to Mallarmé, and 
the actual performance of the whole thing introduces differences and 
contingencies into the repetitions.
What is the difference between the Langeweile and the loop that 
becomes possible with audiotape and film, and is carried over into a 
repeat function in contemporary art?31 Perhaps we could say that the 
Langeweile is an outside of the time of action, whereas the loop is a trap.32 
We are trapped in the exact repetition of what we have seen and heard. 
However, while the loop of a temporal work of art remains the same, the 
visitor to the gallery does not: each repetition will be experienced 
differently, given its temporal non-identity in perception – the same 
happening, being perceived, at a different time. And of course we can 
always leave. So the alternatives set up by the loop are trap and expulsion. 
But the relation between them is not the same as that of boredom and 
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distraction: we are neither expelled into, or out from, the Langeweile. 
This poses the question of whether it is still possible to retrieve the 
Langeweile, the ‘long of it’: and the short of it is I’m not sure that it is.
We should now go on to consider why the ‘great boredom’ might be 
at an end. As is the case with art after great art in Hegel, that does not mean 
that there is boredom no longer. Quite possibly there is more boredom 
than ever before. But the character of the mood has changed, along with its 
technological conditions. Boredom is a historical mood, perhaps the mood 
of modernity. For Heidegger, as Miguel de Beistegui suggests, the thinking 
of boredom, as distinct from the ‘universal’ human finitude of being 
towards death, is a way of thinking the relation to time as epochal – that is 
historical – and as collective.33 These ‘epochs’ were those in which being is 
forgotten in distinctive ways, and each ever more forgetful: as idea; as 
God; as the subject; in total oblivion in the epoch of the Gestell (usually 
translated as ‘enframing’, perhaps rather ‘set-up’) of technology. Whereas 
Heidegger thinks of modernity in ontological terms, such that boredom 
as a distinctively modern mood in its radical form involves a non-relation 
to being, as a moment in the ‘history of being’, Simmel, Kracauer and 
Benjamin think of the modernity of boredom in terms of society, economy 
and media. The continuity lies in the relation of all these things to 
temporalisation. A question we need to pose is whether the transition 
from the ‘great’ boredom to what we could call ‘minor’ boredoms is related 
to a transformation in temporalisation, connected with new technologies, 
affecting the extent to which the substance of life may be mediated, 
rendered abstract and subject to the extraction of surplus value.
Boredom is ‘the blasé attitude’ according to Georg Simmel in ‘The 
metropolis and mental life’ (1903). It results from a combination of 
‘the intensification of nervous stimulation’34 in the city with the money 
economy, which reduces all quality and individuality to quantity so that 
‘the meaning and differing values of things, and thereby the things 
themselves, are experienced as insubstantial. They appear to the blasé 
person in an evenly flat and gray tone; no one object deserves preference 
over any other. This mood is the faithful subjective reflection of the 
completely internalized money economy.’35 Thus, boredom is a response 
to the combination of the abstraction brought about by money as the 
universal medium with the acceleration of urban life under capitalism. 
For Siegfried Kracauer, boredom is the refusal of and even resistance 
to distractions such as advertising, a guarantee that one is present and 
still in control of one’s existence: ‘Eventually one becomes content to 
do nothing more than be with oneself, without knowing what one 
actually should be doing.’36
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Boredom is a mood or Stimmung in relation to what is present 
being either empty or withheld. This raises the question of whether it is 
directed towards something other than the present. Since boredom has 
to do with the suspension or withholding of possibilities, it involves an 
orientation towards the future, even if in the negative sense. This is 
announced by Benjamin in his notes on boredom made in 1928–9, the 
same period as Heidegger’s lecture course, when he writes, ‘Waiting is, in 
a sense, the lined interior of boredom. (Hebel: boredom waits for 
death).’37 Waiting implies futurity. Boredom thus involves a non-relation 
to the present in the name of a future that remains undetermined. This 
is articulated in terms of both historicist time and eternal recurrence. 
Historicist time is a ‘progressive’ continuum where the future is essentially 
the same as the present even if it looks different, and exactly the same is 
true of the past. Both are in this sense continuous with the present. 
Eternal recurrence, Benjamin’s reinterpretation of Nietzsche’s amor 
fati via the Eternity of the Stars of the insurrectionist Louis Auguste 
Blanqui, figures the way in which the new ‘returns’ as the ever-same, 
and therefore blocks the possibility of the revolutionary new as event. 
Being bored would therefore be a refusal to be absorbed by the recurrent 
new, for the sake of that which is awaited on the basis of interruption 
rather than the continuum of historicism. Boredom is in this respect a 
‘great boredom’ because it is tied to – is the very mood of – the standpoint 
of redemption. Boredom is ‘the dream bird that hatches the egg 
of experience’, writes Benjamin, and, he adds, ‘A rustling in the leaves 
drives him away.’38
Benjamin and Heidegger’s accounts of boredom share a totalising 
operation, and it is arguably this that characterises the ‘great’ boredom. 
This is evident in the contrast of boredom and discontent. Discontent is 
discontent with something, whereas boredom involves a withdrawal 
from or of everything. Boredom is therefore opposed to any partial 
amelioration. The only way of transforming everything would be a 
transfigured relation to time as such, whether this is the time of being 
for Heidegger, or messianic redemption for Benjamin. Such is the project 
of the ‘great’ boredom. It is also the project of Capital: to turn all lived 
time into abstract labour. We would have to say, therefore, that a minor 
boredom could be taken as a refusal of a major boredom, maybe a being 
bored with the ‘great’ boredom, not only in the failure of redemption, 
but also in discerning that the redemptive expectation in the boredom 
of waiting may itself be part of the problem.
The boredom of the 1960s is not yet at this point. We could see 
it rather as the attempt to sustain the idea that the rejection of the 
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redemptive boredom might take the form of another ‘great’ boredom. 
We may find this in the conjunction, which is also a non-meeting, of John 
Cage and Andy Warhol. If boredom has to do with the withdrawal of 
possibilities whereby things come to appear empty or distracting, there is 
a reorientation in the 1960s of what those possibilities could be directed 
towards, a turn from action to consumption. This cuts across differences 
in the respective attitudes and approaches to art of Cage and Warhol. 
With Warhol, the relation of boredom to consumption is obvious: to do 
the same thing every day is to consume the same thing, including the 
same food. Warhol famously replied when asked why he started painting 
the Campbell’s soup cans: ‘Because I used to drink it. I used to have the 
same lunch every day, for twenty years, I guess, the same thing over and 
over again.’39 Along with the abstraction produced by repetition goes 
affectlessness, or the reassuring feeling of being affectless: ‘the more you 
look at the same exact thing, the more the meaning goes away, and the 
better and emptier you feel’.40 For Cage, by contrast, the implicit posture 
of the consumer would figure as the reception or openness to the audible 
in 4′ 33″, or being subjected to chance. The supposed conjunction of the 
two was that first performance of the greatest of boring works, Satie’s 
Vexations, the one organised in New York at the Pocket Theatre in 1963 
by John Cage with which we began. The claim has been made that Warhol 
attended the performance, a claim that was the basis of an event at 
Tate Modern on 27 May 2007, in which Satie’s Vexations was played live 
to accompany a screening of Warhol’s film Sleep, made in the same year 
as the Satie performance.41 The film of Warhol’s lover John Giorno 
sleeping, shot in 16 mm, lasts 321 minutes.
What does this conjunction of Cage, Warhol and Satie mean for the 
relation between temporality and abstraction that is a condition for 
boredom? It is Warhol who provides the clue: between 1962 and 1984 
he produced works in the Factory, as his successive studios are named, 
works that have to do with the registration of existing images, and 
with forms of advertising and consumption and films that tend to be 
single-shot and/or long-duration. This is the historical moment of the 
acceleration of consumption becoming itself a form of production. If 
the condition for this is the abstraction of consumption – it doesn’t 
matter what is being consumed, what matters are the profits and the 
social relations that determine where they go – consumption becomes 
simultaneously interesting and boring, which is perfectly encapsulated 
in Warhol’s pose. Consumption becomes interesting because it becomes 
conceptual, a universal term subsuming sensuous experiences, but the 
very condition that allows it to become conceptual, its abstraction as a 
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result of its being subsumed under the medium of exchange, also renders 
it boring, since the particular qualities of the sensuous experiences 
are replaced with symbolic ones (the current expansion of this process 
takes place through social media such as Instagram, where the signs 
of consumers’ experiences are consumed). Thus a shift in the mode 
of boringness coincides with the emergence of what has been called 
‘semiocapitalism’.42
A change in the nature of boredom involves an alteration in the 
relation between the abstraction of time and the withdrawal of 
possibilities. The abstraction of labour in the factory left possibilities 
open outside and in the time after work. This surely is why one of the 
first documentary films, Workers Leaving the Factory (1895), directed 
by Louis Lumière, is so affecting. The abstraction of labour has been 
understood as a totalisation through a form required by capitalism. So 
long as the matter or substance of life, or at least aspects of it, remain 
un-totalised, not abstracted for the extraction of value, boredom can lead 
somewhere that is not boring. Of course, it could be argued that neither 
Vexations nor Sleep is really boring, but rather that the repetitions and 
exclusion of any narrative focus attention on changes and differences. 
Brandon Joseph suggests that while for Warhol repetition means doing 
the same thing every day, for Cage it has to do with variety.43 In other 
words, there is a way out within the experience of boredom itself.
By 1968 boredom was a talking point. The Fluxus artist Dick 
Higgins wrote in an article published in the Something Else Newsletter 
that ‘Boredom was, until recently, one of the qualities an artist tried 
most to avoid. Yet today it appears that artists are deliberately trying 
to make their work boring.’44 He suggests that ‘in the context of work 
which attempts to involve the spectator, boredom often serves a useful 
function: as an opposite to excitement and as a means of bringing 
emphasis to what it interrupts, causing us to view both elements 
freshly’.45 The successful, repetitive, long-form work of art depended on 
boredom not in the end being boring. The ‘great’ boredom combines 
totalisation with the expectation of an exit or total transformation, 
and the intimation of this within the experience of the work itself. The 
notion of boredom also suggests something shared, whether broadly in 
society, or by a select group. However, as art, its social character becomes 
channelled into aesthetic self-transformation. This is not necessarily 
a bad thing, since boredom is not the most promising motivation for a 
demand for social change.
The ‘minor’ boredoms that follow the 1960s take two forms: on the 
one hand a financialised boredom, and on the other a revival of acedia. 
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It is the book in which acedia is a central motif that shows us the 
connection between the two. Before his suicide in 2008, David Foster 
Wallace organised the typescripts and associated computer files for the 
novel he was working on, The Pale King, so that they would be found. 
The novel revolves around the changes to the US tax code in the 1980s, 
under the presidency of Ronald Reagan, and the formation of a tax 
examiner in the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) who worked during 
the time of those changes. The new tax code involves the shift from 
the idea of tax work as a civic duty for the benefit of society to the 
subordination of the IRS to corporate profitability. This is the bedrock of 
the seismic turn from the aftermath of the New Deal to the emergence 
of neoliberalism.
Boredom is both described and thematised in the novel, and 
arguably is also fundamental to its structure and the implied reader. 
The formation of the protagonist takes place during the 1970s, the last 
period of the ‘great boredom’. Implied is a critique of the idea of the 
great boredom from a later perspective, combining the viewpoints of 
the protagonist in the 1980s and the author in the first decade of the 
twenty-first century. That critique involves making a distinction between 
‘aesthetic’ boredom (already identified and criticised in the nineteenth 
century by Søren Kierkegaard),46 and the boredom of certain kinds of 
necessary work. If boredom for Simmel, Kracauer and Benjamin is 
a mood that takes on a particular character in modernity, it tends 
specifically to be a response to the life of the metropolis, and therefore 
already to imply a distinction between metropolitan boredom (as a 
defensive reaction to over-stimulation) and provincial boredom (of 
Madame Bovary for example – therefore also a question of gender). In 
Wallace, provincial boredom has become that of the suburbs, and he 
introduces a further distinction between that boredom and a boredom 
that is unavoidable and indeed necessary as a civic virtue. It is the value 
accorded to the latter type of boredom that is threatened by neoliberal 
capitalism from the 1980s.
According to the first distinction Wallace is making, aesthetic 
boredom has become the boredom of kids from the Midwestern suburbs, 
who are of college age. The privilege here is being supported by parents 
(of the New Deal generation), who have to do boring jobs to provide 
that support. This suburban kids’ boredom becomes the Warhol version 
of aesthetic boredom. The bored college kid, after his father’s traumatic 
death in an accident, goes into a boring job of his own, with the IRS. 
This boring job becomes located on an inflection point of social values. 
So repetitive boring labour, which is negatively coded, here becomes 
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positively coded. In a way the structure is both similar to and different 
from Heidegger’s opposition of profound boredom and its evasion by 
little boredoms, or Benjamin’s of waiting and distraction. On one level 
the IRS job is stupid and repetitive, but on another it has a crucial social 
value. Indeed, it is at this level of detail that history is really made, 
beneath the distracting political spectacle. What is needed to discern 
it is a practice of boredom in order to achieve attention.47 There is a 
connection here with the very origin of boredom in the acedia of the 
Church Fathers,48 which is suggested in the conversion narrative of the 
protagonist of The Pale King when he accidentally sits in on a university 
accountancy class given by a substitute tutor who happens to be a Jesuit.
In the course of the novel, attention-in-boredom is needed to 
perform as an IRS examiner, but also to discern what is happening, 
to perform a critical reading of the tax code itself and of the changes 
that it is undergoing. This provides an analogy for the reading of the very 
long novel with its own boring passages dealing with the minutiae of 
working for the IRS. It is no longer a matter of heroically undergoing 
an immensely long, repetitive, boring artwork (witness Karl Schenzer 
as the heroic audience member at Vexations), or passing through 
boredom to live in the affirmative differentiations of the moment, both 
of which uncover some fundamental relation to time and human 
possibility, but rather of paying attention through boredom in order to 
grasp why things are the way they are, and indeed in order to act in the 
public sphere, which is not so much a matter of time as such, but rather 
of history. It is perhaps through a necessary minor boredom that a 
relation between time and history is reinstated, like the role acedia plays 
in the Christian redemptive story, but in a new way and in a lower key. 
The underlying bureaucratic key is the ability to deal with boredom. 
To function effectively in an environment that precludes everything 
vital and human. To breathe, so to speak, without air … It is the key 
to modern life. If you are immune to boredom, there is literally 
nothing you cannot accomplish.49
It is indeed this ‘minor’ boredom that is presented as ‘heroic’ by the Jesuit 
substitute tutor, in a way that is satirised by the author to imply that it is 
anything but:
He said, ‘To retain care and scrupulosity about each detail from 
within the teeming wormball of data and rule and exception and 
contingency which constitutes real-world accounting – this is 
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heroism. To attend fully to the interests of the client and to balance 
those interests against the high ethical standards of FASB and 
extant law – yea, to serve those who care not for service but only for 
results – this is heroism. This may be the first time you’ve heard the 
truth put plainly, starkly. Effacement. Sacrifice. Service. To give 
oneself to the care of others’ money – this is effacement, perdurance, 
sacrifice, honor, doughtiness, valor. Hear this or not, as you will. 
Learn it now, or later – the world has time. Routine, repetition, 
tedium, monotony, ephemeracy, inconsequence, abstraction, 
disorder, boredom, angst, ennui – these are the true hero’s enemies, 
and make no mistake, they are fearsome indeed. For they are real.50
The relation to history is a matter of reading, with the implication that 
we will never be able to understand history without being able to continue 
to read through boredom.51 This implies a critique of the historical genres 
of the novel and film that would seek to avoid boring the reader or viewer. 
The implication of The Pale King is that the examination of tax returns 
provides the model for the reading of the book itself, and since the book 
deals through its minutiae with a turning point in history, for the reading 
of history itself.
Wallace is attempting to fuse the ‘minor’ boredom from the 1980s 
with the ‘great’ boredom of the late nineteenth to mid-twentieth 
centuries, while at the same time drawing attention to the distinction: 
Pay close attention to the most tedious thing you can find (tax 
returns, televised golf), and, in waves, a boredom like you’ve never 
known will wash over you and just about kill you. Ride these out, 
and it’s like stepping from black and white into colour. Like water 
after days in the desert. Constant bliss in every atom.52
The boredom that comes with the monotonous attention to tedious 
detail, necessary for civil society, for an understanding of history and for 
close reading, is combined with a Christian tradition from the desert 
fathers to Kierkegaard, of thinking of boredom as a path to salvation. 
In a monologue by a ghost – referring to the ‘noonday demon’ seen by a 
devout ‘wiggler’ (a trade term for a tax examiner) – we find the following 
reference to acedia: ‘No word for the Latin acedia made so much of by 
monks under Benedict. For the Greek ακηδία. Also the hermits of third-
century Egypt, the so-called daemon meridianus, when their prayers 
were stultified by pointlessness and tedium and a longing for a violent 
death.’53 Perhaps in this respect The Pale King is the last statement and 
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exemplar in its own longueurs of the ‘great boredom’ while at the same 
time seeking to encompass the ‘minor’ boredoms that anticipate its 
undoing. However, it is also clear that boredom is a form of resistance 
to depression, or an attempt to turn depression into resistance as a 
relation to possibilities denied or withheld.54
In the twenty-first century, the conditions for boredom have 
changed once again. The possibilities for a virtuous, civic boredom 
posited by Wallace in The Pale King have been reduced by algorithms 
based on machine learning. The targeting of information and 
communications, and the demand for instant response, have reduced 
the toleration for the stretched-out time of boredom. Media have at 
once produced and exploited shortened attention spans. Of course this 
has produced reactions, such as the movement of ‘slow radio’ and 
‘slow television’, but these are marginal, and do not touch the profound 
changes that media have produced in the experience of temporality. 
It is no coincidence that the new phase of the suppression of boredom, 
which is approaching totality through the multiplication and penetration 
to every level of life by distraction, goes together with the attempt to 
financialise all forms of attention. This tendency has reached its apogee 
during the years following David Foster Wallace’s death. The problem 
remains what it already was in the first decades of the twentieth century, 
the relation of boredom to distraction, the attracting away of attention, 
while the new situation is the corporate colonisation of attention at 
every level.
With the emergence of ‘semiocapitalism’ during the 1980s in what 
has become the ‘global North’ we see a shift from a ‘Fordist’ boredom, 
linked to repetitive and tedious labour and statist and corporate 
bureaucracy, to a new kind of all-pervasive boredom involving a general 
exhaustion and emptying out of significance.55 Punk boredom acts as 
a hinge between the two: on the one hand a continuation of working-
class male boredom celebrated with an energy that is associated with the 
idea that there is a sphere of freedom outside that of work; on the other 
hand, a devaluation of all values and refusal to see the point in anything. 
The phase after this is described by Mark Fisher as ‘anhedonic boredom’ 
and he gives the example of Kurt Cobain and Nirvana: ‘In his dreadful 
lassitude and objectless rage, Cobain seemed to give wearied voice to 
the despondency of the generation that had come after history, whose 
every move was anticipated, tracked, bought and sold before it had even 
happened.’56
If boredom is still a matter of time, as it is in the classic accounts, 
and also concerns a relation to abstraction,57 then we would expect this 
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new condition of boredom to involve changes in the relation between 
temporality and abstraction. When it is possible to maintain the 
distinction between the abstraction of time and the labour process 
and non-abstract aspects of life (friendship, love, self-realisation), 
boredom has a telos and an end. The expansion of abstraction and 
commodification into leisure and home life began to happen in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, picked up after the depression 
in the 1930s and accelerated during the post-war period, increasingly 
from the 1960s with the development of the advertising industry 
which – from at least the 1890s – lay behind this penetration of capital 
into consumption and the colonisation of private life. Distraction offers 
itself as the solution to boredom, inevitably becoming boring itself. This 
is the logic behind Benjamin’s critique of fashion according to the eternal 
return. The cycle of distraction and boredom preempts the redemptive 
dimension of waiting of the ‘great’ boredom. Minor boredom takes 
over where ‘great’ boredom might lead. The condition for this is that life 
‘beyond’ boredom becomes itself subject to abstraction.
Roberto Finelli explains this extension of abstraction in terms 
of the distinction in Marx between formal and real subsumption. The 
totalisation of capital has to arise not from particular contents but 
from a determination of its form, since the addition of particulars 
could continue indefinitely without resulting in a totality.58 Formal 
determination concerns the penetration of the social relations of 
production into the labour process when an existing labour process 
is taken over by capital. With real subsumption capital penetrates 
the whole process of production such that living labour counts only 
as a supply of working time.59 Abstract labour arises when different 
performances with their sensuous particularities all count as ‘universal’ 
labour. The abstracting involves the emptying out of different labours 
with their particular character for an interchangeable labour-in-general. 
An additional factor is the expansion of what counts as labour: as the 
nature of work changes, cognitive labour comes under the relations 
of production; and as media technologies are transformed, affective and 
intimate life itself becomes labour. In the course of this, writes Finelli, 
abstraction
invades the concrete, filling it according to the exigencies of its 
expansive-reproductive logic. At the same time, however, it leaves 
it a semblance, an exterior surface of concreteness … It posits the 
abstract and the concrete in connection not through contradiction 
but through abstraction – emptying-out … I believe that postmodern 
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society should be interpreted, not as rupture and discontinuity, 
but, rather, as the deepening and the more complete realisation of 
modern society. It is completed by means of the extension and the 
unfolding on the part of the subject constituted by impersonal and 
abstract wealth into all of the collective and private environments 
of life: a colonisation which is dissimulated and negated through 
an hysterical over-determination of the surface.60
This occurs in cognitive and affective capitalism,
in which, given that it is essentially information which is worked 
on, the active and creative participation of subjectivity is valorised 
and emphasised to the maximum, with all of the individuality of its 
psychic resources; while the elaboration of information refers in 
reality to the function of choosing between alternatives already 
preconstituted and predetermined, obeying programmes and work 
plans already conceived and signified by others, and placed in that 
great artificial brain external to our mind that is the informational 
machine. Expressed in other terms, this is the way real abstraction 
presents itself, as mental labour that is merely discursive-calculative 
and devoid of intentionality or personal appropriation, appearing 
as dissimulated in its superficial appearance, turned upside down 
into its opposite of creative and personalised labour.61
When the work/personal life distinction is collapsed, assisted by 
smartphones, email and so on, and the dimension of love and relation-
ships becomes labour, ‘The sphere of consumption, of that zone which 
once was still defined as private, thus experiences ever more the decline 
of feeling, of taste, of sensual emotion, giving way to boredom, to 
insignificance and quantitative indifference.’62 Under such circum-
stances, can boredom still be a form of refusal or withdrawal? Or a way 
of waiting to find desire, as the psychoanalyst Adam Phillips puts it?63 
What happens when desiring itself becomes a form of abstract labour? 
And what kind of temporality would make this possible?
The relation to the future presupposed in the classic accounts of 
boredom has undergone a change as a result of the mediations made 
possible by new technologies. Twenty-first-century media have affected 
the temporality of sensibility in a ‘feed-forward mechanism’, so that 
behaviour no longer becomes a question of intentionality or perception.64 
In the example of the bored adolescent girls addressed by YouTube 
discussed by Tina Kendall, the solution to the problem of boredom is 
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pre-programmed even prior to the awareness of it.65 This is the condition 
for the financialisation of boredom typically addressed to adolescent girls 
through YouTube videos that purport to provide solutions. The technical 
condition for the transformation of temporality that facilitates this is that 
of the computation-based media which have made surveillance capitalism 
possible. Hansen argues that the micro-temporalities of computation 
applied to tracking and sensing contribute to a general sensibility that 
works below the level of perception as a condition for consciousness 
and predetermining its intentionality. What the ‘feed-forward’ creates 
is a continuum effect whereby the future is predicted and therefore 
within an order of probability pre-empted from a present in a way that is 
imperceptible to consciousness but available as probabilistically processed 
data which can be used to inform or to advertise towards future outcomes. 
It is not only that the possibilities are controlled for actualisation in certain 
directions, for example the financialised solutions to feeling bored, but 
that the future is to be constituted solely in the modality of possibility. This 
is the determination of futurity which enables its real subsumption – its 
abstraction and financialisation in advance as labour for capital – to be 
always already anticipated.
A new temporal dimension is added to the continuing saturation 
of boredom.66 Instead of a temporality of slowness and distention – 
Langeweile – as a withdrawal from the speed of modern time (as in 
Kracauer, Simmel, Benjamin and Heidegger), boredom becomes 
itself incorporated into sensibility subject to the micro-temporalities 
of computation. While Fordist boredom was something to be endured 
and could be relieved in social life outside the factory, there is no 
outside according to the topology of semio- and surveillance-capitalist 
boredom. If ‘profound boredom’ had to do with a withdrawal to 
potential, the aim of semio- and surveillance capitalism is to make sure 
all potential is reduced to possibilities that can be financialised, and 
therefore are abstracted and rendered interchangeable by means of big 
data and machine learning.
In such a situation, passing through boredom doesn’t lead 
anywhere else. In effect, boredom ceases to become a way of holding 
off depression, and becomes indistinguishable from it. The end is not 
transfiguration or redemption but exhaustion and collapse. That is one 
reason why we can no longer talk of a ‘great’ boredom. But that does not 
mean that boredom may not be directed at abstraction as such and its 
data-sanctioned possibilities, seemingly unlimited but beneath their 
apparent differences all the same, as in Benjamin’s version of the eternal 
return of the new. Perhaps to consider this a ‘great’ boredom would 
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be an evasion or a nostalgia, as if in such circumstances some kind of 
transfiguration could still be possible. Such an aspiration would be 
irresponsible given the injustices and ecological threats that exist today. 
In retrospect, it is possible to see the ‘great boredom’ as the last avatar of 
the sublime, but in the modality that Sianne Ngai calls ‘stuplimity’, where 
‘the initial experience of being aesthetically overwhelmed involves 
not terror or pain (eventually superseded by tranquility), but something 
much closer to an ordinary fatigue – and one that cannot be neutralized, 
like the sublime’s terror, by a competing affect’.67 If for Edmund Burke the 
aim of the sublime was to shake the subject up through a combination of 
pleasure and pain, or for Immanuel Kant to overwhelm the imagination 
for the sake of the transcendence of reason, boredom is more like a 
dulling, clogging inertia or the tedium of one thing after another.68 The 
failure is not so much a failure of the imagination to totalise as a 
diminishing of the energy to enumerate. While eschewing transcendence, 
the ‘great boredom’ served as a last hope that the experience of art can 
change us, if only through exhaustion. In the materialist comedy of 
its repetitions and falls, Ngai’s ‘stuplimity’ may provide what, quoting 
Gertrude Stein, she calls ‘a little resistance’.69 Even that expectation 
directed towards boredom now seems vain. Mark Fisher writes that:
It is certainly true that one could feel almost nostalgic for Boredom 
1.0. The dreary void of Sundays, the night hours after television 
stopped broadcasting, even the endless dragging minutes 
waiting in queues or for public transport: for anyone who has a 
smartphone, this empty time has now been effectively eliminated. 
In the intensive, 24/7 environment of capitalist cyberspace, the 
brain is no longer allowed any time to idle; instead, it is inundated 
with a seamless flow of low-level stimulus.70
The process of formal abstraction and real subsumption is continuous 
from the nineteenth-century factory system, but undergoes a series of 
ever more rapid quantum leaps with semiocapitalism in the 1980s and 
1990s, cognitive capitalism arising from the 1990s to the early 2000s, 
and surveillance capitalism from 2008, aiming to transform all of life 
to a source of surplus value.71 The increasing breadth and depth of 
abstraction lead from sign production and exchange to post-Fordist 
forms of work leading to precarity and the gig economy, and to the 
subsumption as labour of sociality, love and what would previously have 
been private life through forms of tracking via search, social media and 
sensing devices.
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These technologies produce data that is aggregated and subject 
to machine-learning algorithms, and they generate value through 
the application of a probability calculation to possibilities whereby the 
subject’s behaviour, including consumer choices, may be predicted. 
This enforces the idea of a person as a bundle of possibilities which may, 
given the appropriate data and analytical tools, be subject to calculation 
and prediction. The extension of the category of possibility as that which 
is predictable is therefore a condition for abstraction in the economic 
sense. The possibilities may even be considered to be infinite, as in the 
ideology that ‘you can be anything you want to be’. The category of 
possibility as it is used in this way needs to be distinguished from that of 
potentiality, a condition of being which, according to Giorgio Agamben’s 
reading of Aristotle and application of this to sovereignty, must involve 
the potentiality not to be, in other words contingency.72 There is no 
necessity, even to a degree, that a potential should be or occur, hence it is 
in principle not calculable. What if that which is boring results precisely 
from the reduction of potentiality to possibility? Boredom would then be 
the attempt to withdraw or regress from the possible in order to restore 
potentiality, through the potentiality not-to. If the distinction of potential 
from possibility is that potential always involves contingency, that is the 
potential to just as well not be, does the end of the ‘great boredom’ also 
mark the closure of the ‘profound’ boredom that is distinguished by a 
withdrawal to the potential not-to? Is it possible that after the end of the 
‘great boredom’, this relation to contingency might rather come to inhabit 
the ‘minor’ boredoms? Perhaps a ‘profound’ boredom can after all only be 
a ‘minor’ boredom, since it must also involve a non-relation with what 
makes it ‘profound’, that is, the relation to potential not-to, given that a 
simple relation would turn the very withdrawal in potential into a 
possibility that may be cashed out.
There is a danger, however, if potential is set in opposition to 
possibility, which is that the implied reserve becomes a matter of ‘clean 
hands’, of a potentiality that remains ‘pure’ and ‘full’ only by being 
insulated from actualisation. The possibilities are infinite only so long 
as they are withheld in potential which, as potential not-to, remains 
immeasurable, that is, prior to and beyond any calculus of probabilities. 
Thus the status of boredom oscillates between withdrawal into potential 
and hesitation before possibilities that will become determinate by being 
actualised. Chance is held up as a way of maintaining contingency 
in actualisation, as an alternative solution to the loss of potential in the 
predictability of possibilities.73 Boredom, as withdrawal from decision 
since all the possibilities are indifferent, is the obverse of undecidability. 
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Nineteenth-century ennui, associated with the dandy, involved an 
intense desire for sensations combined with a state of indifference 
marked by superiority over all the possibilities, none of which can be 
sufficiently beautiful or transformative.74 The hyper-discrimination 
between sensations of the bored aesthete is both a reflex against the 
subsumption of experience under abstraction, and a defence against 
being overwhelmed. What is desired, sensation, becomes a threat to the 
integrity and distance of the transcendental subject of perception and 
judgement. Boredom as a defence against the overwhelming could also, 
of course, be understood in terms of social relations.
If there is to be actual change, a limited possibility will have to be 
chosen and realised, including a possibility that may seem to be blocked 
and therefore ‘impossible’.75 In a fragment of Benjamin’s Arcades Project 
we read that ‘Boredom is a warm gray fabric lined on the inside with 
the most lustrous and colorful of silks. In this fabric we wrap ourselves 
when we dream. But the sleeper looks bored and gray within his 
sheath.’76 The potential that seems to inhere in the lining becomes 
boredom in actuality, and conversely the experience of boredom speaks 
Figure 10.6 Maybaby, What to Do when You’re Bored during Summer Break. Screenshot captured 
at 05:26. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yHt-jEZfVX8.
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of the lining in potentiality. But for change to occur, this potentiality 
would need to be limited to become a possibility, in which case the 
colourful silk would revert to prosaic grey, which is precisely the 
necessary condition of boring service of which David Foster Wallace 
writes in The Pale King. However, the process of the abstraction of 
experience as it is turned into data for the possibility of its appropriation 
as surplus value and corporate profit becomes a pre-empting of 
the conversion of potential – the lustrous lining of boredom – into the 
counter-possibility of a transformation that would interrupt this 
machine. We appear to be in a moment when the abstract (as formal 
relations of capitalist value extraction) has been allowed, as Finelli puts 
it, ‘to invade the concrete’77 with the result that everything becomes 
simultaneously attention-grabbing and boring, not in the ‘great’ sense of 
a duration endured for some kind of illumination, but with an endless, 
indefinite, low-level hum. Boredom, which could once have been a form 
of resistance, is returned into the cycle of repetition. As in all exploitation, 
what is appropriated, in the end, is time. However, the limits to and 
disastrous consequences of this expansion of the abstraction of labour 
and expropriation of experience are becoming increasingly clear. As 
the boredom of precarious labour that leads nowhere becomes more 
pervasive, boredom as an aesthetic stance comes to seem self-indulgent. 
What is in question is not stretching my time, but freeing the time of 
others, and that there be time at all.
Coda
If boredom is an affect that is epochal and in that respect an ‘attunement’, 
it will have been transformed under the impact of a genuine event. The 
Covid-19 pandemic, affecting all of mankind, is clearly such an event. To 
date boredom has been understood in psychological, existential and 
historical terms which are all human-centred. However, the pandemic 
both connects and displaces the human with respect to micro and 
macro temporalities, from the cellular and viral to the climatic and the 
anthropocene. What place can boredom have at these scales? 
The long stretches of lockdown have created new occasions for 
boredom, and also made explicit that the different kinds of boredom 
reflect social inequality, as they have done in the past, when the ennui of 
the monied is not the same as boredom with repetitive work. Generative 
boredom, if such can still occur, is the privilege of those who have the 
time and space for it. 
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By forcing people into isolation, or into tight ‘bubbles’, the 
circumstances of the pandemic bring to the fore that boredom, unlike 
for example shame, is not a social affect. What is shared, rather, is what 
alleviates it: banter, humour, gossip and storytelling. This alleviation is 
not the same as distraction because it has to do with the connection 
with others. If the ‘great boredom’ was supposed to be an orientation 
towards everything in the mode of negation or withdrawal, including 
from distraction, then the pandemic, socially divisive as it may be, 
changes both the relation to the whole and the experience of isolation. 
Boredom has always involved a problem with desire and the 
future. Today it encounters the way surveillance capitalism monetises 
anticipated behaviours and decisions, thereby pre-empting potentiality, 
including that held in reserve in supposed boredom. If, under the 
pandemic, languor, sadness or the daily struggle alternate with sheer 
panic, what then? Would boredom finally be revealed as the hither side 
of a different kind of connectedness?
Notes
 1 See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0mqO-xsRyTM.
 2 ‘Pour se jouer 840 fois de suite ce motif, il sera bon de se préparer au préalable, et dans le plus 
grand silence, par des immobilités sérieuses’ (quoted at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Vexations). See also Potter, Erik Satie, 139–44. Potter describes Vexations as a ‘a deformed 
chorale, a broken-down hymn tune’ (141) and she goes on to discuss the effect of stasis and the 
use of extreme repetition by Satie to empty expressive content.
 3 The work is in the collection of the Museum of Modern Art, New York. See their notes at 
https://www.moma.org/collection/works/303039#:~:text=Empire%20is%20an%20
epic%20black,Life%20Building%20in%20midtown%20Manhattan.
 4 ‘Art, considered in its highest vocation, is and remains for us a thing of the past [ein 
Vergangenes]. Thereby it has lost for us genuine truth and life, and has rather been transferred 
into our ideas instead of maintaining its earlier necessity in reality and occupying its higher 
place.’ Hegel, Aesthetics, 11. The lectures were delivered by Hegel in Heidelberg and Berlin 
between 1818 and 1829.
 5 ‘Absolute Knowing’ is the final stage in the journey of Geist or ‘Spirit’ in Hegel’s Phenomenology 
of Spirit. ‘The goal, Absolute Knowing, or Spirit that knows itself as Spirit, has for its path the 
recollection of the Spirits as they are in themselves and as they accomplish the organization of 
their realm.’ Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 493.
 6 ‘Well, the Phenomenology may be viewed, then, as the biography of world-spirit ….’ Royce, 
Lectures on Modern Idealism, 150.
 7 See Heidegger, ‘The question concerning technology’, in Basic Writings, 311–41. ‘The essential 
unfolding of technology threatens revealing, threatens it with the possibility that all revealing 
will be consumed in ordering and that everything will present itself only in the unconcealment 
of standing-reserve. Human activity can never directly counter this danger’ (339).
 8 From ‘First We Take Manhattan’ on the album I’m Your Man (1988): ‘They sentenced me to 
20 years of boredom / For tryin’ to change the system from within.’ The conference at which 
the first part of this essay was originally delivered was ‘20 Years of Boredom’, 16 December 
2017, Institute of Advanced Studies, UCL.
 9 For a prescient study of the use of distraction in politics, see Jamieson, Dirty Politics. 
For a genealogy of distraction, see North, The Problem of Distraction. On the digitisation of 
distraction see Pettman, Infinite Distraction.
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10 Heidegger, ‘The question concerning technology’, 340, quoting from Friedrich Hölderlin’s 
poem ‘Patmos’ (1802).
11 Given the pressures of funding combined with the justification through exhibition attendance 
numbers in public institutions.
12 Die Langeweile, which translates as ‘boredom’, is a compound of lange and Weile, ‘long 
while’, related to weilen, ‘to stay’, and verweilen, ‘to tarry’ or ‘to linger’: see Heidegger, The 
Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, 78. Karl Schenzer certainly tarried in the performance 
of Vexations. 
13 Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, 164–7.
14 Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, 171.
15 Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, 172. For an excellent discussion of these 
matters, see de Beistegui, Thinking with Heidegger, 61–80.
16 For this formulation, see Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 50, 74, 153. 
17 See Hatton, ‘Looping the loop’; Mulvey, Death 24 × a Second, 8, 101. 
18 Moravia, Boredom.
19 Phillips, On Kissing, Tickling and Being Bored, 80.
20 Phillips, On Kissing, Tickling and Being Bored, 77. 
21 See Srnicek, Platform Capitalism.
22 For the shift from studio to project-based approaches to art production, see Lauwaert, 
‘Changing artist’s practices’. 
23 See Heidegger, Being and Time, 184–88, 304–11.
24 See Day, ‘Candy Crush Saga’.
25 Bataille, The Accursed Share, vol. 1, 25–6 and 72–7.
26 Barthes, Travels in China, 27. See Badmington, ‘Bored with Barthes’, 317: ‘Tea breaks up the 
boredom, offers an alternative to ennui, by offering something “indirect” in the midst of the 
doxa, which is both direct and correct (in that it repeatedly confirms its own authorised 
account of life under Mao).’
27 For a discussion of désoeuvrement in Blanchot and others, see Iyer, ‘The workless community’.
28 See Bataille, ‘Letter to X’, on ‘unemployed negativity’. 
29 See Bataille, The Accursed Share, vol. 1, 27–77.
30 See the discussion of Beckett, together with Gertrude Stein and Kenneth Goldsmith, in the 
chapter on ‘stuplimity’ in Ngai, Ugly Feelings, 248–97.
31 See Hatton, ‘Looping the loop’.
32 Susan Morris spoke, in the conference on which this book is based, of the loop as ‘time on hold’.
33 de Beistegui, Thinking with Heidegger, 77.
34 Simmel, The Sociology of Georg Simmel, 410.
35 Simmel, The Sociology of Georg Simmel, 411.
36 Kracauer, The Mass Ornament, 304.
37 Benjamin, The Arcades Project, 118, quoting Hebel, Werke, 393.
38 Benjamin, Selected Writings, vol. 3, 149.
39 Quoted in Swenson, ‘What is pop art?’, 26. For Warhol and boredom, see Svendsen, 
A Philosophy of Boredom, 100–6; also Josh Cohen’s essay in this volume.
40 Andy Warhol quoted in Joseph, ‘The play of repetition’, 32.
41 Joseph, ‘The play of repetition’, claims that Warhol did attend the performance of Vexations 
organised by Cage, and that this affected the structure of repetition of Sleep. Comenas, 
‘Notes on John Cage’, argues convincingly that Warhol is very unlikely to have attended the 
performance. However, he knew about it, and probably thought that he should have been 
there, so whether he actually attended or not does not affect Joseph’s argument for a relation 
between Vexations and Sleep.
42 For semiocapitalism, see Baudrillard, For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign; Berardi, 
‘Cognitarian subjectivation’; and Berardi, Precarious Rhapsody. 
43 Joseph, ‘The play of repetition’, 38–41, has a detailed discussion of Cage’s disagreement with 
La Monte Young about repetition and boredom.
44 Higgins, ‘Boredom and danger’, 1.
45 Higgins, ‘Boredom and danger’, 2. Marcel Duchamp associated the artistic production 
of boredom with Happenings: ‘Happenings have introduced into art an element no one had 
put there: boredom. To do a thing in order to bore people is something I never imagined! 
And that’s too bad, because it’s a beautiful idea.’ Cited in Cabanne, Dialogues with Marcel 
Duchamp, 99.
tHE Long AnD tHE SHoRt of it 137
46 For boredom in Kierkegaard, see McDonald, ‘Kierkegaard’s demonic boredom’.
47 Wallace, The Pale King, 177: ‘I know that I wouldn’t understand this prior to entering the 
Service and seeing the bearing of some of the older examiners who spend all day for years at a 
desk or Tingle table, leaning forward to examine tax returns, primarily to identify those that 
should be audited. In other words, it’s the posture of someone whose daily work means sitting 
very still at a desk and working on something in a concentrated way for years on end.’
48 See Clare, ‘The politics of boredom’.
49 Wallace, The Pale King, 440.
50 Wallace, The Pale King, 233.
51 The distinction between the aesthetic and the ethical, and the focus on authorship and 
reading, of course suggests that the closest preceding account of boredom to Wallace’s is that 
of Kierkegaard.
52 Wallace, The Pale King, 548.
53 Wallace, The Pale King, 385. The novel is discussed in relation to acedia in Clare, ‘The politics 
of boredom’, and in Michael, ‘Pale king or noonday demon?’.
54 For depression and The Pale King see Cohen, Not Working (a book in which Cohen advocates 
for the benefits of idleness), 194–217. 
55 See Crary, 24/7.
56 Fisher, Capitalist Realism, 9; see also Fisher’s discussion of boredom in K-Punk, 57–61 and 
549–50, where he argues that the boredom of Fordist factory labour is associated by neoliberals 
with the ‘tedium’ of social democracy and stability, to be replaced by the anxiety correlating 
with precariousness, an anxiety that should be politicised rather than medicalised.
57 See Osborne, ‘The dreambird of experience’.
58 Finelli, ‘Abstraction versus contradiction’, 63.
59 Finelli, ‘Abstraction versus contradiction’, 64. Arguably both are present in all stages of 
capitalism, but that does not mean that they are not present in different relations and ratios.
60 Finelli, ‘Abstraction versus contradiction’, 66.
61 Finelli, ‘Abstraction versus contradiction’, 67.
62 Finelli, ‘Abstraction versus contradiction’, 68.
63 Phillips, On Kissing, Tickling and Being Bored, 72.
64 Hansen, Feed-Forward, 34 –81.
65 Kendall, ‘#boredwithmeg’.
66 Gardiner, ‘The multitude strikes back?’. This kind of boredom is anticipated in the boredom of 
saturation described in Klapp, Overload and Boredom.
67 Ngai, Ugly Feelings, 270.
68 Burke, A Philosophical Enquiry, 30–6; Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, 134.
69 Ngai, Ugly Feelings, 294.
70 Fisher, K-Punk, 549–50.
71 Zuboff, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism, 93–6.
72 For potential, see Agamben, Potentialities, 177–84, and on the relation of potential to boredom, 
Agamben, The Open, 63–70. 
73 This would enable us to understand better the transition from nineteenth-century ennui, 
for example in Baudelaire, via the indecision to cast the dice in Mallarmé’s Igitur, which 
references Hamlet, to the casting of ‘A throw of the dice will never abolish chance’, which 
expresses the desire to maintain potential despite the actualisation of the possibility in the 
number produced by the thrown dice. For a discussion of this see Meillassoux, The Number and 
the Siren. 
74 The supreme exemplification of this would be Huysmans, Against Nature.
75 Fisher, Capitalist Realism, 17: ‘Emancipatory politics must always destroy the appearance 
of a “natural order”, must reveal what is presented as necessary and inevitable to be a 
mere contingency, just as it must make what was previously deemed to be impossible seem 
attainable.’
76 Benjamin, The Arcades Project, 105.
77 Finelli, ‘Abstraction versus contradiction’, 66.
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What do we mean when we say that we are bored? Or when we find a subject 
boring? Contributors to On Boredom: Essays in art and writing, which include artists, 
art historians, psychoanalysts and a novelist, examine boredom in its manifold and 
uncertain reality. Each part of the book takes up a crucial moment in the history of 
boredom and presents it in a new light, taking the reader from the trials of the consulting 
room to the experience of hysteria in the nineteenth century. The book pays particular 
attention to boredom’s relationship with the sudden and rapid advances in technology 
that have occurred in recent decades, specifically technologies of communication, 
surveillance and automation.
On Boredom is idiosyncratic for its combination of image and text, and the artworks 
included in its pages – by Mathew Hale, Martin Creed and Susan Morris – help turn 
this volume into a material expression of boredom itself. With other contributions from 
Josh Cohen, Briony Fer, Anouchka Grose, Rye Dag Holmboe, Margaret Iversen,  
Tom McCarthy and Michael Newman, the book will appeal to readers in the fields  
of art history, literature, cultural studies and visual culture, from undergraduate students 
to professional artists working in new media.
Rye Dag Holmboe is currently Leverhulme Early Career Fellow at UEA, where his 
research examines the relationship between creative process and psychoanalysis. 
Holmboe has published books on contemporary artists as well as articles on art, 
literature and theory. 
Susan Morris is an artist interested in the relation between automatic drawing, writing 
and photography. Recent essay writing includes ‘Drawing in the Dark’ for Tate Papers 
No. 18, 2012, and ‘A Day’s Work’, for the eponymous exhibition she curated for SKK 
Soest, Germany, in 2019.
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